The Impact of Presentence Investigations on Plea Bargained Dispositions in Kings County Supreme Court by Enright, Joseph G
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
1987 
The Impact of Presentence Investigations on Plea Bargained 
Dispositions in Kings County Supreme Court 
Joseph G. Enright 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2210 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
INFORMATION TO USERS
While the most advanced technology has been used to 
photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of 
the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of 
the material submitted. For example:
•  Manuscript pages may have indistinct print. In such 
cases, the best available copy has been filmed.
•  M anuscripts may not always be complete. In such 
cases, a note will indicate that it is not possible to 
obtain missing pages.
•  Copyrighted material may have been removed from 
the manuscript. In such cases, a note will indicate the 
deletion.
Oversize m aterials (e.g., maps, drawings, and charts) are 
photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is 
also film ed as one exposure and  is av a ilab le , for an 
additional charge, as a standard 35mm slide or as a 17”x 23” 
black and white photographic print.
Most pho to g rap h s reproduce accep tab ly  on positive 
microfilm or microfiche but lack the clarity on xerographic 
copies made from the microfilm. For an additional charge, 
35mm slides of 6”x 9” black and white photographic prints 
are available for any photographs or illustrations th a t 
cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography.

8713757
E n r i g h t ,  J o s e p h  G e r a r d
THE IMPACT O F PR ESEN TEN C E INVESTIGATIONS ON PLEA BARGAINED 
DISPOSITIONS IN KINGS COUNTY SUPREM E COURT
Ci ty Un i ve rs i t y  o f  Ne w York  Ph.D. 1987
University 
Microfilms
International 300 N. Z eeb Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106

THE IMPACT OF PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS ON 
PLEA BARGAINED DISPOSITIONS IN KINGS COUNTY SUPRB1E COURT
by
JOSEPH G. ENRIGHT
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
The City University of New York.
1987
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate 
Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the 
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy.
Date 1 Chair of Examining Committee
f l e n & a W , . IS&7
' Date Executive Officer
Alexander B. Smith. Ph.D.
Carl Wiedemann. Ph.D. 
Supervisory Committee




THE IMPACT OF PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS ON PLEA BARGAINED 
DISPOSITIONS IN KINGS COUNTY SUPREME COURT
Adviser: Professor Harriet Pollack, Ph.D.
This study examines the presentence function of probation 
from an historical and empirical perspective which argues that the 
purported diminution of the role of the presentence report (PSR) in 
the sentencing process--as a result of sentence bargaining--is more 
reflective of a prevailing disenchantment with the rehabilitative 
ideal than any thoroughly considered, reliable validation of the PSR's 
dispensibility. It is demonstrated, through a review of the 
literature, that poorly conceived, polemically biased empirical 
research has helped to perpetuate the notion that these reports have 
little value. A survey of studies and inquiries conducted in New York 
over the past twenty years highlights this argument.
PSRs, formerly considered an "enlightened" fulcrum for the 
ameliorating correctional and sentencing reforms of the Progressive 
era, eventually were linked to the potential and/or actual abuses of 
indeterminate sentencing schemes by civil libertarians (concerned with 
sentencing disparity) and anti-positivist criminologists (critical of 
rehabilitation-directed correctional theory and practice). Such 
arguments, absent any sustained or substantive rebuttal from the
probation community, bolstered executive branch efforts to scapegoat 
the judiciary and gain more control over an instrument potentially 
regulative of jail/prison intake during an era of chronic overcrowding 
and attendant federal court intervention.
The author's own study of a random sample of PSRs from Kings 
County Supreme Court in New York City finds considerable evidence for 
the proposition that PSRs account for a significant proportion of the 
observed variance between sentence promised and sentence imposed.
Path analysis finds that the custodial status has the most effect on 
the plea bargain and the recommendation of the probation officer, but 
the latter is the single most important predictor of the eventual 
disposition. Further analysis suggests that PSRs containing the most 
relevant information are more likely to result in amendments of the 
sentence bargain, while perfunctory reports are most likely merely to 
endorse the sentence already promised.
An examination of reaction to a recent attempt to evxo»_erate 
the PSR's content in New York lends further support to this study's 
hypothesis that presentence reports have much more utility in the 
criminal justice system than the revisionist literature suggests.
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INTRODUCTION
In his history of the American criminal justice system, 
Samuel Walker identifies three distinct cycles of correctional 
reform: the last cycle commenced "slowly in the 1930s, reached its 
peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then collapsed suddenly 
after 1971." Walker further notes that "the concept of 
rehabilitation, of individualized correctional treatment, has 
energized each of the great reform cycles."1 Although Walker 
virtually ignores it--there is no reference to probation at all in 
his survey of the past four decades--one of the major developments in 
criminal jurisprudence during the period, 1930-1971, was the 
widespread adoption of the presentence report as the cornerstone 
instrument of individualized justice throughout the English speaking 
world. In a sense, presentence investigations (PSIs), which 
resulted in presentence reports (PSRs)2 written by probation
1Samuel Walker, Popular Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), pTo3
2"PSI" connotes the investigative process conducted by the 
P.O. (researching police, prosecutorial and court records; 
interviewing defendants, their families and complainants; and 
obtaining financial, educational and medical verification of 
defendants' backrounds). "PSR" refers to the actual document 
summarizing the foregoing data, including a recommendation as to 
sentence, which is submitted to the court. For the sake of 
consistency, I have used the unhyphenated spelling of "presentence" 
throughout, except for footnote and bibliographical references to 
titles which contain the common earlier usage, "pre-sentence."
1
2
officers (P.O.'s), had become living embodiments of the rehabilita­
tive ideal. By supposedly allowing courts and correctional 
authorities to gear punishment to the particular offender--by 
considering his "social circumstances," his criminal history and his 
crime--rather than simply and classically to let the punishment fit 
the crime, the presentence report came to be seen by correctional 
theorists and practitioners as the diagnostic stage in a carefully 
orchestrated course of treatment.
This rehabilitative ideal promised much more than it could 
ever have hoped to deliver. But it is instructive to note that the 
withering bombardment which the "medical model" has suffered during 
the past decade, with the principal targets comprising what some 
critics have dubbed an "unholy trinity" of probation, parole and the 
indeterminate sentence, is very much reminiscent of earlier 
criticisms of the correctional components of the criminal justice 
system which marked the "Roaring Twenties," a decade similarly beset 
by public anxiety over "crime waves." It is the intention of this 
dissertation to demonstrate that the present low esteem in which the 
presentence report is held was not only an inevitable by-product of 
the last "great reform cycle" of corrections, but also the result of 
the reactive nature of probation's function within a criminal justice 
system that underwent rapid change in the I960's.
Chapter I will provide an extensive historical overview and 
analysis of this shift. In it I will trace the presentence report's 
evolution from the sine qua non of progressive correctional practice 
and the indispensible mechanism which allowed the sentencing judge
3
to mete out individualized justice, to its present embattled status.
I will show how dissatisfaction with sentencing disparity and with 
the rehabilitative concepts of the Progressive era which has informed 
correctional practice and theory throughout most of this century, 
prompted critics of widely divergent ideological and criminological 
viewpoints to attack the PSR on two fronts. Those concerned with 
checking the power of deviance processing agents pointed to the lack 
of scrutiny of probation officers' decision making--arguing that 
P.O.'s have too much unchecked discretion--while governmental 
commissions, court administrators, and those scholars of bureaucratic 
and organizational determinants of criminal justice system operations 
and workflow advanced arguments revolving around the unfocused 
quality of the PSR and labeled its accompanying recommendation an 
exercise in futility because of the prevalence of sentence bargaining.
In Chapter II, previous empirical studies of the impact of 
the presentence report are examined. Most are found wanting, 
partially because of methodological errors, but also because of the 
narrowness of their focus, indeed their preoccupation, with the 
congruence (or lack of it) between the presentence investigator's 
recommendation and the eventual sentence.
In Chapter III, the logical inconsistencies evident among the 
critics of the presentence report are shown to be particularly 
evident in New York, where inquiries conducted by municipal and state 
ad hoc commissions empanelled by executives and legislators concerned 
about the administration of justice have generally repeated the
condemnations of previous surveyors of the PSR, who in turn relied on 
secondary sources of dubious validity. Glaring by its abscence in 
most of these studies is any critical assessment of the forces
underlying chronic court and correctional underfunding, or the impact
of prosecutorial policies on the justice system.
As described more fully in Chapter IV, an empirical study 
which replicates the methodology of the more salient research noted 
in the literature was conducted in a state court--Kings County 
Supreme Court in Brooklyn--to answer the following questions: 1)
Does the PSR have a significant impact on sentencing? 2) Are there 
other factors equally influential in sentencing? 3) Is the quality 
of a PSR an important factor in determining its impact? Through 
statistical and content analysis of 340 randomly selected PSR's, I 
attempt to determine whether the PSR, out of more than 40 other 
observed independent variables, has the most significant impact on 
sentencing. My findings are presented in Chapter V.
As governmental scrutiny of PSR's in New York City and New
York State became increasingly critical of a perceived diminution of 
their quality and importance, the focus shifted from streamlining 
their content and making them more uniform (pursuant to a loss of 
faith in rehabilitation and a desire to reduce disparity) to an 
emphasis on client-specific sentencing programs. The latter trend 
can be viewed as a means of promoting more active alternatives to 
incarceration (day-fines, restitution, comnunity service, etc.) among 
a citizenry grown weary of unsupervised probationers but unmoved by
political appeals to solve endemic correctional overcrowding by 
funding prison building programs. These issues will be explored in 
Chapter VI against a backdrop of the 1981 PSI speed-up in New York 
City, which brought into focus judicial resistance to attempted 
executive devaluation of the PSR.
The importance of this study is underscored by similar 
chronic overcrowding of correctional facilities throughout the United 
States since the 1970's. And it is also germ •“ to the ancillary 
debates involving the efficacy of identifying and targeting career 
criminals for scarce prison resources on the one hand, and selecting 
the best candidates for alternatives to incarceration programs on the 
other.
Indeed, most probation agencies assign the majority of their 
staff to the production of presentence reports because of the concern 
of municipal executives to reduce or prevent overcrowding of 
detention populations. The timely submission of these reports speeds 
sentencing, which in turn allows for prompt transfer of prison-bound 
detainees to the state correctional system and the immediate release 
of other detainees sentenced to community supervision. These 
outcomes, which can reduce the jail population dramatically if the 
time period separating conviction date from sentence date can be 
shortened, depend heavily on the prompt submission of PSR's.
Probation administrators' performance in jurisdictions suffering from 
jail overcrowding is thus most likely to be judged on their ability 
to deal efficiently with the constant perturbations in the PSI 
workload generated by judicial and prosecutorial case processing--
which in turn is a by-product of arrest/indictment rates. Knowing 
which components of the PSR are most important to the court and which 
are most relevant to arriving at a strongly buttressed sentencing 
recommendation are therefore essential ingredients for successful 
probation management in times of crisis. What data can be 
streamlined? What data can be omitted? How can essential data be 
obtained more quickly? These are questions not easily answered absent 
any thorough assessment of the PSR's impact on sentencing.
If, however, the PSR can be shown to have little impact on 
sentencing decisions, regardless of the quality of the report, pro 
forma PSR's satisfying only the statutory minimum requirements are 
given such greater justification. The implications for probation 
staffing and management goal setting are, in either eventuality, 
crucial. Should the often argued contention that PSR's have little 
impact on judges' decision-making be borne out by this dissertation, 
the implications for probation would appear to be evident: a 
deemphasis on the preparation of presentence reports and a 
concentration on supervision. Since probation presently (and 
traditionally) regards presentence investigations as its primary 
function, this would mean a pronounced shift in policy.
On the other hand, a detailed analysis of the data might 
reveal that presentence reports have much more influence than generally 
believed. In which case future research might better address itself 
to the truly ethical questions related to criminal sentencing instead 
of concentrating so narrowly on bureaucratic exigencies.
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TIE PRESENTENCE REPORT
The Origins of The Presentence Report 
The court process we have come to know as probation originated 
in large urban centers (Boston and London), where judges presumably 
had limited knowledge of the social and criminal background of 
defendants before the bar, unlike rural areas, where informal 
knowledge of the accused and available familial and community 
resources might have obviated any need for a probation officer. By 
extension, probation itself could thus be interpreted, like the first 
appearance of urban police departments in the 1830's and 1840's, as an 
instrument of expanded social control, in this case by empowering 
others to literally serve as the "eyes and ears" of the court in an 
increasingly anonymous urban environment.*
The "Father of Probation," John Augustus, placed great stress 
on the probationer selection process when he began approaching young 
alcoholics in Boston courtrooms in 1848 to determine their interest in 
reforming under his supervision. Thus, his cursory background checks 
of probation candidates could be considered the first presentence
*The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, "The 
Selective Pre-Sentence Report," Federal Probation 38 (December 1974): 
47-54. Also see John Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1971).
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investigations. "Great care was observed," Augustus wrote in his 
Journal, "to ascertain whether the prisoners were promising subjects 
for probation, and to this end it was necessary to take into considera­
tion the previous character of the person, his age, and the influences 
by which he would in future be likely to be surrounded."1 Despite 
the care he exercised in selecting his "caseload," and despite his 
reported success, John Augustus' innovation did not take immediate 
root. In fact, the adoption of probation and other reforms, such as 
parole, the reformatory and the indeterminate sentence was very slow 
indeed until the first two decades of this century, when the United 
States criminal justice system began to experience an extraordinary 
revolution in its correctional component. Whereas in 1900, only six 
states had salaried probation officers, by 1919, 34 states had 
developed probation staffs.2 Similarly, in 1900, indeterminate 
sentence laws held sway in only five states, but during the next 20 
years 31 other states enacted statutes which effectively transferred 
from a court to an administrative authority the power to determine
Ijohn Augustus, First Probation Officer (New York: The 
Probation Association, 1939), p. 34. This was a reprint of Augustus' 
Journal, first published in 1552.
2Edwin H. Sutherland and C.E. Gehlke, "Crime and 
Punishment," in Recent Social Trends in the United States, edited by 
the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1933), p. 1156. People Ex Rel. Forsyth v. Court of 
Sessions of Monroe County, 141 tf.Y. 288 (1894) provided the final 
judicial benediction needed to formalize probation by establishing 
that the "power to suspend sentence is inherent in every court having 
criminal jurisdiction." See Sandra Shane-DuBrow, Alice P. Brown, and 
Erik Olsen, Sentencing Reform in the United States: History, Content
and Effect (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. 
Department of Justice, 1985), p. 6.
what portion of an imposed sentence would actually be served.
Finally, by 1900, parole laws had been passed in only 12 states, but 
by 1920, there were 40 states which had embraced parole supervision.1 
It was during this halcyon era of penological reform that 
probation threw off its informal, volunteer trappings and began to 
produce written reports, handbooks, regulations and a body of 
literature.^ The new field's theoretical underpinnings were greatly 
influenced by the emerging disciplines of sociology and psychology, as 
embodied in that new figure in the urban landscape--the social 
worker. Thus, in tracing the development of presentence investiga­
tions, Robert Carter identifies William Healy's "Juvenile Psychopathic 
Clinic," established in Chicago in 1910, as the logical starting 
point.^ Healy cried out for accurate "diagnosis" of the offender as 
a prerequisite for "treatment," and in his seminal 1915 text, The 
Individual Delinquent, he specified eleven different areas for the 
youth worker to investigate as a means of pinpointing the cause of the
^Sutherland and Gehlke, "Crime and Punishment," p. 1156.
^"Originally the probation officer submitted orally to the 
judge information used for screening candidates for probation. With 
the expansion of probation, this process became formalized and written 
reports were prepared." From "Probation: National Standards and
Goals," in Corrections: National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals (.Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973), p. 324.
^Robert Carter, The Pre-Sentence Report Hardbook 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978J, p. 3. The first 
juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899, an institution 
which also helped spur probation's adoption, since 30 states first 
established probation bureaus or "clinics" as an integral part of 
juvenile court procedure. See New York State Division of Probation, 
Manual for Probation Officers in New York State, 6th edition (Great 
Meadow Correctional Institution, I960), p. 1U1.
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delinquency.1 Carter also cites Mary Richmond's Social Diagnosis 
(1917), addressed to social workers as well, which called for exact 
definitions of a client's personality and social background, as an early 
influence in determining the content and structure of PSR's.2
Since the presentence report was initially developed by 
probation officers who emerged from a background in social work, these 
early reports emphasized "a social work model that involved strong 
emphasis on the person's life history."-* The medical model 
orientation of probation's pioneers helps to explain not only the 
shaping of the content of the presentence reports themselves, but also 
accounts for the structuring of the entire probation bureaucracy as 
well. For just as medicine clearly separates diagnosis and treatment 
both chronologically and procedurally, so did probation adopt the same 
division. It was Edwin J. Cooley, director of a demonstration project 
in New York City's Court of General Sessions, who pioneered the 
fundamental dichotomy in probation organization in 1925, when he 
divided the probation staff under his direction into the "Investigative 
Corps and Supervision Corps.'"1 By the same token, Cooley's 
influential prescription for the presentence report divided the 
document into a legal history and a social history, with a concluding 
"diagnosis" of the offender integrating all that preceded it.^
As probation's popularity grew, enshrining the "casework
1Ibid. 2Ibid., pp. 3-4.
^National Advisory Committee, Corrections, p. 325.
“̂Carter, The Pre-Sentence Handbook, p. 4. 5n)id-
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method"! 0f the social scientist in its practices, initial resistance 
to this ameliorating reform of the criminal law faded and then was 
revived in the early 1920's, when a perception of increased 
lawlessness after the lull of the war years precipitated a backlash 
against the liberalizing reforms which lasted well into the Great 
Depression. Thus, the dean of American criminologists, Edwin H. 
Sutherland, in a 1933 survey of the criminal justice system 
commissioned by the federal government, found that during the decade, 
1917-1927, there was a discernible shift in favor of "longer prison 
sentences, increased use of the death penalty and more opposition to 
the trend towards humane treatment of the criminal (probation, parole, 
the indeterminate sentence, as well as improvements in the condition 
of prison life)."2 New York provides us with an excellent example 
of this trend.
In 1926, New York's Baumes Commission, responding to public 
concern about crime, particularly in New York City, recommended a 
series of draconian measures to the State Legislature, which speedily 
enacted them. The new laws all but eliminated the indeterminate 
philosophy in sentencing, their authors arguing that since 
"criminology, psychiatry, psychology and sociology have not yet become 
exact sciences...adoption of the theory that all criminals are sick
iThis method "assumes that if knowledge can be acquired of 
all the facts about an offender, the cause of his criminality can be 
discovered and a course of corrections determined." From "The 
Selective Pre-Sentence Report," p. 49.
Sutherland and Gehlke, "Crime and Punishment," p. 1156.
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would not remedy the (crime) situation."1 Other crime commissions 
in other states came to similar conclusions as public officials "tried 
to limit the discretion of court and correctional personnel in the 
administration of indeterminate sentences, probation and parole."2
Raymond Moley, one of the foremost political scientists of his 
time, who was later to become a member of the "New Deal" inner sanctum 
seemed to have the Baumes Laws in mind when he wrote in 1930, after 
studying New York's criminal courts: "If the limitations of 
legislation were frankly recognized and sufficient discretion given to 
someone to insure that the infinitely varied human types of conduct 
which fall within the confines of the criminal law would be subjected 
to more equal determination, justice in its most enlightened sense 
could be more definitely achieved."-*
Moley's argument seemed prescient when a later commission 
found that, instead of deterring crime, the Baumes Laws served only to 
make judges, juries and prosecutors work harder to find legal 
loopholes to circumvent their harshness. In fact, the legacy of the 
Baumes Laws was a decrease in the number of defendants sentenced to 
state prison during years of rising crime rates. Accordingly, the
JNew York State Crime Commission ("The Baumes Commission"), 
Report, New York State Legislative Document No. 99 (1929), pp. 10-11.
2Nathan Couthit, "Police Professionalism and the War Against 
Crime in the United States, 1920's and 1930's," in Police Forces in 
History, George L. Mosse, editor (London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 
321. See also, John Pfiffner, "The Activities and Results of Crime 
Surveys," American Political Science Review 23 (November 1929): 930-55.
^Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts (New York: Minton, Balch 
$ Co., 1930), p. 174.
13
Lewisohn Commission of 1932 restored the indeterminate sentence for 
all felonies except murder.1
President Hoover's Crime Commission, in its 1931 report (the 
"Wickersham Commission") also countered the drift toward repression 
when it demonstrated with telling effect the final result of an 
unbridled "war against crime: "police illegality in arrest, 
interrogation and detention.2 Although the Great Depression added 
a further impetus to undercut correctional programs in an era of 
chronic municipal funding shortages, dissatisfaction with what J.
Edgar Hoover dubbed the "cream-puff school of criminology" eased as 
public concern over crime rates leveled off and receded.-*
During World War II, the rehabilitative ideal once again began 
to gather steam, abetted by the country's need for manpower (convict 
or not), by a decrease in social anomie occasioned by the national 
unity on behalf of the war effort, and by the conscription of the most 
delinquency-prone segment of the population. Lingering unease over 
the concept of imprisonment in the aftermath of the totalitarian 
barbarities perpetrated in Europe, coupled with the general elevation
iCommission to Investigate Prison Administration and 
Construction ("The Lewisohn Commission"), Prisoners: Their Crimes and 
Sentences, Special Report to the New York State Legislature (Albany, 
19^3), p. 54.
2The United States National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931).
\j. Edgar Hoover's speech of November 9, 1937, "Crime's 
Challenge to Society," reported in Couthit's "Police Professionalism 
and tne War Against Crime," p. 315. Hoover was fond of telling his 
audiences that he was a member of the "machine gun school of 
criminology."
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of the standard of living in the post-war era ushered in what appears 
to have been a golden age of huraanitarianism in correctional 
history.^ Such an atmosphere stands in marked contrast to the
decade following World War I, but it is reminiscent of post-Civil War
America when correctional philosophy entered the reformatory era and 
gave birth to parble, the indeterminate sentence and "the belief that 
the way to succeed was through education.In much the same way 
the 1950's saw the widespread use of group therapy in corrections, the 
rise of halfway houses, work and study release, therapeutic 
communities and a generally favorable acceptance of probation and 
parole among policy makers and the public. Thus, by 1954, every state 
except Mississippi had institutionalized probation as part of its 
sentencing structure.^
The Ascendancy of the Presentence Report
As probation, parole and the indeterminate sentence became
fixed in the post-war correctional firmament, the presentence report 
came to occupy a sanctified position, since it provided the 
philosophical justification for all three practices. Raymond Moley 
appears to have been one of the first to recognize the key position 
which the presentence function of probation had assumed in the
!charles Silberman, Criminal Justice, Criminal Violence (New 
York: Random House, 1978), p. 30.
^William E. Amos, "The Philosophy of Corrections:
Revisited," in An Introduction to the Federal Probation System 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976J, p. N-l.
^Shane-Dubrow, Brown and Olsen, Sentencing Reform, p.6.
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sentencing process: "Probation has come to mean much more than a 
method of supervising persons...Its more important function is to 
provide for many courts a species of intelligence service. It studies 
the prisoner at the bar...and when the court finds it necessary to 
pass judgment upon him, is able to provide intelligent information and 
advice upon which to base the decision."*
Not only were these reports assisting judges, they were also 
forwarded to prison officials, parole boards and the line offices in 
parole and probation. Thus, "the investigation report," wrote Edmund 
Fitzgerald in 1956 (then Chief Probation Officer in Kings County Court 
in New York City), "had come to be the repository for all biographical 
data needed not only for supervision...but also for planning and 
executing rehabilitative programs for offenders committed to 
prisons." Reflecting the still dominant medical model orientation of 
his field, Fitzgerald concluded that "the investigation (diagnostic) 
process has become as important as the rehabilitation (treatment) 
process. It is, in fact, of greater importance, since it is the 
bedrock of treatment. Quantitatively, it is now the most significant 
part of all probation work."^
The Supreme Court's validation of the presentence investiga­
tion as having "high value" for "conscientious judges who want to 
sentence persons on the best available information, rather than on
*Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts, p. 158.
2Edmund Fitzgerald, "The Pre-Sentence Investigation,"
National Probation and Parole Association Journal, no. 2 (1956), p. 
JIT.---------------------------------
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guesswork and inadequate information" in its 1949 decision,
Williams v. New York, provided the most important impramatur for the 
individualized style of criminal jurisprudence and correctional 
practice that would reign during the following two decades.1 
Briefly, in Williams the Court held that a defendant convicted of 
murder could be sentenced to death despite a jury's non-binding 
recommendation for a non-capital sanction (life imprisonment), based 
on material independently gathered by the probation officer from 
police and other sources which linked the defendant to numerous other 
crimes and found him to be possessed of a "morbid sexuality".
Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black noted that the 
officer investigating the convicted before the bar was not motivated 
by a zealous desire to root out unfavorable information about the 
subject because probation officers "have not been trained to prosecute 
but to aid offenders.Thus did the Supreme Court unwittingly 
provide the legalistic underpinnings for rehabilitative excess. For 
although Black correctly observed that "retribution is no longer the 
dominant objective of the criminal law" and that "reformation and 
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal 
jurisprudence,"^ he erred in assuming that due process concerns over 
the presentence investigation were misplaced simply because of the 
professionalism of the investigators:
Ŵilliams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), at p. 249.
^Ibid. ^Ibid., at p. 248.
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Undoubtedly, the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modem 
philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender 
and not merely the crime....For indeterminate sentences and 
probation have resulted in an increase in the discretionary powers 
exercised in fixing punishments. In general, these modem changes 
have not resulted in making the lot of offenders harder. On the 
contrary a strong motivating force for the changes has been the 
belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of 
convicted offenders, many could be less severely punished and 
restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship. This 
belief to a large extent has been justified. (Underscoring 
added.)*
While agreeing with the majority opinion "as to the value and 
humaneness of liberal use of probation reports as developed by modern 
penologists," Justice Murphy dissented. Since the damaging material 
upon which sentencing was based "would concededly not have been 
admissable at the trial, and was not subject to examination by the 
defendant," Murphy argued that "the high demands of due process were 
not obeyed.Even Black allowed that "broad discretionary 
power...susceptible of abuse can result from a sentencing judge's 
reliance on out-of-court information," but eschewed "a requirement of 
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence" in assessing 
punishment.^
^Ibid. 2Ibid., at p. 250. ^Ibid., at p. 249
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The abuse which unscrutinized discretion can sometimes 
engender in bureaucracies left to police themselves is illustrated by 
the "treatment" afforded a defendant who was convicted of robbery in 
the same court which had sentenced Williams four years earlier. This 
defendant, who came to my attention as the subject of a PSI conducted 
a quarter of a century later in Brooklyn Supreme Court, was ordered to 
undergo a psychiatric evaluation as an aid to sentence following a 
jury conviction in 1953. In a letter contained in the case file, 
addressed to the investigating probation officer by the examining 
psychiatrist at Kings County Hospital, the defendant is described as 
continuing to maintain his innocence. The psychiatrist then writes: 
"He was given Sodium Amytal [a "truth serum" drug usually administered 
intravenously] and interviewed while under [the influence of] this 
drug. He continued to protest his innocence...He admits that he 
indulges in alchohol to excess at times and states he was drinking 
when he got into this present difficulty."1
Although Black's major concern in exempting out-of-court 
material from adversarial review was to prevent a time consuming 
re-trial of collateral issues at the sentencing stage, the inference 
in Williams--that due process safeguards placed unnecessary limits on 
the rehabilitative efforts of social workers (and also by extension 
upon the discretion of judges)--helped to usher in an era of 
correctional supremacy. In much the same way that probation, parole
1Letter dated 23 May 1953 contained in N.Y.C. Probation 
Department case file KS82-04199.
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and indeterminacy had first swept the country in the early part of the 
century, now maximum discretion in the post-conviction stage was 
legislatively enthroned, reaching its full glory in states such as 
California where (until sentencing reform in 1976 toppled it) "one of 
the most extreme forms" of indeterminacy permitted sentences of one 
day to life for even relatively minor offenses.1
Although indeterminacy, like its handmaiden, parole, arose out 
of a desire for prison reform in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, its use first became widespread in the United States during 
the 1930s ("given nearly irresistible impetus by the rise of the new 
social sciences, such as psychiatry and social work"),2 until, "by 
the 1960s, every state of the nation had an indeterminate sentencing 
structure of some variation."-* And the increased discretion which 
the indeterminate sentence bestowed upon judges rendered the 
presentence report just as important to distant wardens and parole 
commissioners as the essential repository of legal and social data to 
be consulted at each decision-making stage in administering the 
imposed sentence.
Thus by 1965, which Carter identifies as the high water mark 
for the presentence report,^ the rehabilitative ideal had become
1Shane-DuBrow, Brown and Olsen, Sentencing Reform, p. 33.
2The Executive Advisory Committee on Sentencing ("The 
Morgenthau Committee"), Crime and Punishment in New York: An Inquiry 
Into Sentencing and the Criminal Justice System (Albany, New York, 
March 19?9), pT 14.
%hane-DuBrow, Brown and Olsen, Sentencing Reform, p. 6.
4Robert Carter, The Pre-Sentence Report Handbook, pp. 5-6.
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entrenched in our criminal law, in the courts and in corrections:
Much as the precise mix of Bible reading and hard labor necessary 
to achieve reformation had occupied the attention of reformers a 
century earlier, correctional personnel now debated the problems 
of diagnosis and formulation of treatment plans. Criticism of the 
correctional and sentencing system did not question the 
assumptions...but focused exclusively upon the need for more 
resources and better therapeutic techniques.*
The Eclipse of the Rehabilitative Ideal
Within ten years, this consensus had not only fallen apart, 
but in some states probation, parole and the indeterminate sentence 
once again faced abolition. What happened? First, the unpredicted 
crime wave which suddenly commenced in the mid-1960s undoubtedly 
played a key part in spreading dissatisfaction with the system, just 
as spiraling crime rates did in the 1920s. But now the opposition no 
longer consisted of polical and law enforcement spokesmen such as 
Edward Simons^ or J. Edgar Hoover, but respected scholars, legal 
historians and correctional administrators themselves. Secondly, it 
would appear that the sheer numbers of offenders which now engulfed 
the courts and prisons dramatized the need for judgments based on more
1Morgenthau Committee, Crime and Punishment in New York, p.
14.
2As President of the Chicago Crime Commission in 1920,
Simons blamed better prison conditions, as well as probation and 
parole, for the crime increase. See his article, "Fighting Crime in 
Chicago," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 11 (May 1920): 22.
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rational, equitable and expeditious procedures. The traditional 
reliance on ill-defined, subjective, decision-making came to be seen 
as rooted in times more conducive to unpressurized scrutiny of 
offenders: in short, the "careful study" conducted by a probation 
officer came to be viewed as a luxury. Thirdly, the Warren and Burger 
Courts' extension of due process protection to the post-conviction 
stage, combined with an emerging prisoner rights movement, focused 
interest for the first time on sentencing disparity and the rights of 
the convicted.*
Perhaps the first cracks in the foundation of the presentence 
report were detected by the "San Francisco Project" of the mid-1960s. 
Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, among others, conducted the first 
empirical study of the presentence investigation in northern 
California's federal courts and began to identify what would become 
seminal issues in the coming debate. The utility of gathering so much 
information on the accused (at the time of this study, the federal 
presentence report was organized into 16 separate sections)^ was 
seriously questioned by their finding that so much of the information 
figured not at all in the sentence recommendation.^ The Project's 
finding that P.O.'s used very little information in selecting a 
recommendation was based on a study of 14 P.O.'s and five PSRs, one
^Alexander B. Smith and Harriet Pollack, Criminal Justice:
An Overview (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), pp. 211-33.
^Robert Carter, The Pre-Sentence Handbook, p. 5.
Joseph D. Lohman, Albert Wahl, and Robert M. Carter, 
Decision-Making and the Probation Officer: The Presentence 
Investigation Tberkeley: University of California, June 1966), p. 16.
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of which was described as a clear cut probation case and the other an 
open-and-shut imprisonment case, which led to later criticism that "to 
generalize about levels of information usage on the basis of five 
cases from a universe of thousands is indefensible."* I will 
examine the San Francisco Project at greater length in Chapter III.
It will suffice to note here that the importance of the PSR was, by 
extension, diminished by the finding that the judge uses the same data 
triumvirate as the probation officer in making nearly all of his 
decisions: namely, the seriousness of the crime, the prior criminal 
record and social stability of the defendant.2 All of which led 
Carter and Wilkins to pointedly observe that "the increasing problems 
of crime and delinquency are being addressed by the application of 
correctional principles and practices which have not been 
substantially modified, or even questioned, since their inception.
The length of the presentence report and its meandering focus 
also provided much fuel for subsequent studies. The President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967) 
complained of the "high manpower levels required to complete reports" 
at the expense of better supervising offenders, noting that there was 
no clear-cut "need for the kind and quality of information that is
*William P. Adams, Paul M. Chandler and Mark G. Neithercutt, 
"The San Francisco Project: A Critique," Federal Probation 35 
(December 1971): 50.
2Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, "Some Factors in 
Sentencing Policy," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police 
Science 58 (December 1967): 503-14.
^Ibid., p. 503.
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typically gathered and presented." As a remedy, it urged experimenta­
tion with a shortened, simpler format for the reports which some 
probation agencies had recently developed out of sheer necessity to 
cope with the rising intake of cases. The Commission, taking notice 
of the San Francisco Project's findings, also identified the PSR as 
contributing to disparity in sentencing because of its susceptibility 
to "arbitrary and random influences," such as the personality of the 
probation officer or bureaucratic exigencies.* The prevalence of 
plea bargaining--which the Commission partially defended while 
criticizing its frequent uninformed decision-making--nevertheless also 
called into question many of the PSIs preconceptions. The Commission 
proposed remedying this state of affairs by the adoption of procedures 
"which would enable the parties to call upon the probation office...to 
obtain what is in effect a presentence investigation for use in the 
(plea) negotiation discussion."2 Not addressed by the Commission is 
the inherent inconsistency posed by its identification of probation 
officers as conduits of inappropriate and potentially harmful extra- 
legal considerations into the sentencing arena, while simultaneously 
urging their expanded influence on plea bargaining itself through 
pre-pleading investigations (PPIs). As discussed more fully in 
Chapter III, this call for expanded use of PPI's, echoed by a number 
of subsequent critics, forms one of many paradoxical leit-motifs in
^President's Commission, Task Force Report on Corrections 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Minting Office, 1967), pp. 27-37.
^President's Commission, Task Force Report on Courts 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 12.
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the literature produced by purveyors of the argument that sentence 
bargaining renders PSRs virtually useless.
The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal 
Justice (1970) was also critical of lengthy reports, reminding the 
probation community that "the primary purpose of the presentence 
report is to provide the sentencing court with succinct and precise 
information" and while recognizing its use by correctional decision 
makers, it urged such ancillary considerations "be subordinated to its 
primary purpose" so as to keep the report at a length less intimidat­
ing to busy judges. The American Bar Association also joined the 
President's Crime Commission in urging short-form reports as a 
strategy for coping with scant resources.*
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals (1973) in turn endorsed the American Bar Association's 
proposals and complained of the PSR's over-emphasis on the defendant's 
"life history," emphasizing that "judges want to know the 'here and 
now' of the offender, not a detailed life history."1
Self criticism was also abundant, as probation professionals 
fought to stay afloat amidst the drowning of many of their once 
cherished ideals. Chester Bartoo (1963) found a probation officer's 
sentence recommendation was not always an outgrowth of careful 
synthesis and analysis of relevant data: rather, it might also be a
1American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Standards Relating to Probation (New York: Institute of 
Judicial Administration, 1970), pp. 33-34.
^National Advisory Committee, Corrections, p. 327.
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reflection of his morale, geography, public opinion, the judge's 
personality, administrative policies or his own manner of collecting 
data in the first place.* John Wallace (1964), then head of the New 
York City Office of Probation which serviced the lower courts, called 
presentence reports chock full of information "for everyone but the 
main user, the j u d g e . A  decade later federal probation 
administrators traced the social work origins of probation and 
identified a "a tendency to provide exhaustive historical accounts 
of an offender's life, perhaps from anxiety that some single pertinent 
factor, however insignificant it might appear at the time, might be 
excluded and lost to the future."-*
While some administrators had become critical of the 
"compulsiveness" inherent in the "case method" approach, Richard 
Quinney (1970) identified the social work background of most probation 
officers4 as contributing to inconsistent sentencing recommendations
^Chester H. Bartoo, "Some Hidden Factors Behind a Probation 
Officer's Recommendation," Crime and Delinquency 9 (July 1963): 278-79.
2 John Wallace, "A Fresh Look at Old Probation Standards,"
Crime and Delinquency 10 (March 1964): 124-25. Lower court PSR's, of 
course, have no prison or parole board utility in any case, leading us 
to conclude that Wallace must have been a somewhat parochial theorist.
^Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, "The Selective 
Pre-Sentence Report," p. 49.
4Not all probation officers are trained as social workers. 
Donald Newman, for example, notes that a number of Michigan courts 
employ "a high percentage" of ex-police officers to prepare PSI's that 
are as a consequence minimally about the defendant and more concerned 
with arrest details. See Conviction (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 
14-15. Charles Lindner, in a series of articles on the history of 
probation published in 1984 by Federal Probation, also noted that many 
probation officers originally came from the ranks of the police.
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because of "incompatible role obligations" arising out of difficulties 
in balancing the authoritative/punitive demands of the job with the 
social worker's orientation to "help" one's clients.1 Law professor 
John Coffee (1978) expanded this argument and identified other 
extraneous variables that might lead probation officers to contribute 
to sentencing disparity:
...whether they have a law enforcement perspective or a social 
welfare one, whether he writes his presentence report in a vivid, 
novelistic prose style or in a cold bureaucratic one, whether he 
edits out unverified information or leaves the reliability of the 
data for the judge to determine--these and other factors are 
likely to have an impact on the sentencing judge's impression of 
the defendant.^
Coffee chastized fellow attorneys for ignoring these and other 
sentencing factors controlled by the probation officer and criticized 
their unfettered power, taking this cue from legal scholar Fred Cohen
(1968), who was the first to point out that "probation, unlike law 
enforcement and prosecution, has been allowed almost total freedom to
iRichard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (Boston:
Little Brown, 1970), p. llY. Quinney's argument is rebutted by a 
number of empirical studies, however. See Charles Shireman, "A Study 
of the Agreement of Probation Officers on the Influence of Specific 
Factors Upon the Dispositional Recommendation," Social Science Review 
40 (September 1966): 339; and Herbert Langerman, "Determinants of 
Probation Officers' Pre-Sentence Recommendations” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
New York University, 1976).
2 John Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing:
Accountability, Predictability and Equality in the Era of the 
Sentencing Commission," Georgetown Law Journal 66 (April 1978): 1044.
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fashion its own decision-making criteria and procedures."1 A third 
professor of law (and psychiatry), Willard Gaylin (1974), attacked the 
courts' "enormous dependence" on PSRs, concluding that "in many courts 
the probation officer rather than the judge is the sentencer."^
What Gaylin found to be even more objectionable than the PSR's poor 
quality ("[they] are not very good. Those that I have inspected would 
not have been highly valued in a department of sociology")-* was the 
fact that probation officers "are not open to the public scrutiny of 
the actual decision maker, and they are protected by the false 
assumption of the objectivity of the social scientist, reinforced by 
the paternalistic jargon and attitudes of modem day social workers. 
Whatever their intention, whatever their purposes, disparity exists at 
an incredible rate..."11 Coffee takes up this theme in his mono­
graph, comparing investigating probation officers to seventeenth 
century "ministers who stood quietly behind the throne," manipulating 
the monarchs they served by letting the kings hear only what they 
wanted them to hear: "Today the judge must operate in a system that 
processes a high volume of criminal cases, and therefore he must rely 
heavily on his own ministers, the probation staff."5
^red Cohen, "Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative 
Ideal: The View from Mempa V. Rhay," Texas Law Journal 47 (December 
1968): 32.
^Willard Gaylin, Partial Justice: A Study of Bias in 
Sentencing (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p.13.
^Ibid., p. 99. ^Ibid., p. 13.
5 John Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 984.
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The large number of cases found in state courts leads one of 
Gaylin's interview subjects, "Judge Garfield," to observe: "While I 
have the appearance of great discretion, I don't have the reality of 
it. I work under the constant awareness of the burden of cases in 
this court which demand resolution."1 Gaylin agrees, suggesting 
that his disparity paradigm is directed more at federal courts: 
"Whether discretion is good or bad...is somewhat irrelevant. For all 
practical purposes, discretion is minimized in the crowded calendar of 
the big city court."2 And to deal more rationally with such a large 
caseload, "Judge Garfield," who sentence bargains 50 percent of his 
dispositions, urges expanded use of PPIs to induce more pleas and 
thereby reduce congestion.^
One of the landmark works on sentencing disparity was written 
by another judge, now a very successful New York defense attorney, who 
served as a U.S. District Court Judge in the busiest federal juris­
diction in the country, the Southern District of New York, in the 
early 1970s. Marvin Frankel's Criminal Sentences (1972) describes 
how m s  fellow jurists arrive at sentencing decisions in the absence 
of guidelines, training or uniformity of penal philosophy. In such an 
atmosphere it is not surprising that judges lean heavily on probation 
officers and their recommendations.
Indeed, as a federal probation officer who once served in the 
Southern District of New York, I can attest to this reliance; many, if
iGaylin, Partial Justice, p. 77.
^Ibid., p. 80. ^Ibid., p. 71.
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not most, federal judges prefer to discuss the case with the P.O. 
before sentencing, and some even prefer the P.O. to be present at 
sentencing. (The P.O.'s presence is often helpful to the court in 
structuring the plethora of sentencing options under the federal rules 
of criminal procedure.)
Frankel is thus one of the few recent lawyer-practicioners who 
posits substantial value in the presentence investigation, which he 
describes, in a phrase reminiscent of Moley, as "indespensible in any 
sentencing scheme that does not treat the infinite varieties of people 
as entirely fungible."1 It is also worth noting in this regard that 
even a harsh critic like Gaylin is forced to admit from his survey of 
state and federal jurists that PSRs, although "not good on an 
absolute scale, in comparison with what else is offered to the 
sentencing judge, they seem spectacular."2 However, unlike Gaylin's 
easy dismissal of PSRs as laughable exercises in sociological jargon, 
Frankel is more concerned with the probation officer's "difficient 
techniques of fact gathering" and his "establishmentism" which relies 
too heavily on the prosecutorial viewpoint of defendants, thus frustra­
ting the hypothetically mediating role which the PSR sould occupy.3
Noted criminologists, upon entering the debate on sentencing
^Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 35.
^Gaylin, Partial Justice, p. 99. A federal judge told 
Gaylin: "I study those reports very carefully. I generally take them
home with me...Very often I will reread a report. Then I will always 
confer with the probation officer who wrote it." Ibid., pp. 103-4.
■̂ Frankel, Criminal Sentences, p. 33.
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disparity in the 1970s, also tended to side with legal scholars in 
identifying the manner in which presentence investigators collect 
their data, and the manner in which the data is embodied in their 
reports, as the two key ingredients contributing to unequal justice. 
Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, citing the San Francisco Project, 
argued that "it is primarily differences in the way information is 
categorized and perceived (by judges)...which explain disparity in 
sentencing."1 Since the PSR determines which pieces of information 
the judge will receive, the probation officer is seen as playing "an 
important part in the sentencing process.Leslie Wilkins, the 
foremost empirical criminologist in this field, is even more forceful 
in labeling the probation officer as the operative decision-maker: 
"There is considerable empirical evidence that judges in the 
sentencing decisions tend to be 'ratifiers' and that probation 
officers, in operational terms, perform much of the sentencing 
function."3
While presentence reports were coming under increasing attack 
because of their "exhaustive" length, poor quality and their 
unscrutinized inconsistent influence on sentencing which led to 
disparity, others somewhat paradoxically attacked the PSR as
^Roger Hood and Richard Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 159.
^Ibid., p. 166.
^Leslie T. Wilkins, "A Typology of Decision-Makers? A 
Theoretical and Speculative Contribution," in Parole: Legal 
Issues/Decision-Making/Research, William Amos and Charles L. Newman, 
editors (New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1975), p. 168.
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superfluous because of the prevalence of sentence bargaining.
Although his study is based on observation (and experience as 
a probation officer), Abraham Blumberg's pioneering work, Criminal 
Justice (1967), is probably the most cited source for the argument 
that the need for PSRs is obviated by the court's reluctance to amend 
sentence bargains and thereby risk losing dispositions sorely needed 
to cope with the bone crushing volume of cases. Blumberg claims that 
the PSR's major utility is its service to the modern urban court's 
"bureaucratic due process" model, which he defines as "a non-adversary 
system of justice by negotiation (consisting) of secret bargaining 
sessions, employing subtle, bureaucratically ordained modes of 
coercion and influence to dispose of onerously large case loads in an 
efficacious and rational manner."1 Thus, judges routinely "pass the 
buck to the district attorney...and prefer to ratify the plea 
negotiated by the district attorney, the defense counsel and sometimes 
even the police." Rarely do they exercise "their responsibility to 
review the propriety of a plea," argues Blumberg, because of bureau­
cratic pressures to speedily obtain as many dispositions as possible so 
as to prevent being strangled by burdensomely heavy calendars.^
Because the actual sentence usually is bargained at the time of the 
plea negotiation in New York City felony courts (since at least the
Graham Blumberg, Criminal Justice (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1967), p. 21.
^Ibid., p. 131. Abraham Goldstein argues from an opposite 
perspective in The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and The 
Guilty Plea (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1981) that 
judges have avoided review of plea decisions because of a misplaced 
Belief in prosecutorial expertise and an unfounded fear of abridging 
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
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mid-1960s),1 Blumberg argues that a probation officer's 
recommendation has no impact at all on a sentence but instead the 
report is "cynically employed to validate judicial behavior or is 
otherwise used to reinforce administrative action already taken in 
connection with a plea."^ Blumberg concludes that "the importance 
of the presentence investigation as a decision-making tool for the 
judge is overrated" since it is full of "unverified, speculative, 
hearsay material about an accused" which is "tailored to fit some 
preconceived model of the offender" and is "replete with cliches and 
appropriate stereotypes, all serving to rationalize and codify the 
basis for disposition."-*
Referring to the Williams decision, Blumberg finds that the 
"Supreme Court's confidence in the presentence investigation as an 
impartial means of gathering facts is hardly justified" because of 
civil service bureaucracy, large caseloads, probation officers' 
professional dissatisfaction, etc., all of which "cast serious doubt 
on their objectivity, validity and integrity.'"1 In essence, 
probation officers, "in order to avoid being deceived or manipulated 
by administrators or clients...adopt an intellectual stance of 
misanthropy" which in turn is injected into presentence reports "which
lnYou don't get a plea without a bargain and part of the 
bargain is the sentence,"--an unidentified judge quoted in the New York 
Times, 26 September 1972, at p. 1, column 1. See also New York State 
Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, Its Causes, Control and Effect 
on Society ("The Hughes Committee"), Report, New York State 
Legislative Document No. 26 (1971), pp. 7-15.
^Blumberg, Criminal Justice, p. 131.
3lbid., pp. 160-61. 4lbid., p. 157.
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reflect these harsh attitudes of displaced hostility."1 Despite the 
"vituperative and prejudicial epithets of the most loose, inaccurate 
and vague" description which characterize the offender in a typical 
report, the probation officer does perform perhaps his most 
"significant function" for the court bureaucracy by "cooling out" an 
accused who has pleaded to a lesser offense," i.e., by allowing the 
defendant to ventilate frustration with the courtroom processes and by 
simultaneously ensuring that the offender does not withdraw the 
plea.^ Blumberg displays similar contempt for the defense counsel 
and the judge in his "metropolitan court" (in actuality, Manhattan 
Supreme Court). He sees the defendant's lawyer as a "confidence man" 
whose major objective is to get his client to plead guilty as quickly 
as possible,-* and pictures the typical county judge as a mediocre 
political hack.4 However, these actors remain relatively unscathed 
compared to his overwhelming assault on probation officers as 
prejudiced, discontented, lazy, self-important, whining, intemperate 
and unprofessional minor functionaries in a bureaucratically ruled
^bid., p. 158.
2 Ibid., pp. 157, 161-62. Blumberg decries a widespread 
ignorance of the fact that the probation officer interviews the 
defendant immediately after his plea is entered. However, Blumberg 
himself appears to overlook that the probation officer is also a 
cathartic agent for complainants.
•*Abraham Blumberg, "The Practice of Law as a Confidence 
Game," Law and Society Review 2 (January 1966): 1-25.
4Blumberg, Criminal Justice, pp. 137-39.
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sentencing process controlled by the district attorney.1
Criminal Justice spurred much research into plea bargaining and 
courtroom procedures. It also stands as the most damning indictment 
of the PSR ever written and undoubtedly had an impact on subsequent 
studies,^ particularly those undertaken by governmental agencies in 
New York State, which we will examine in Chapter III.
Prosecutorial Dominance 
Blumberg was by no means the first to recognize the gulf which 
had developed between the ideal and the reality since Justice Black's 
1949 characterization of the probation officer as an impartial 
mediator between the court and the defendant. As early as 1962, Paul 
Keve found that "this ideal relationship does not exist anywhere in 
America...a probation department's 'independence' and 'impartiality' 
are inevitably tainted by its involvement with the organizational 
motives and designs of the court itself."3 Bigene Czajkoski, a 
decade later, found the probation officer's professional role 
undermined more by prosecutorial controlled sentence bargaining than
lit is tempting to see the same misanthropy Blumberg 
attributes to probation officers' descriptions of defendants as 
reposing in Blumberg's merciless portrayal of probation officers.
^Donald Cressey, in a phrase most reminiscent of Blumberg, 
had this to say on the subject in a 1976 aside: "Frequently, the
probation officer has no special training and the reports are nothing 
more than moralistic statements or gossipy accounts," from his and 
Arthur Rossett's study of plea bargaining, Justice by Consent 
(Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1976), p. 3T!
3Paul Keve, "The Professional Character of the Pre-Sentence 
Report," Federal Probation 26 (June 1962): 46.
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by a judiciary which had "abdicated a major portion of (its) 
sentencing role (to) the chief plea bargainer," the prosecutor, "who 
in reality determines sentence."1 Echoing Blumberg, Czajkoski also 
finds the probation officer's major function consisting in soothing 
the accused who has just pled guilty in the "production-oriented and 
confidence game-like system of expeditiously moving defendants through 
the court by means of plea bargaining."2 Not surprisingly then, 
Czajkoski posits little value in the recommendation since "whether or 
not a defendant is sentenced to probation probably depends more now on 
his success in plea bargaining than on his promise of reformation,"^ 
and concludes that "it is now probably more appropriate for the 
probation officer to counsel the prosecutor on rehabilitation 
potential than the judge.
Indeed, this suggestion proved remarkably prescient. A 
defense attorney some six years later was to write (in describing 
current sentencing practices in Wisconsin):
...the prosecutor is often influenced by the recommendation in the 
report and the information underlying it. Some prosecutors 
frequently adopt the report's recommendations as their own to the
^gene Czajkoski, "Exposing the Quasi-Judicial Role of the 
Probation Officer," Federal Probation 37 (September 1973): 9.
^Ibid., pp. 9-10. ^Ibid., p. 10.
^Czajkoski speculates that "if the probation officer ties in 
more with the prosecutor, then the probation officer's quasi-judicial 
function may paradoxically increase because of the judicial 
aggrandizement of the prosecutor's office through plea bargaining and 
other arrangements." Ibid., pp. 11-13.
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court or use it as a benchmark in deciding on their recommenda­
tion. Sometimes a plea agreement will include the condition 
that the proseuctor will adopt the report's recommendation as 
his own.*
As more states abandon the indeterminate sentence, 
prosecutorial influence on sentencing must of necessity expand; and as 
judges and parole boards are stripped of their former statutory 
discretion, the PSR must also undergo change, suggesting perhaps that 
the pre-pleading investigation--which by definition is devoid of a 
sentence recommendation--will form the final redoubt for probation's 
much reduced decision-making function.
Conclusion
Viewed from an historical perspective, the ebb and flow of 
scholarly and governmental estimations of the value of the presentence 
investigation suggests a number of observations. First, the 
literature reveals that the presentence investigation originally 
developed in the late nineteenth century as a means to screen 
potential candidates for probation supervision. As probation assumed 
all the trappings of a formal institution in the first two decades of 
this century, its role was expanded. Presentence reports now became 
lengthy case studies used by the court, the prison, the parole board 
and probation and parole officers as decision-making tools at each 
step of an indeterminate sentencing process which was initiated by a
^Walter Dickey, "The Lawyer and the Accuracy of the 
Pre-Sentence Report," Federal Probation 43 (June 1979): 30.
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judge and modified by a parole board.
During an era of quiescent crime rates extending from the 
middle of the Great Depression until the early-1960s, the agencies of 
social control enjoyed a stable intake which encouraged a concomitant 
trend toward professionalization (civil service appointments, educa­
tional requirements, expanded training, technological improvements) 
and an increased sense of self-importance attached itself to their 
respective roles. For probation, this meant perfecting diagnostic 
tools and "treatment modalities" for offenders:
The role of the probation officer emerged as part of a two century 
social movement concerned with the humanitarian reform of western 
penal systems. The principles of casework used by probation 
offices were originally intended to assist the probation officer 
in keeping the person already given probation from re-offending. 
However, with the introduction of probation reports into the 
sentencing process, and with the request for probation officer 
recommendations based on these reports, new significance was given 
to the social background information collected.^
The presentence report thus came to be viewed less as a 
screening device and more as an offender biography with multiple uses, 
only one of which involved sentencing. The social work ethos also
Ijohn Hagan, "The Social and Legal Construction of Criminal 
Justice: A Study of the Pre-Sentencing Process,” Social Problems 22 
(June 1975): 635.
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dictated a "non-judgmental" approach to a client's behavior and this 
striving for clinical detachment (although frequently violated because 
of the law enforcement tension in the probation officer's dual role, 
it nevertheless dictated the structure of the report itself) militated 
against the report's being more directed and pointed in its 
evaluations. When there were manageable sentence calendars in urban 
courts, the unfocused nature of the report could be compensated for by 
personal contact between probation officer and judge.1
However, when the number of defendants increased dramatically 
during the 1960s, organizational constraints brought about a 
"bureaucratization of justice." In dispensing justice to three to 
five times as many offenders,^ the system, rather than grind to a 
halt, adopted different strategies: judges, to induce speedy 
dispositions, made specific sentence promises at the time of the 
guilty plea--promises which were usually dictated by prosecutorial 
policy; and probation reports in turn became shorter, less 
descriptive, more judgmental and less reliable.
Secondly, empirical validation for the anti-rehabilitation 
arguments of prisoners, civil libertarians and conservatives alike 
began to gain prominence and coincided with growing public impatience 
with correctional promises unfulfilled. Since the presentence report
*In federal courts, probation officers are still routinely 
invited to judges' chambers to discuss their report and recommendation 
prior to sentencing.
^Alexancder B. Smith and Harriet Pollack, "The Courts Stand 
Indicted in New York City," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 68 
(No. 2, 1977): 252-61.
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stood at the nexus of the correctional triumvirate, it naturally came 
to be identified as a sore spot by critics of every persuasion:
Francis A. Allen (1964), John P. Conrad (1967), Robert 0. Dawson
(1969), Fred Cohen (1968), American Friends Service Committee (1971), 
Marvin Frankel (1972), Jessica Mitford (1973), Norval Morris (1974), 
David Fogel (1975), Ernst van den Haag (1975), James Q. Wilson (1975) 
and Andrew von Hirsh (1976)1. These and other critics have, in 
effect, "demolished for the current generation the idea that an 
individualized approach to sentencing that emphasizes treatment and 
rehabilitation is either feasible or safe."^
Indeed, Robert Martinson's 1974 oft-cited study of the 
literature on correctional treatment's efficacy concluded rather 
glumly that "these data, involving over 200 studies and hundreds of 
thousands of individuals as they do, are the best available and give 
us very little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of
^Francis A. Allen, The Borderland of Criminal Justice 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); John P. Conrad, Crime 
and Its Correction: An International Survey of Attitudes and Practices 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Pobert 0. Dawson, 
Sentencing (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); American Friends Service 
Committee” Struggle For Justice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971); 
Jessica Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1973); Norvall Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1974); bavid Vogel, We Are the Living Proof: The 
Justice Model For Corrections (Cincinatti: W.H. Anderson, 1975); Ernst 
Van Ben Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning A Very Old and Painful 
Question (New York: Basic Books. 1975); dames Q. Wilson, Thinking 
About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Andrew Von Hirsh, Doing 
Justice: The Choice of Punishments (New York: Hill and Wang, 19761"!
2 John Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 977.
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reducing recidivism through rehabilitation."1
Thirdly, as the criminal justice system became the object of
increasing scrutiny by the federal government, political commissions,
the legal community and scholars, the evils of unchecked discretionary
powers became apparent. Although perhaps failing to recognize that
the distance between the ideal and the actual is more palpable today
than it was in the more orderly justice system extant in 1949, Fred
Cohen nevertheless eloquently sums up this argument:
Implicit in the Williams rationale, and explicit in the opinion of
many courts and correctional administrators, is the belief that
the goals of corrections can be best obtained by the preservation
of maximum discretion on the part of judicial and correctional
authorities. [They] confused benevolent purpose with actual or
2potential arbitrary outcome.
Others convincingly questioned whether anyone could predict an 
offender's future behavior with any certainty, arguing that the 
possible inequities of such unscientific guesswork outweighed whatever 
gains it promised. In short, early critics of discretion urged more 
standardized techniques of decision-making while later critics
^Robert Martinson, "What Works? - Questions and Answers 
About Prison Reform," The Public Interest 35 (Spring 1974): 54; see 
also, Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson and Judith Wilks, The 
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment, A Survey of Treatment 
Evaluation Studies (few York: Praeger Publishers, 1^5).
^Fred Cohen, "Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative 
Ideal," p. 15.
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eventually came to recommend demolition of the indeterminancy 
principle itself.
These developments cannot be viewed in isolation, for it is 
important to recognize that as public alarm over crime levels 
increased, funding for the institutions of social control became 
disproportionately distributed: police and prosecutors expanded their 
share of the criminal justice dollar while the courts and corrections 
lost ground. In such circumstances, it is not hard to see how 
prosecutors came to gain more control over the sentencing process 
through sentence bargaining and the further narrowing of sentencing 
options. With the decline of judicial authority, probation, the 
foremost ancillary service of the court, necessarily suffered a 
reduction in its influence.
Thus, the literature would appear to suggest that as 
prosecutorial hegemony over sentencing increased, the value of the PSR 
has decreased. Since it will be the intention of this dissertation to 
examine empirically this proposition, we must first determine what 
prior empirical studies of the PSR have shown.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Introduction
Georgetown Law Professor John Coffee, in a lengthy review of 
the current debate over sentencing disparity, chides his fellow 
lawyers' "culture-bound vision of the legal system" which has led to 
"the belief that the sentencing process is one in which the only 
participants are lawyers and judges." Noting a "transformation in the 
sentencing process" which has occurred in the United States over the 
past thirty years, Coffee writes:
The key event in this process has been the professionalization of 
the probation staff...the simple turnkey of an earlier era has 
given way to the modem, highly trained P.O., equipped with a 
master's degree in criminology, a manual of standard operating 
procedures, and a highly developed sense of the importance of his 
role in the sentencing drama. A by-product has emerged, however, 
from this process of professionalization: a developing bureacuracy 
that defends its institutional turf zealously...[There is a 
tendency for probation officers] to define their success in terms 
of their ability to obtain acceptance of their sentencing 
recommendations from judges; the higher the percentage of 
concurrence between the judicial decision and their
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recommendation, the greater the evidence...of their recognition as 
"professionals.
Coffee is undoubtedly correct in identifying this 
preoccupation with the influence of recommendations upon sentences, 
but as the following discussion will attest, the "percentage of 
concurrence" has come to be offered as evidence of the diminution of a 
probation officer's professional role.
California
The first major tabulation of recommendations and sentences in 
American courts was performed by the California Department of Justice 
which found that in 1963, 97.6 percent of all adult defendants in the 
state superior courts who were recommended for probation were so 
sentenced, while 82.5 percent of all adult defendants who were not 
recommended for probation were denied probation. Further tabulation 
of the period 1959-1965 in California Superior Courts revealed a 
remarkably consistent average agreement rate of 96 percent between 
judge and P.O. on recommendations for probation and an 81 percent 
agreement rate for denial of probation.^
These statistics caught the eye of an ex-probation officer and 
a British criminologist who were then engaged in an otherwise 
"supervision-oriented study" of the federal probation system in the
Ijohn Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 983.
^State of California, Department of Justice, Delinquency and 
Probation in California, 1963 (Sacramento, California: 19641, pp. 
226-23.
44
Northern District of California funded by the National Institute of 
Mental Health. Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, as part of the San 
Francisco Project (1965-66), focused on the decision making process of 
P.O.'s and judges in Northern California's federal courts and found "a 
very high relationship between the probation officers' recommendations 
and the court's dispositions." In essence, they found a 96 percent 
agreement on the recommendation for probation and a 88 percent 
agreement on the recommendation for imprisonment, much like the 
figures reported in state courts.* In attempting to explain this 
consensus, a number of legal and demographic factors in each of the 
300 sampled reports were later analyzed. A rank of about 30 such legal 
and demographic factors utilized by both P.O.'s (for determining 
recommendations) and judges (for determining sentences), according to 
probability and contingency coefficient values, revealed "an extremely 
high and significant rank order correlation”  ̂which indicated that 
the sentence and the recommendation were both more oriented to the 
crime than the offender:
It appears that there is little "shaping" of presentence 
recommendations, but some very close agreement on the significance 
of certain factors and characteristics as being particularly
1Joseph D. Lohman, Albert Wahl, and Robert M. Carter, 300 
Presentence Report Recommendations (Berkeley: University of 
California, June 196$), p. 12.
2Joseph D. Lohman, Albert Wahl, and Robert M. Carter, 
Presentence Recommendations and Demographic Data (Berkeley: University 
of California, February 1966), p. 687
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important for either probation or imprisonment recommendations or 
dispositions.
Although they found wide variation among particular P.O.'s 
recommendation patterns (a frequency range of 25.9 percent to 93.3 
percent was tabulated for probation recommendations submitted by 
individual P.O.'s ),̂  they also observed that formal and informal 
pressures exerted by superiors tended to reduce such fluctuations.5 
Perhaps the most crucial finding, however, was that "probation officers 
make decisions relating to presentence recommendations with relatively 
small amounts of information,"^ customarily placing the most stress 
on "prior record, current offense and largest period of (a defendant's) 
employment."5 (In a later experiment utilizing Wilkins' "decision- 
game" technique again, Carter found that P.O.'s arrived at recommenda­
tions after selecting the first few items of information about a case 
which they consistently deemed most important.
In a later analysis of their empirical studies, Carter and
^Ibid., p. 71.
2Lohman, Wahl, and Carter, Decision-Making and the Probation 
Officer, p. 7.
5Ibid., pp. 17-18. ^Ibid., p. 16. 5Ibid., p. 3.
^Robert Carter, "Hie Pre-Sentence Report and the Decision 
Making Process," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, no. 4 
(1967), pp. 203-11.
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Wilkins identified four possible (interacting) factors which might 
account for the observed ,rhigh degree of agreement between probation 
officer recommendations and court dispositions": 1) judges follow the 
probation officer's expertise in sizing up offenders; 2) many 
offenders are "obviously probation or prison cases"; 3) P.O.'s 
accurately second-guess the judge's intended disposition; and 4)
P.O.'s make their recommendations based on the same factors which 
judges employ in arriving at sentences.* The third factor was to 
be frequently cited by subsequent critics of the PSR, foreshadowing as 
it did the debate about the utility of recommendations in 
jurisdictions where sentences are bargained.
In retrospect, the San Francisco Project set the agenda for 
future research into the impact of presentence reports on sentencing. 
However, the applicability of its empirical findings to state courts 
is limited by the fact that federal courts enjoy uncongested criminal 
calendars, a plethora of resources, and no need to sentence bargain. 
Thus, a concomitant conservation of judicial autocracy over the 
sentencing process obtains there.
Britain and Canada
Although not widely recognized, a considerable body of 
literature has accumulated during the past decade in Canada and Great 
Britain on the impact of presentence reports on sentencing, clearly 
influenced by the San Francisco Project methodology. Since both
^Carter and Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy," 
pp. 509-10.
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nations employ common law based systems of jurisprudence, there are 
great similarities between their criminal jurisprudence and ours--but 
there are also major differences. It is beyond the scope of this 
study, however, to conduct any rigorous comparative analyses, although 
the topic does cry out for some investigation. (Immediately most 
striking about presentence reports in Canada and England is the fact 
that they were only very recently incorporated into the sentencing 
process--specifically, during the post-World War II era*--and 
would thus appear to lend themselves to a more thorough-going 
organizational analysis.)
The earliest empirical study of British PSRs appeared in 1965 
and the results were somewhat dissimilar from the American studies, 
but therein lies a clue to their slightly different roles in the 
respective systems. Taking a sample of 272 recommendations prepared 
between 1955 and 1960 in Cornwall, Jarvis found a 70 percent agreement 
rate (suprisingly low, compared to most U.S. studies) between judge 
and probation officer on probation dispositions but an 86.7 percent 
agreement rate (almost identical to that found by most American 
studies) on non-probation dispositions.2
These findings were duplicated three years later in London's
1David Mathieson, "The Probation Service and Sentencing" 
Probation Journal 25 (March 1978): 22-25; Stephen White, "The Effect 
of Social Inquiry Reports on Sentencing Decisions, British Journal of 
Criminology no. 12 (1972), pp. 230-249; and John Hogarth, Sentencing 
As a Human Process, p. 246.
2F.V. Jarvis, "Inquiry Before Sentence," in Criminology in 
Transition, T. Grygier, et al., editors (London: Tavistock, 1965), pp. 
43-66.
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Queen's Court by McWilliams, who found a 77.5 percent agreement rate 
for probation sentences and a 79 percent agreement rate for prison 
sentences, with an overall agreement rate of 73 percent for the 170 
cases tabulated.1 Jennifer Thorpe and Kenneth Pease, in a study of 
212 reports during 1972 in Kent and Nottingham, found some points to 
dispute with Jarvis et al., but of most interest was their observation 
that "recommendations against probation were less likely to be 
rejected than any other type of recommendation.
Recalling the California Superior Court tabulations and the 
San Francisco Project's finding that judges are much less likely to 
agree with a P.O.'s recommendation for prison (81 and 88 percent for 
state and federal courts, respectively) than a recommendation for 
probation (96 percent in both state and federal courts), Carter and 
Wilkins have argued that there is considerable evidence that the 
"probation officer is more punitive than the judge"-* in the U.S. 
However, there are organizational and legal constraints on state court 
judges here that are absent in England (and less prevalent in federal 
courts) which appear to explain more of the discrepancy, not only 
between acceptance of probation and prison recommendations as a whole,
*-W. McWilliams, "Pre-Sentence Study of Offenders," Case 
Conference, no. 15 (1968), pp. 136-39.
2Jennifer Thorpe and Kenneth Pease, "The Relationship 
Between Recommendations Made to the Court and Sentences Passed," 
British Journal of Criminology 16 (October 1976): 393-94.
^Carter and Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy," p.
507.
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but which also help to explain the differential between state and 
federal courts of seven percentage points on the rate of judicial 
acceptance of prison recommendations (81 percent vs. 88 percent). (A 
subsequent study--the Witztum Report, discussed more fully in Chapter 
III--proposed an alternate explanation, however: that judges primarily 
use PSR's in state courts to "guard against mistaken decisions to 
release"* offenders on probation.)
Probation officers in England meanwhile, are more apt than 
their American counterparts to see the overall consensus between their 
recommendations and the court's sentences as cause for alarm, 
eschewing John Coffee's arguments of "professionalism" in this regard. 
In fact, Helen Napier argues that presentence investigators could be 
in danger of losing their independence by colluding with the court in 
the sentencing function and urges P.O.'s to assume the role of an 
"indepedent expert witness" in framing objective reports.2 Martin 
Davies, in a similar vein, but more blunt, criticized P.O.'s for 
attempting to match their recommendations to the anticipated sentence 
of a particular judge. In effect, Davies here uses Carter and 
Wilkins' "third factor" mentioned above to explain the degree of 
congruence between recommendation and sentence, to wit: the P.O. 
tailors the recomnendation to the judge, rather than to the offender
iRuth Witztum, "The Utilization of Pre-Sontence Reports in 
Kings County," unpublished report submitted to the Mayor's Criminal 
Justice Coordinating Council, November, 1972.
2Helen Napier, "I>robation Officers and Sentencing,"
Probation Journal 25 (December 1978): 122-24.
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and his crime. Since sentence bargaining is not uncommon in felony- 
level courts in urban England--although appearing in somewhat 
different guise than in its more obvious American incarnation--this is 
not an impossible task for the British P.O., but the argument is 
nevertheless not very convincing when one considers the relatively low 
rate of agreement between judge and P.O. observed by McWilliams.1
TWo of the most elaborate empirical studies of the impact of 
PSRs on sentencing were conducted independently in Canadian courts in 
the early 1970s by Toronto sociologists John Hogarth and John Hagan.
Hogarth's 1971 study did not tabulate recommendations and 
dispositions because at the time of his investigation, probation 
officers were "not permitted by law or policy to suggest a particular 
sentence" in Ontario; they merely indicated the "likely response of 
the offender to probation if granted."2 Instead, Hogarth conducted 
"decision-games" (using the Wilkins model) with P.O.'s and judges, 
interviewed 71 magistrates, and compiled data on 2400 reports in the 
province. Hogarth's findings were significant, relevant and timely 
but have yet to assume their rightful place in the literature, perhaps 
because of their "foreign" origin.
Basically, he found a sentencing process benumbed by 
information overload, widely divergent judicial attitudes on the aims
^Martin Davies, "Social Inquiry for the Courts," British 
Journal of Criminology 14 (No. 1, 1974): 18-33. For an excellent 
comparative study of American and British plea bargaining in action, 
see Silvia Suzen Giovanni Casale, "The Plea Compromise Process in the 
Criminal Courts of New York and London" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1977), pp. 346-48.
2John Hogarth, Sentencing As A Human Process, p. 248.
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of sentencing, unstandardized reports, and nunerous intervening 
variables which produced sentencing disparity. Hogarth found that: 1) 
"very often urban magistrates ...'skim' reports and in some instances 
they read only the summary at the end";* 2)"magistrates tended to 
seek information consistent with their preconceptions [and] tended to 
avoid information which was likely to present a picture of the 
offender that was in conflict with their expectations;"^
3) presentence reports were requested in cases for which magistrates 
were considering sentences that are not normally or usually given for 
that type of offence"-* (e.g., prison for dangerous driving or 
probation for armed robbery); and 4) since "communication tends to be 
more effective when the receiver does not feel that the communicator 
is trying to convince him," then the PSR presents problems because not 
only can it be "viewed as an attempt by the P.O. to affect the 
magistrate's decision" but the report is the product of a group 49 
with a lower status (P.O.'s "tend to accept magistrates' views of the 
cases, while magistrates would resist any effort of persuasion from 
P.O.'s").4 Hogarth concludes that if PSRs are to have any impact 
on sentencing, then they must be read by the judge, the judge must 
have informal access to the P.O. to discuss the case and the judge 
must subscribe to the theory underlying the reports themselves, i.e., 
the individualization of justice.5
John Hagan's study focused less on judges and instead
llbid., p. 262. 2Ibid., p. 374. ^jbid., p. 373.
4Ibid., p. 263. 5Ibid., p. 262.
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attempted to determine the impact of seven independent variables upon 
the P.O.'s recommendation and the judge's disposition. Four of the 
variables were extra-legal--race, socio-economic status, the 
defendant's demeanor and his/her success prospects (as perceived by 
the P.O.); and three were legal variables--seriousness of offense, 
prior record and number of present charges. In analyzing 507 reports 
and recommendations collected from 15 cities, Hagan computed 
correlation and path coefficients seeking to relate all nine variables 
collected. He found that "recommendations alone account for more than 
fifty percent of the variation in final dispositions. In tabular 
terms, probation officers and judges agree in 79.7 percent of the 
cases."! Hagan attempted to find validation in his study for three 
major schools of criminological thought: the conflict theorists (since 
the defendants studied were all from the lowest socio-economic class); 
the interactionist school (P.O.'s perceptions of his subject--i.e., 
the subject's personal characteristics interacting with the P.O.'s 
prejudices); and the organizational perspective (when judges request 
recommendations they elevate the P.O.'s sense of importance and 
transform the resultant reports into more evaluative, less factual 
exercises that overemphasize the importance of extra-legal variables 
on sentencing).2
Nkich like the California examples presented earlier, the 
applicability of these British and Canadian studies to American urban
!john Hagan, "Social and Legal Constraints," p. 628.
^Ibid., pp. 635-36.
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courts is diminished by their failure to deal with plea bargaining as 
a crucial dimension in today's sentencing process. In this respect 
the studies thus far surveyed are much alike: they make no distinction 
between trial and plea bargained convictions; they treat sentences as 
dichotomous variables (prison vs. probation); and they ignore sentence 
bargaining.
"Western City"
The most important recent empirical study of the impact of 
presentence reports, however, did attempt to incorporate the effect of 
sentence promises into the research design. This was a study 
conducted by sociologist Rodney Kingsnorth and probation administrator 
Louis Rizzo in a California city identified only as "Western City."
The authors chose 302 cases (from the calendar year 1972) where 
defendants had pled guilty to felonies. These cases were then 
categorized into two groups according to sentence promise: those
guaranteed "no state prison" by the court (126) and those given no 
such guarantee (176). A 99.2 percent agreement rate (125/126) between 
promise and disposition and a 97.6 percent agreement rate (123/126) 
between recommendation and sentence were found for the group promised 
no prison sanctions. In fact, only four cases prevented this group 
from achieving perfect congruence for promise, recommendation and 
sentence (in one case a defendant promised "no prison" was nonetheless 
sentenced to prison as per the probation officer's recommendation; in 
the other three cases involving defendants recommended for prison, the 
court kept its original promise of "no prison"). For the second
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group--in which no promise was made--a 90.3 percent overall agreement 
rate between recommendation and sentence (159/176) was found, with an 
88.1 percent agreement for non-jail dispositions (118/134) and a 97.6 
percent agreement rate for jail dispositions (41/42).! The authors 
conclude from this data that "P.O.'s are influenced in their 
recommendations by knowledge of prior agreements between prosecution 
and defense.
So convinced are Kingsnorth and Rizzo of this hypothesis that, 
echoing Blumberg, they urge future studies of the PSR's impact on 
sentencing be placed within the broader context of court 
administration, because:
...the autonomy of the P.O. in fully 40 percent of all cases that 
do not go to trial [i.e., those cases where a "no state prison" 
sentence has been promised] has been severely eroded by pressure 
on P.O.'s to function within the constraints imposed by guilty
plea bargaining The single most potent source of pressure is
the judiciary which, committed to managerial efficiency within the 
court system, will assert the primacy of plea bargaining 
agreements over P.O. recommendations when those are in conflict, 
rather than permit the withdrawal of the guilty plea and the 
return of the case to the bargaining stage.^
!Rodney Kingsnorth and Louis Rizzo, "Decision-Making in the 
Criminal Courts: Continuities and Discontinuities," Criminology 17
(May 1979), pp. 3-6.
^Ibid., p. 8. 3Ibid., p. 11
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Borrowing Hagan's organizational perspective and Blumberg's 
bureaucratization of justice observation, the authors create a 
synthesis in arguing that "the probation officer is a member of a role 
set within a court system committed to the pursuit of managerial 
efficiency, i.e., the efficient processing of an ever-expanding 
backlog of cases...latent pressures on probation officers to 'go 
along' with plea bargaining agreements would be readily mobilized 
against 'deviant' officers.Seen from this vantage point, Supreme 
Court decisions which have established that a plea bargain not kept is 
a conviction which can be overturned2 are what explain the court's 
reluctance to follow P.O.'s recommendations for prison when no 
incarceration sentence has been promised: "they are not necessarily 
doing so because they are more 'lenient' but because they are oriented 
to norms of managerial efficiency and are reasserting the primacy of 
the plea bargain."-* Thus, P.O.'s learn they have very little 
impact and "tailor their recommendations accordingly."4
Because of the sentence bargain's sacred status, they see only 
three alternatives to the present sentencing process for the probation 
system: 1) abolish plea bargaining (but most American criminologists 
counter that this would be inefficient and is a doomed proposal); 2)
1 Ibid., p. 9.
2See Santobello v. N.Y., 404 U.S. 257 (1971); McMann v. 
Richardson, 3§7 U.S. 759 (1970); and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 2$ (1970).
^Kingsnorth and Rizzo, "Decision-Making," p. 6.
4Ibid.
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incorporate the P.O. into the plea bargaining process at an earlier 
stage (through use of pre-pleading investigations and by providing 
pre-trial services); or 3) abolish PSRs since "the consequences of 
such abolition would be negligible.Launching into their final 
peroration, Kingsnorth and Rizzo sum up the past decade's universal 
displeasure with probation reports: "The presentence report's attempt 
to fit treatment to the criminal rather than punishment to the crime 
is a spurious exercise in treatment logic incompatible with equity in 
law and as such should be abolished."2
However, Kingsworth and Rizzo's conclusions are not supported 
by the data because their methodology is seriously flawed. First, 
only three variables were coded for each case (promise, recommenda­
tion, sentence), ignoring numerous other important factors 
(including both legal and non-legal variables such as custodial 
5tatus, seriousness of crime, number of prior arrests, and social 
stability). And secondly, the plea bargain and recommendation were 
each coded as a dichotomous variable, a gross oversimplification which 
seriously skews the results of all the comparisons they present. In 
fact, closer scrutiny of the 176 cases in which no promise was made 
tends to give greater support to alternate explanations for why judges 
and P.O.'s agree so frequently on sentence (e.g., Carter and Wilkins' 
finding that each considers the same legal and extra-legal variables 
as overwhelmingly important). The reason is simple. The inexact 
coding of Kingsnorth and Rizzo rendered 13 cases within the "no
1Ibid., p. 13. 2Ibid.
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promise" group as anomalous, when the authors themselves note that 
their dichotomous coding "may reflect a degree of conflict between 
P.O.'s and judges greater than actually exists."1 The authors erred 
when they reduced the congruence between recommendation and sentence 
in this group from 172 out of 176 (97.6 percent) to 159 out of 176 
(90.3 percent) by coding 13 "probation denied" recommendations as 
recommendations against imprisonment when arguably they should have 
been considered as recommendations for jail. This extraordinary 
agreement in cases where defendants had in effect been promised 
nothing (60 percent of the court's workload in "Western City".') flies 
in the face of their argument in the same paper that there are few 
"obviously" prison or probation cases (they cite the San Francisco 
Project's finding that 1,232 recommendations showed a span of 50 
percentage points between individual P.O.'s recommendations).
Since there is no organizational pressure to carry through on 
a sentence bargain in the no promise group, an identical 97.6 percent 
agreement rate for sentence bargains and for cases where no sentence 
promise is made deals a serious blow to the authors' argument that the 
goal of organizational efficiency causes more congruence.
Juveniles and Misdemeanants
There has been some research on the impact of probation 
reports in juvenile and misdemeanor courts over the years, but it 
seems meager compared to the emphasis in the literature on adult 
felony cases. Yonah Cohen's 1963 study of criteria employed by P.O.'s
1 Ibid.
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in making juvenile case recommendations is of interest in that he 
found objective information to predominate over subjective data. Thus 
a typical report would be more apt to include a description of the 
crime and the defendant's family finances than to contain a discussion 
of the juvenile's personality and his family relationships, although 
the latter are considered all-important in a casework approach. Cohen 
concurs with this prejudice against social work oriented reports, 
arguing that juvenile reports should focus on information relative and 
pertinent to the decision being made by the judge and not on the 
proposed course of treatment.1
Seymour Gross, taking his cue from Carter and Wilkins, 
attempted to rank the variables most affecting a P.O.'s recommendation 
(by interviewing P.O.'s). The juvenile court P.O.'s ranking was found 
to be: 1) details of offense; 2) family background; and 3) prior 
arrests. Noteworthy here is that the same P.O.'s were then asked 
their perception of what the juvenile court considered most 
important. The results were only slightly dissimilar: 1) details of 
offense; 2) prior arrests; and 3) the juvenile's attitude. (P.O.'s 
therefore suspect judges of being more swayed by subjective transient 
factors such as "attitude," than by the more objective "family 
background"). In addition, both judges and P.O.'s considered the
1Yonah Cohen, "Criteria for the P.O.'s Recommendations to 
the Juvenile Court Judge," Crime and Delinquency, no. 9 (1963), pp. 
262-75.
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juvenile's interests, activities and religion the least important.1
Probation officer James Davis' 1979 doctoral dissertation 
stands out as the first comprehensive overview of the sentencing 
decision in the lower criminal courts. From a random sample of almost 
a thousand misdemeanor cases in Brooklyn Criminal Court, Davis found 
that judges follow P.O.'s recommendations in 81 percent of the cases 
(793/979). Path and discriminate analysis of a number of legal and 
non-legal variables found that judges based dispositions on (in order 
of importance): 1) P.O. recommendations; 2) custodial status of 
defendant at time of plea; 3) prior arrests; 4) prior violation of a 
probation sentence; and 5) seriousness of offense. In a separate 
sample of 100 defendants sentenced without a PSR, Davis found judges 
relied most heavily on: 1) seriousness of offense; and 2) prior 
arrests. Finally, recommendations were found to rely most heavily on: 
1) prior arrests; 2) custodial status; and 3) prior violations of a 
probation sentence. Not surprisingly, then, Davis found that 
defendants in detention with a history of many arrests were 
overwhelmingly recommended for jail sentences and usually received 
them.^ Davis found the judicial sentence promise to be of minor 
significance in criminal court since "promises were loosely
^Seymour Gross, "The Pre-Hearing Juvenile Report: The P.O.'s 
Conception," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, no. 4 
(1967), pp. 212-17.
2James R. Davis, "The Sentencing Dispositions of New York 
City Lower Court Criminal Judges" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York 
University, 1979), pp. 279-80.
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constructed, with several alternatives, very flexible,"* with the 
nature of the promises most strongly affected by the defendant's 
custodial status. Davis found PSR recommendations to be so 
influential that he concluded (in a phrase that would probably cause 
critics such as Willard Gaylin to shudder): "this research implies 
that P.O.'s might do the sentencing in misdemeanor courts."2
Because misdemeanant and juvenile courts operate with a 
completely separate set of organizational procedures, goals and 
constraints, the findings of Davis and others are not transferable to 
adult felony courts.3
What This Research Will Replicate
In devising my own research, I have decided to incorporate: 1) 
the San Francisco Project's rank order correlation methodology to test 
whether judges and P.O.'s consider the same variables most important 
in decision making; 2) John Hagan's and James Davis' path analyses of 
legal and extra-legal variables to determine their impact on 
recommendations and dispositions; and 3) Kingsnorth and Rizzo's 
comparison of promises, recommendations and sentences to determine if 
the court's goal of organizational efficiency outweighs the probation 
officer's judgments. Finally, I will also take into account the
*Ibid., p. 263. 2Ibid., p. 284.
3For an excellent discussion of the more predominant role 
played by judges in sentence bargaining in lower criminal courts, see 
Joseph Hoane, "Strategems and Values: An Analysis of Plea Bargaining 
in Urban Criminal Court" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 
1978). Also see Casale, "The Plea Compromise Promise."
61
intervening variables in the sentencing process observed by Hogarth, 
which center around the actions of the sentencing judge.
CHAPTER III
PUBLIC AND POLITICAL INQUIRIES INTO THE 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION IN NEW YORK
The Early History of New York City Probation
Any analysis of the history of the public administration of 
probation agencies in New York City (and probably nationwide)* must 
start from one inescapable conclusion: probation has never been funded 
in a manner commensurate with its responsibilities. This lack of 
resources traditionally has been offered by the predominately 
rehabilitation-directed correctional theorists and practitioners who 
have held sway in this field for generations as the response to the 
recurring charge by more retribution oriented critics that probation 
just does not work. Regardless of the merits of the argument, there 
appears to be more evidence of probation underfunding in the lower 
courts than in the felony courts of New York City until the 
cataclysmic decline of the past decade. A few examples will 
illustrate this point.
In 1922, Chief City Magistrate William McAdoo, (a former New 
York City Police Commissioner) in a "Manual of Probation Work"
*See Jim Atkinson, "The Proving Ground," Texas Monthly, June 
1982, pp. 180-88, for a study of the Dallas Probation Department beset 
by all the ills afflicting New York City P.O.'s (e.g., 1,000 P.O.'s 
supervise 135,000 Texas offenders).
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prepared for the 38 Magistrates' Courts scattered throughout the City 
(in effect, the forerunners of what are now New York City's family and 
lower criminal courts), reported that 91 P.O.'s supervised 13,741 
offenders and prepared 17,352 presentence reports during the previous 
year.
This "enormous amount of work" caused "acute and massive 
administrative problems" because the probation staff was "limited and 
entirely inadequate in number and constantly overworked."1 New York 
probation pioneer Edwin J. Cooley made the same complaint in 1923 when 
he wrote that "one of the commonest weaknesses in probation work is 
that most probation officers have more work than they can do well." 
Cooley, anticipating present P.O. union activism, added: "There is no
greater duty incumbent upon probation officers in all communities than 
that of keeping constantly before the proper appropriating bodies, the 
need for an adequate staff, a just compensation and sufficient 
clerical help."^
Other plaintive wails of despair have permeated the 
professional probation literature in New York City during every decade 
since the 1920s. The federal probation system also experienced 
relative stagnation in staffing for the first two decades of its 
existance. (In 1931 there were 65 federal P.O.'s in the U.S., 
supervising 15,448 cases for an average caseload size of 237; by 1942
^William McAdoo, "Manual of Probation Work," Magistrates' 
Courts of the City of New York, 1922, pp. 13-14.
2Edwin J. Cooley, "Standards of Probation," Magistrates'
Courts of the City of New York, 1923, p. 5.
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the caseload average was still an unmanageable 137.)1 This appeared 
to be a universal phenomenon in community corrections until the 
post-World War II era in New York City when the separately 
administered county probation offices (which were controlled by the 
state judiciary) dramatically outstripped the probation offices 
serving the lower city courts (which were controlled by local 
automonous probation administrators) in salary, prestige and 
professionalization. In fact, recognition of this administrative and 
qualitative disparity between the probation departments servicing the 
City's courts and those servicing the state (felony level) occasioned 
the first important modem study of probation's performance in New 
York City. When 1960 court reorganization legislation initiated the 
eventual merger of the probation bureaus of the Special Sessions and 
Magistrates' Courts (consolidated in 1962 to form the City's lower 
Criminal Courts), and the probation bureau of the Domestic Relations 
Court (consolidated with the Children's Court in 1962 to form the 
City's Family Courts) into a unified New York City Office of 
Probation, Mayor Wagner was prompted to appoint a committee to study 
why these "three probation systems had fallen markedly from the high 
esteem in which they were once held throughout the country."2
^Victor H. Evjen, "The Federal Probation System: The 
Struggle To Achieve It and Its First 25 years," in An Introduction to 
the Federal Probation System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976), p. A-13.
^The Mayor's Committee on Auxiliary Services to the Courts 
of New York City: Report (New York, 1961), p. 3.
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The Mayor's Committee 
In studying the deteriorating quality of probation services in 
the City courts, the Committee found understaffing to be "a situation 
of many years' standing" and concluded that "since 1930 there have 
been many protracted periods in which there was virtually no change in 
the number of probation officers, although the need for additional 
personnel increased greatly."1 Furthermore, management of the 
City's probation system was found to be grossly inadequate: "probation 
officers are too often inadequately trained, overburdened with 
excessive caseloads, and hampered by a poverty of resources and the 
absence of any over-all planning, procedures and administrative 
structure.The Committee placed part of the blame on the lower 
salaries in the city probation service which had "not been attracting 
high-level probation personnel."-*
Although its mandate was to examine only probation services in 
the lower courts, the Mayor's Committee repeatedly turned to the 
county departments in its evaluations, finding there a model which the 
City should emulate. In virtually every qualitative comparison of job 
performances between the local and county courts, the felony court 
P.O.'s outdistanced their peers. In the preparation of presentence 
reports, for example, their findings (which I have condensed in Table 
1) were derived from a comparative content analysis of 680 reports:4




MAYOR'S COMMITTEE COMPARISON OF COUNTY f, CITY PSR'S
Rate of Accomplishment
Job Function County P.O. City P.O.
Horae Visits 5lT 49f
Educational Contact 781 55%
Employer Contact 821 261
Comnunity Contact 86% 87%
Diagnosis of Offender 86% 51%
Analysis of Family Environment 90% 55%
In sumaarizing its survey, the Committee attributed the better 
performance of county probation to a "higher degree of skill" resulting 
in part from "a higher pay scale [which] attracts on the whole a more 
competent staff, many of whom have worked dilligently to raise 
professional standards in probation service."1 Significantly, the 
Committee's conclusion that the lower court PSI "produces a collection 
of facts which are usable, but which have not been correlated or 
analyzed,"2 like all its other unfavorable conclusions, refers only 
to the lower court probation services. However, over the years this 
phrase has reappeared time and again in other reports completed by 
other committees as proof of the long standing poor quality of PSRs 
in felony courts, suggesting perhaps a polemical bias against 
probation among politicians and the legal community which might help 
explain the miniscule funding so much in evidence.
After 1962, the underfunding, understaffing and mismanagement
1Ibid., p. 46. "Salaries for P.O.'s in county courts are 
fixed by the judges of the county courts under their mandatory powers 
and are thus on the whole higher...".
2Ibid., p. 45.
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prevalent in the lower court structure infected and then consumed the 
adult courts with the advent of the 1974 consolidation of all 
probation services in the city into a single mayoral agency, the 
Department of Probation, and the subsequent loss of one third of staff 
during New York's 1975 "fiscal crisis." Whereas during the period, 
1945-1962, a position as a P.O. in county court was deemed the most 
prestigious, with fierce competition among federal and city P.O.'s (as 
well as state parole officers) for appointment to these better paying 
slots, there has now been a complete reversal of this pecking order, 
owing to shrinking municipal correctional budgets, with federal and 
state positions now recruiting most of their staff from the 
demoralized New York City Department of Probation.1 In a recent 
letter to the State Legislative Committee on Expenditure Review, the 
former President of the City's Probation Officers' Union summarized 
this process:
In 1957, when I entered employment in the Kings County Court 
Probation Department, as a promotional opportunity after a few 
years experience in the then Magistrates Court Probation Bureau, 
the qualifications of staff and the salaries were the highest in 
the nation....The specialization of caseloads for drug-addicted
1The state and federal correctional establishment has been 
better able to shield their budgets from the depredations of public 
and political pressures in the past decade. However, although 
professionalization of federal P.O.'s continues apace, its performance 
has also been criticized in the past decade. See U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Probation and Parole Activities Need to be Better 
Managed: A Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: General 
Accounting Office, 1977).
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offenders, psychiatrically based offenders, the provision of 
special employment and referral services on an "in- house" basis, 
were all innovations emulated by other departments. As time went 
on, however, particularly with the consolidation of agencies 
within the City of New York and the elimination of differentials 
of qualification, experience, pay, and the equalizing- downward of 
delivery of services to the least-passable, probation itself as a 
professional field of employment and as a credible alternative to 
incarceration of offenders--have both become distasteful jokes.1
This "equalizing-downward" process in the quality of probation 
services, particularly in the preparation of PSR's in Kings County 
Supreme Court, will concern us later. For the moment it is sufficient 
to point out that chronic resource problems began to penetrate the 
county probation unit level at precisely the same time (1962) that 
county court judges themselves suffered a statutory diminution of 
their mandatory powers and prestige.2 When one adds to the equation 
the crime explosion of the late 1960s, which dramatically increased 
the workload of the courts, all the ingredients for organizational 
change present themselves.
In fact, a 1977 study by Smith and Pollack of the reasons 
behind the increased use of plea bargaining in New York State courts
^Letter of Ross L. Umans to N.Y.S. Chairman of Legislative 
Committee on Expenditure Review, A. Kremmer, 19 September 1982.
2Their powers of mandamus were stripped effective 1 Sept­
ember 1962, when state reorganization transformed the county court 
into the State "Supreme Court."
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(97 percent of all convictions were a result of pleas in the peak 
years of the early 1970s)1 found that between 1952 and 1974, while 
the felony workload of judges had increased six times, the number of 
judges had only doubled.2 In addition, lengthier trials 
necessitated by the U.S. Supreme Court's expansion of due process 
rights and its imprimatur for plea bargaining helped spur the wider 
adoption of "sentence bargaining" as a bureaucratic refinement of plea 
bargaining to induce speedier dispositions. (An interesting ancillary 
question not raised by recent apologists for plea bargaining, who have 
convincingly demonstrated that guilty plea dispositions accounted for 
the majority of convictions in state courts since the second half of 
the nineteenth century, is: what percentage of pleas were sentence 
bargained prior to the 1960s?)
The fact that the five district attorney offices in New York 
City expanded dramatically at the same time that sentence bargaining 
gained ascendency in county courts appears to add support to the 
theoretical perspective which posits a shift in de facto sentencing 
power from the judge to the assistant district attorney. To 
illustrate, when Eugene Gold became District Attorney of Kings County 
in 1968, his Office had a staff of 90 prosecutors and an annual budget 
of two million dollars. When Gold retired in December of 1981, he 
ruled a veritable empire of more than 300 ADAs and a 14 million
1Hughes Committee, p. 14.
2Alexander Smith 6 Harriet Pollack, "The Courts Stand 
Indicted in New York City," pp. 252-61.
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dollar annual budget.1 Comparing these resources to the workloads 
of the courts and corrections in the same period is a sobering 
exercise but to date there is very little attempt in the literature to 
relate this power shift to less pedestrian perspectives, such as socio­
economic trends.2 Instead, the focus has been on dispositional 
modes in the daily courtroom processing of the workflow and sentencing 
disparity largely attributed to judges.
In fact, the periodic reports of political and legal 
committees, commissions and agencies have been uniformly lacking in 
any systematic overview of how organizational changes might have 
evolved from efforts to cope with the inefficient consequences of the 
extension of due process rights or how the imbalance in resources 
allotted to the police, prosecution, courts and corrections affects 
case processing.5 Instead, there is a narrow preoccupation with
lnGold, Near Retirement, Asks Justice System Aid," New York 
Times, 9 August 1981 , p. 47. Smith and Pollack ("Courts Stand 
Indicted," p. 257) note that in New York City, "the entire criminal 
justice system outside the Police Department receives only 1-1/2 
percent of the city budget."
2Anthony Platt attempts a non-empirical overview from a
radical perspective in his 1977 epilogue to The Child Sayers, claiming
that increased funding for the criminal justice system since the 1960s 
has been the result of governmental desires to repress dissent and 
cope with worsening economic situations. Platt's argument lacks 
substantive documentation and is too simplistic.
5F. D. Cousineau and S. N. Verdun-Jones come closest to such 
a perspective, criticizing the lack of research in this area, since 
prosecutorial bargaining practices have major implications "for the 
whole range of criminal justice agencies." See their monograph, 
"Evaluating Research into Plea Bargaining in Canada and the United 
States: Pitfalls Facing the Policy Makers," Canadian Journal of 
Criminology 21 (July 1979): 305.
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what is inevitably labelled the "crisis in our courtrooms and jails." 
Scapegoating is coimnon and procedural changes are advanced as 
paliatives until the next commission is appointed. This avoidance of 
larger questions and the failure to acknowledge the impact of public 
sentiment upon the funding and public administration of the 
politically sensitive institutions of social control renders these 
reports (prepared by lawyers and politicians absent input from public 
administrators and technocrats) remarkably similar, imbued as they are 
with what John Coffee elsewhere has labelled the legal community's 
"unconsciously egotistical vision of the legal process" and its 
"tendency toward a culture-bound vision of the legal system."1
The Hughes Committee
Thus, the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Crime 
(the "Hughes Committee"), in its 1971 Report, took note of the "new 
practice in the criminal courts in New York City in response to case 
load pressures" --sentence bargaining--arising from the discovery of 
judges in felony courts that "pleas of guilty in any significant 
number cannot be obtained without sentence committments in advance of 
the p l e a . T h i s  practice was presented as simply the dubious 
consequence of judicial work load pressures and the solution offered 
was to restrict judicial discretion by enacting more regulations for 
plea bargaining into the Criminal Procedure Law. Such changes were
Ijohn Coffee, "Repressed Issues of Sentencing," p. 1044.
^Hughes Committee, p. 14.
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enacted, with the result that fewer felony indictments were bargained 
down to misdemeanors, more defendants were incarcerated and sentence 
bargaining continued to remain the predominant means of obtaining 
dispositions.
The Hughes Report ensured its honored position in the 
subsequent literature on presentence investigations when it 
observed--absent any empirical validation--that "once a sentence 
committment is made by a judge, the PSR is subtly tailored to justify 
the sentence." The Committee, anticipating Kingsnorth and Rizzo by 
eight years, concluded that "a very important component in the 
sentencing process is thus distorted to fit the exigency of having to 
keep the dispositions flowing."* (This observation appears to have 
been borrowed from Blumberg but he is not credited.) The Committee, 
again by inductive reasoning (absent any study of PSR's and relying 
only on interviews with judges and offenders),2 concluded that the 
"subtle tailoring" of the PSR introduces distortion into the entire 
correctional process because the PSR is used for prison assignment and 
classification, for parole elligibility, and for community supervision 
purposes. Consistent with the recommendations of the 1967 
Presidential Crime Commission and the American Bar Association 
Standards Committee, the Hughes Committee urged expanded use of
*Ibid., p. 15.
2In a Staff Report on "Guilty Plea-Bargaining and Prisoner's 
Attitudes," March, 1971, N.Y.S. prisoners were found to be largely 
resentful of the bargaining process; 47 percent of Attica inmates were 
reported to feel the judge did not keep his sentence promise. Ibid., 
p. 7.
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pre-pleading investigations and a reduced role for PSRs.1
In the same year that the Hughes Committee issued its
influential report, another committee--the Interdepartmental Committee 
on Probation Reports of the Appellate Division^--surveyed the 
attitudes of 65 county court judges in New York City on PSR's. If one 
were to believe the Hughes Committee, this survey would be expected to 
indicate judicial consensus that the PSR is non-essential. On the 
contrary, almost every one of the 17 data elements of the PSR which 
the judges were asked to rate as either "essential," "desirable" or 
of "little value" was considered "essential" by an overwhelming 
majority of judges. This Committee concluded that "the judges, having
failed to conclusively identify any items as being of 'little or no
value,' all should be retained."3 (Considered most essential were:
1) prior criminal history; 2) circumstances of offense; and 3) 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.)
A third subcommittee (the Subcommittee on the Functioning of 
Probation, a task force formed from the state legislature's
Subcommittee on Liaison with Public and Private Agencies) studied New
York City PSRs in 1973, and, noting the great increase in workloads
for P.O.'s, found the reports to be "water[ed] down [in] their
informational content" and increasingly contained "unverified and
1Hughes Committee, pp. 15-17.
^Interdepartmental Committee on Probation Reports of the 
Appelate Division, First and Second Departments, Report, 1971, p. 4.
3Ibid.
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inaccurate information."1 This sudden intense interest in New York 
City's PSRs was spurred by jail overcowding caused by record numbers 
of indictments and convictions. Since a significant number of 
detainees were awaiting completion of PSRs,2 many observers argued 
for the elimination of an expensive, time consuming step in the 
sentencing process, focusing narrowly on the lack of impact of the 
P.O.'s recommendation on "bargained for" sentences. At this time of 
jail and prison turbulence across the state, two reports, both 
prepared by law school students (for the New York City Board of 
Correction) enshrined this anti-PSR point of view in New York State.
A decade later the probation community has yet to even attempt a 
response to this direct attack on the raison d'etre for the PSI.
These two reports, combined with Kingsnorth f, Rizzo's 1979 study, have 
served only to hand further anmunition to the legal community's 
attempt to exclude probation agencies from the sentencing process.
The Witztum Report 
Ruth Witztum, then a student research associate for the
Subcommittee on Functioning of Probation for the 
Subcommittee on Liaison with Public and Private Agencies, The Role and 
Quality of Probation Services in New York City, Unpublished 
manuscript, 1973, pp. 25-34. The Judicial Process Commission, A Study 
of Probation, 1976, another unpublished manuscript, made many of the 
same non-empirical claims.
2Up until overwhelming numbers brought about a change in the 
practice in 1973, the Probation Department in county courts controlled 
the sentence calendar, scheduling sentences upon completion of the 
PSR. This practice naturally led to some abuse, including one 
instance known to this writer wherein a defendant remained detained 
for nine months waiting for a P.O. to complete the investigation (see 
Chapter VI).
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Criminal Law Education and Research Center at N.Y.U. Law School, spent 
the summer of 1972 on a project which was to be immediately utilized 
by the New York City Board of Correction in its efforts to spur public 
policy changes to improve jail conditions and which would eventually 
be cited by all subsequent researchers in this field in New York 
(although rarely directly). Securing the probation administrator's 
approval (in Brooklyn Supreme Court), she conducted the first 
empirical study of the impact of PSRs on sentence bargaining.
Testing two hypotheses--that the PSR has little impact on sentence 
bargaining and that a P.O. aware of the sentence promise is more apt 
to ratify the promise than his ignorant counterpart--she purported to 
find strong evidence for accepting both hypotheses. Witztum found 
that the PSR clearly influenced only 7.7 percent of bargained 
sentences, with the promise and sentence agreeing 90 percent of the 
time. In other words, the judge amended his sentence promise to 
follow the PSR's recommendation (a plea was withdrawn by the defendant 
who would not accept such an amended promise) in less than eight cases 
in a hundred.* Secondly, where the promise was known to the P.O., 
the recommendation agreed with the eventual sentence in 14.8 percent 
more cases than when no promise had been made, and an overall 70 
percent agreement rate was found between recommendation and
iThe remaining 2.3 percent of the cases were those where 
promise, recommendation and sentence were all dissimilar.
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promise.1 Witztum reasoned that since in 70 out of 100 cases the 
PSR "merely endorses the plea bargain" and "in the majority of the 
remainder the changes it suggests are not of major significance"
(i.e., recommending either a shorter or lengthier period of 
incarceration than that promised, or recommending processing of the 
defendant through a different correctional institution), then PSR's 
were "largely superfluous, at best verifying the judge's perceptions 
found at the time the guilty plea is taken...in any event the judge 
will most often honor the agreement as to sentence despite a contrary 
recommendation."2 Witztum, not surprisingly then, urges making 
PSRs optional for sentence bargained cases in order to eliminate 
delays in sentencing and free up manpower to reduce supervision 
caseload sizes.
Once again, however, we find methodological error invalidates 
many of Witztum's most salient findings. In selecting 300 odd cases 
for her study, Witztum introduced sampling error when she erroneously 
assigned 107 cases to the category of "no promise" on the assumption 
that no mention of a sentence promise in the probation case file or 
PSR was sufficient proof that no sentence promise had indeed been made 
by the court at the time of plea.^ However, this is faulty
iRuth Witztum, "The Utilization of Presentence Reports in 
Kings County: An Analysis of the Value of Mandatory Presentence 
Reports for Plea Bargained Dispositions," Unpublished manuscript, 
November, 1972, pp. 17-32.
^Witztum, "Utilization of Presentence Reports," p. 29.
^Ibid., pp. 29-30. ^Ibid. , pp. 9, 13.
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reasoning. As a probation officer who examined case files in the same 
Kings County office for almost ten years, I can attest to the fact 
that P.O.'s frequently neglect to either ascertain or note in writing 
the details of a plea bargain. Some fail to do so because they claim 
they do not want their own recommendation or their supervisor's to be 
influenced by the bargain; others simply assume the details of the 
bargain reported by the defendant are correct but don't report them; 
and because some judges object to including mention of the bargain in 
the report, other P.O.'s omit mentioning it altogether. In addition, 
Witztum's reliance on probation's reportage of the plea bargain--often 
based on a defendant's statement to the P.O.--assumes accuracy when 
there is no reason to do so, since defendants sometimes misunderstand 
sentence promises and P.O.'s sometime misunderstand defendants. 
Furthermore, Witztum fails to empirically consider an alternate 
explanation for the 70 percent agreement rate between promise and 
recommendation, namely, the San Francisco Project's finding that 
judges and P.O.'s assign the same weight to the same legal and 
extra-legal variables in their decision-making. Finally, Witztum 
posits no value to the content of PSRs, virtually equating the 
recommendation with the report and ignoring the uses to which the PSR 
is put by other actors in the criminal justice system.
The Board of Correction 
Relying heavily on the Hughes Committee Report and the Witztum 
Report, the New York City Board of Correction's 1973 Report (written 
by Carol Gerstl, another N.Y.U. law student) presented a much quoted
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imprimatur of Witztum's research: "If 95 percent of all convictions
are gained through guilty pleas and if in over half of these cases the 
sentence is determined prior to any investigation so that the report 
acts merely to confirm the already negotiated sentence, the City is 
expending a great deal of money for rubber stamps."1 Foreshadowing 
the 1981 "PSI Crisis" episode, this report blames the PSR and its 
expanded mandatory use in the lower courts for overcrowding in 
detention facilities, neatly sidestepping the impact of the 
precipitous rise in arrests, convictions, and indictments, at a time 
when new procedural safeguards resulting from the Warren Court's 
rulings were also contributing to delays in dispositions. In a less 
than convincing argument, the report also dismisses the 1971 survey of 
county court judges described above (which found judges placed 
considerable value in PSRs), suggesting instead that the jurists were 
merely playing by the rules of the game in politely perpetuating the 
fiction which "assumes the smoothly functioning adjudicative system 
where sentence is not determined until after the PSR has been received 
by the judge."2 The study then recommends, like Witztum, that PSR's 
be waived for cases involving sentence bargaining. In a revolutionary 
proposal which would pose more legal and ethical problems than it 
would solve, the article concludes with a suggestion that the
1Carol Gerstl, "Presentence Reports: Utility or Futility?" 
Fordham Urban Law Journal, no. 2 (1973-74), p. 41. Kingsnorth 8 Rizzo 
found 40 percent of plea bargained cases to contain sentence 
bargains. Like Witztum, their sample was drawn from the year 1972, 
but a continent away.
2Ibid., pp. 34-37.
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admittedly understaffed probation department perform pre-pleading 
investigations on every defendant in felony court prior to 
conviction.' *
The Economic Development Council
In 1977, a citizen's group funded by the private sector, the 
Economic Development Council, produced an 'Organization Report on the 
New York City Department of Probation" after conducting some 200 
interviews of probation staff. However, the usefulness of the Report 
is marginal at best, because the Task Force was unaccountably denied 
"access to case records, observations of case worker interviews 
and...raw material"2 and was specifically "not permitted to 
examine.. .presentence records."-* In a methodological leap of faith, 
the Report first allows that "without hard information on the actual 
impact of PRSs on the sentences imposed by judges, it is difficult to 
assess their real worth,'"* but then nevertheless proceeds to 
evaluate the PSR based on interviews of dubious reliability with 
P.O.'s and administrators:
A substantial part of each report merely repeats or embellishes 
upon information already in the court papers. For example, a 
major felony repeat offender, age 35, whose sentence and plea has 
already been agreed upon, might be the subject of an 8 page single
llbid., pp. 46-53.
2Economic Development Council, Organization Report on the 
New York City Department of Probation (New York, 1977), p. iv.
3lbid., p. 72. 4lbid., p. 44.
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space PSR which includes 3 pages of his past criminal record 
(already in the NYSID printouts) and such "social" information as 
his high school education, past employment, early family life and 
personal drinking habits.*
Hie E.D.C. "study" then questions the value of assigning 
"substantial resources" in adult courts to investigations, noting 
"many unit supervisors and branch chiefs...seriously questioned the 
value of PSIs," while "many P.O.'s and their supervisors...have 
little confidence in the influence of PSRs--an attitude which affects 
their morale and perhaps even the work product.
There are a number of points to make here. First, the claim 
that the PSR merely repeats information about the defendant's criminal 
record already known to the court is a serious distortion of the 
truth. The authors fail to mention that the NYSID printouts (an 
acronym for New York State's computerized criminal "identification and 
data system") available to the judge contain no details of the arrest 
and often lack dispositional data, two shortcomings remedied by the 
PSR (see Chapter VI for a discussion of judicial reaction to deleting 
this data). They also ignore the consistent findings of both critics 
and apologists of present sentencing practices that a defendant's 
prior criminal record is invariably the first or second most important 
factor weighed by sentencing judges. Secondly, "social" information 
on defendants promised state prison sentences has utility for prison
1Ibid. ^ibid.
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officials and the parole process. The E.D.C.'s blithe assurance that 
"the State correctional authorities reportedly perform their own 
investigations and classifications" and that the "use of the 
investigation's report by other agencies, an ancillary benefit, 
has...been more 'potential' than actual,"1 is quite simply, not 
true. Proof of the "ancillary" value of PSRs was provided anew in 
1981 when pro forma PSRs (instituted to quickly process defendants 
out of overcrowded detention centers--see Chapter VI) caused numerous 
complaints by correctional and parole officials. In fact, parole 
officers rely heavily on PSRs in conducting their own pre-release 
reports, which focus only on residence and employment prospects. 
Thirdly, the reported low morale of probation investigators might not 
be a product of their perceived lack of impact but due to other 
factors (such as low pay, overwork and sagging prestige) affecting 
their self evaluation.
In the final analysis, the E.D.C. makes an excellent 
suggestion when it contrasts an uncited "state sampling reported by 
the State Division of Probation in which sentence promises were 
changed about 20 percent of the time after receipt of a PSR" with 
"other informal estimates--as low as 5 percent"2--and calls for an 
empirical six month study of PSR's in Supreme Court, supplemented by a 
polling of judges to find out "what causes changes in prior sentence 
promises."-* This exemplary proposal continues to gather dust nine 
years after the fact.
1Ibid. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 67-69.
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As the 1970s wore on, public pressure for a more retributive, 
incapacitating response to continuing high violent crime rates led to 
numerous amendments to New York State's indeterminate sentencing 
structure, limiting plea bargaining and increasing penalties for drug 
dealers and second and third offenders (1973), violent and juvenile 
offenders (1978) and fixing longer minimum state prison terms 
(1978).1
The Morgenthau Committee
Against such a backdrop and amid escalating dissatisfaction 
with sentencing disparity in New York State, Governor Carey in 1978 
appointed the Executive Advisory Committee on Sentencing (the 
"Morgenthau Committee") to "evaluate the effectiveness of the existing 
laws relating to imprisonment, probation and parole in achieving 
sentencing goal s."2 The Committee found a sentencing system 
"marked by inconsistency and unjustifiable disparity," partly because 
the "vast discretion" exercised by judges was "nearly inmune from 
review" and partly because "the penal law presents no coherent set of 
goals to guide the sentencing decision."3 The blame for disparity
ISee New York State, Chapter 481 of the Laws of 1978; Penal 
Law, Sections 10.00, 30.00, 60.10 and 70.05; N.Y.S. Criminal Procedure 
Law, Sections 1.20, 180.75, 190.71, 210.43, 220.10, 300.50, 330.25, 
720.10, 725.00, and 725.20. See also Joan Edith Nufield, "The 
Allocation of Sentencing Power in New York State, 1964-1970," (Ph.D. 
dissertation, State University of New York, Albany, 1979), p. 180-212, 
which details the first step in this process, the 1 September 1967 
amendments in the penal law which decreased the discretion of the 
parole board by collapsing maxima-minima.
^Morgenthau Committee, Report, p. ii.
^Ibid., p. vii.
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was also imputed to the usurpation of sentencing powers by parole 
boards and to the "mechanical, inaccurate and unfocused" PSR,1 which 
"fails to provide the basis for informed use of judicial discretion, 
or to bring the sentencing decision the order and structure which the 
penal law itself lacks."2
Like previous critiques of the PSR, the Morgenthau Committee's 
Report not only blames PSRs for contributing to sentencing disparity, 
but simultaneously labels them superfluous to the sentencing decision 
because of bargained sentences. Clearly, the reports cannot be both 
at the same time, but this logical inconsistency appears not to have 
been recognized by the Committee. Variations on this basic 
contradiction permeate the entire Committee's treatment of probation 
investigations (analysis of this confusion suggests a final paradigm 
for classification of the literature on the PSR presented below), 
reflecting quite accurately a basic confusion which has been 
introduced into the literature during the past decade.
Decrying the "all or nothing" dichotomy in sentencing 
(incarceration or probation), one of the Committee's key proposals 
called for expanded utilization of "intermediate dispositions-- 
including restitution, day fines and community service."3 To this 
end the Committee called for "encouraging and developing these 
conmunity-based programs on a state-wide basis" by making "a single 
state agency responsible" for creating them.^ The dearth of
*Ibid., p. 37. p# 3g>
3Ibid., p. xv. ^Ibid., p. 149.
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sentencing alternatives and the resultant use of probation as a 
"catch-all disposition,"* were both attributed to one salient 
factor: presentence reports; and to remedy the problem the Committee
recommended that the investigative function be stripped from the
probation agency entirely.
Furthermore, the Committee attacked PSRs in general because 
they "do not describe treatment alternatives nor--even more 
important--do they state whether the offender needs probation 
services," which leads to overuse of probation "for offenders who need 
no supervision and for whom another community sanction...would be more 
appropriate."2 Thus the Committee claimed that "insufficient
attention is paid to assessing the needs of potential candidates for
probation or determining what programs could best meet those needs.
As a result, community sanctions other than probation have never been 
energetically or systematically developed across the state."3 Here, 
the Committee is clearly presenting a prescription for a treatment 
oriented report. In fact, it recommends that the presentence 
investigation function should be "prepared by court investigators," 
and not by P.O.'s, for two interrelated reasons.
First, it argues such a change would allow probation
*Ibid., p. 100.
2Ibid., p. 97. Yet in the Committee's Appendix, a survey of 
judges (pp. 242-46) found "most judges, but not all, say the PSR or 
the Probation Department does inform them (of suitable alternative 
programs of non-incarceration sentence)."
3Ibid., p. 102.
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departments to concentrate on doing the real work of probation: 
"providing social services to probationers."1 Yet, in urging such a 
radical step, the Committee nowhere asks (let alone resolves) the 
question of how "court investigators" will be better able to assess 
the treatment needs of offenders. If the PSI is to be conducted by 
court functionaries, how are they to develop treatment plans when 
pressured by judges to sculpt reports to conform to organizational 
pressures? (The Committee, with perhaps unintentional irony, argued 
that investigators "responsible to the Chief administrative judge" 
would be more "responsive to the needs" of the courts.Indeed, 
elsewhere the Committee complains that probation spends too much of 
its resources servicing the courts when it should be servicing 
probationers, without recognizing the organizational and theoretical 
pressures which made this preeminent concentration on presentence 
reports inevitable. But despite all this lip service to "treatment," 
the Committee's prescription for the presentence report completely 
jetisons the rehabilitative reasoning presented above:
A presentence report... should primarily present information 
relating to the offender's criminal history and facts relating to 
the offense. It would include an indication of the applicable 
guideline sentence and elucidate any factors which might suggest 
that a sentence outside the guidelines would be appropriate.^
Such a proposal is based on the Committee's belief that the
*Ibid., p. 148. ^Ibid., p. 147. ^Ibid., p. 148.
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"nature of the current offense and prior criminal history are the most 
important determinants" in assessing any sentence,1 particularly 
under the revised "justice model" system of sentencing guidelines and 
presumptive parole which they envisage. This type of report, the 
Committee suggests, would eliminate extraneous variables from 
interfering in the sentence recommendation: "...individual P.O.'s make 
[recommendation] decisions on an ad hoc basis...[Fjactors such as the 
probation department's own supervisory caseload and its perceptions of 
the judge's customary sentencing practices may strongly influence 
P.O.'s recommendations.2
So strongly does the Committee feel about these unwarranted 
considerations impinging on sentencing that it offers as another 
reason for transferring PSR production to court investigators the 
following strong words: "[We] are also convinced that probation
departments should not be afforded the opportunity to determine the 
size of their own caseloads through their recommendations regarding 
who and who would not be placed on probation."3 One might be likely 
to conclude from the above discussion that the Morgenthau Committee 
posited much power of influence in the report and its recommendation. 
Paradoxically, it argued from the opposite perspective when it suited 
its purpose:
...the presentence report is seldom more than a prolix offender 
biography which recites facts having little relevance to the 
sentencing decision. Other features of the report, notably the 
offense description and criminal record, are largely drawn from
llbid., p. 37n. 2ibid., p. 38. 3Ibid., p. 148.
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the essentially duplicate information in the prosecutor's 
file...[t]he reports [have been found to be] lacking in 
necessary sentence and treatment recommendations.1
Finding the reports "often irrelevant to the sentencing 
decision to be made," the Committee argued that sentence bargaining 
severely undermined their utility,^ and, without integrating such a 
proposal into their other prescriptions, they reconmended "more 
extensive use of preplea reports."-*
The Committee's findings are based primarily on the previous 
studies which we have detailed earlier. It quotes liberally from the 
non-empirical Economic Development Council's study and uses other 
similarly tainted sources (Board of Correction report, Witztum,
Mayor's Committee, Hughes Committee). The only examples it cites to 
justify its proposal that probation not be allowed to determine its 
own intake (by manipulating recommendations) are the 1927 and 1938 New 
York State Crime Commissions, both of which refer to the New York City 
Court of Special Sessions, then a misdemeanor court, which was under 
fire from the public and politicians alike for granting too many 
probation sentences in 1926!̂
Perhaps the most glaring methodological weakness of the 
Morgenthau Committee's overview of probation can be found in its 
utilization of the only original empirical data it generated--a survey
*Ibid., p. 37. ^jbid., pp. 37-38. 5Ibid., p. 149.
4Ibid., p. 197n. Its Appendix Survey finds only 23 percent 
of judges and 17 percent of prosecutors feel P.O.'s might "sometimes" 
be swayed in their recommendations by caseload considerations. In
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of the actors in the plea bargaining process conducted by Louis Harris 
in late 1978. In the main body of its report, the Morgenthau 
Committee states: "criminal justice practitioners throughout the 
state--and particularly in New York City-- question the accuracy of 
the reports"1 and then refers the reader to the Appendix for 
validation. On the contrary, the Appendix reveals: "Most judges and 
prosecutors believe information in the presentence reports to be 
generally accurate."2 And, further: "[f]ew judges and prosecutors, 
downstate or upstate, criticize the report as usually inaccurate.
Only 10 percent of downstate judges and 17 percent of downstate 
prosecutors find the PSI to be only sometimes accurate."-* And 
lastly: "Most judges and prosecutors believe the reports are 'almost
always' or 'usually' accurate" while "many defense attorneys question 
the reports' accuracy" although they admit "they are less likely to 
challenge information on the defendant's background--perhaps to 
emphasize mitigating factors or to make an argument for probation.
Elsewhere in the main body of their Report, the Committee 
complained that "the offense description and criminal record" features
fact, this is one of the more spurious suggestions in the entire 
Morgenthau Report since it seriously distorts the entire thrust of 
probation history in this regard. Probation has consistently fought 
to make probation a selective sentence and to weed out those offenders 
for whom it would not be appropriate. Indeed, the PSI was originally 
developed for this very reason, as noted in Chapter I above. The 
impetus to use probation indiscriminately comes from other 
quarters--from judges and ADA's who use probation as a dumping ground 
to avoid troublesome or risky prosecutions or to avoid difficult 
sentencing decisions.
Ubid., p. 37. 2Ibid., p. 225. 3Ibid., p. 228.
4lbid., pp. 227-28.
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of the report were worthless rehashes1 of information already known 
to the participants. But Louis Harris' summary of his survey on 
presentence investigations is, in many ways, the direct opposite of 
the Committee's reported findings, providing us with yet another 
example of a government body refusing to be confused by the very facts 
it had collected:
In sum, most judges and prosecutors feel that the presentence 
investigation reports are generally accurate; provide valuable
information, particularly on the defendant's prior record; should
2contain sentence recommendations by trained P.O.'s...
Furthermore, the emphasis which New York PSRs place on a 
defendant's "legal history" is, in fact, largely justified by the 
following finding of the Harris survey:
Almost half the judges and prosecutors list the defendant's prior 
record as the 'one item of information most valuable to you' [in 
the PSR]. The survey reveals that the length or seriousness of 
the defendant's prior record is important to judges in several 
respects. Judges indicate that the prior record is the most 
likely reason they might decide not to impose probation as a 
sentence and is the major reason judges give for not following a 
prosecutor's sentence recommendation.^
^Qutoing in full the paragraph from the E.D.C. report we 
quoted above on p. 80--and if the reader will remember, the E.D.C. 
source was a disgruntled probation supervisor's unsupported feeling.
2Ibid., p. 239. -*Ibid., p. 226
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But if the sentence bargain is arranged at plea and if the PSR
merely "repeats or embellishes upon information already in the court
papers,"* then why would judges and prosecutors value such
"rehashes" so highly? The answer, we suggest, is that the PSR often
provides more detail, more analysis and more verification of the 
defendant's prior record than what was available to the sentence 
bargain participants at time of plea. One obvious example is 
information on subsequent arrests and convictions not reported in the 
computerized printouts which date from inception of the present 
prosecution and therefore do not reflect arrests that occurred while 
the defendant was awaiting trial. Other examples: details of past 
crimes; details of out-of-state and out-of-city convictions and arrest 
histories; details on federal arrests frequently omitted from "rap" 
sheets; details on parole and probation supervision; etc.2
Another case in point involves probation officers' 
recommendations which the Committee (as per Witztum) rated as useless 
and flawed. But the survey participants did not express this view at 
all:
The most important reason why judges and prosecutors favor 
specific sentence recommendations in the presentence investigation
1Economic Development Council, p. 44.
2An ancillary finding of the survey was that "prosecutors 
are three times as likely as judges to list family and job background 
as the most valuable item of information in the presentence report (30 
percent vs. 6 percent in NYC)" while the reverse proportion was found 
regarding the value placed on description of the offense, with judges 
more likely than prosecutors (by a ratio of 32 percent to 17 percent 
in NYC) to find this information of great value. Morgenthau Committee, 
Report, p. 226.
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reports is the belief that those who conduct the investigation are 
more familiar with the defendant's background and the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime...only 6t of
judges complain about the quality of report preparation or
personnel as a reason (for not wanting recommendations).*
It is true that Harris found defense attorneys to be "much 
more likely than others to question the quality of the reports or the
P.O.'s who prepare them."2 This holds true for every question in
the survey. Their displeasure might be an indication of support for 
Blumberg's contentions that judges use PSRs and P.O.'s as "crutches" 
in imposing sentence. But it might also indicate the defense 
attorney's disgruntlement at being "left out of the action." The 
investigating P.O. is least likely to contact the defendant's lawyer 
because, unlike the judge's court file, the assistant district 
attorney's prosecution file and the police officer's arrest file, the 
attorney has no hard information to offer. This also means that since 
the defense counsel's familiarity with the details of the crime are 
limited by whatever discovery motions and the defendant's statements 
have garnered prior to the plea, the attorney is likely to be 
presented the fullest account of the crime only minutes before 
sentencing is imposed--when the PSR is made available by the court. 
Unlike the P.O. however, the defense counsel has rarely interviewed 
the complainant or the arresting officer or researched details of 
previous arrests and so will be at a disadvantage in arguing
xIbid., pp. 230-31. 2Ibid.
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mitigation on the facts of the crime. Thus, the attorney will be more 
likely to concentrate on the social background of the report in 
arguing mitigation or in casting doubt on the report's "validity," 
since his client's social circumstances are least likely to be known 
to the ADA, and most likely to be familiar to defense counsel.
In any event, the anti-probation animus of the Morgenthau 
Committee is further elucidated by a study of its portrayal of the 
plea bargaining process. In perhaps the best description of the 
practice of sentence bargaining in New York City felony courts today, 
the Committee compares the process to the method of settling a civil 
lawsuit prior to trial:
...the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge act as a surrogate 
jury; by assessing the evidence in relation to the seriousness of 
the offense and the defendant's prior record, they arrive at a 
charge and sentence agreement which they deem to be appropriate in 
light of what they could reasonably expect to happen if the case 
proceeded to trial.*
In such a system the image of a magisterial above-the-battle 
judge poring over PSRs in order to arrive at a proper disposition 
would, of course, be absurd. But just as absurd is the Committee's 
attempt to absolve prosecutorial decision-making from any share of the 
blame for the sentencing disparity it so loathes. The Harris survey, 
for instance, found that "about half of the (polled) prosecutors held 
the belief that their sentence recommendations were 'almost always' or
*Ibid., p. 27.
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'usually' equivalent to the final sentence.Yet, how prosecutors 
arrive at their recommendations received scant attention from the 
Committee, which preferred to utilize the artificial and spurious 
device of a "simulation approach" whereby judges--unencumbered by 
defense attorney arguments, ADA or probation recommendations--were 
asked to read randomly chosen PSR's and then impose the best 
sentence.2 Would the incredibly disparate results have been any 
less disparate if prosecutorial decision-makers were administered a 
comparable instrument? Since the Committee failed to do so, we can 
not answer that question.
In addressing the related subject of long-standing judicial 
reluctance to supervise prosecutorial discretion, law professor 
Abraham Goldstein points out that traditional unchecked prosecutorial 
powers have resulted in: "the distorting effect of inaccurate pleas;" 
misleading defendants who plead to lesser charges but who are often 
sentenced for the "real" offense, rather than the adjudicated one; 
and relying on ad hoc "correctional factors as a basis for choosing or 
retaining a charge," thereby frustrating "the effort to make 
sentencing more rational by relying on...presentence reports."-* 
Indeed, the leading legal scholar in this area, Albert A1schuler, has 
noted that prosecutors are usually "unaware of information that even 
a routine pre-sentence investigation would have uncovered."*
*Ibid., p. 193. 2Ibid., p. 193.
^Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary, pp. 44, 60, passim.
*Albert W. Alschuler, "The Trial Judge's Role in Plea 
Bargaining," Columbia Law Review 76 (1976): 1059.
94
Finally, another compelling argument for the utility of 
presentence reports can be found in the Harris survey's discussion of 
judges' opinions on prosecutorial recommendations:
Judges whose sentences do not always coincide with the 
prosecutor's recommendations were asked [why]...many judges cite 
mitigating circumstances of the case. One judge cited, "the facts 
and feel of the case." Another cited, "factors revealed in the 
presentence report, of which the prosecutor is unaware." Several 
judges expressed a concern that the prosecutor's recommendations 
are often too severe a sentence, "not taking all these 
(mitigating) factors into consideration." Another judge commented 
that "the prosecutor nearly always recommends incarceration 
in every case. I personally believe I should attempt to take into 
account...the individual case."1
In assessing the bias of the Morgenthau Report it is 
interesting to note that in its survey of the "actors" in the plea 
bargaining process, it excludes what Susan and Leonard Buckle have 
referred to as "the only non-lawyer professional in a lawyer dominated 
coramunity"2--the probation officer.
The Morgenthau Committee's recommendations constituted one of 
four independent proposals made during a five year span to strip the 
PSR function from probation and transfer it to the courts or to a
1Morgenthau Committee, Report, p. 193.Ibid.
2Susan R. and Leonard Buckle, Bargaining for Justice: 
Disposition and Reform in the Criminal Courts (New York: Praeger
Publications, 1977), p. 153.
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not-for-profit agency. In 1977, the New York State Division of 
Criminal Justice Services promulgated as part of its criminal justice 
standards that "[p]resentence investigation and ROR investigation 
should be handled by an independent agency under the jurisdiction of 
the courts separate from the probation department."1
A committee of criminal lawyers from the New York bar, in a 
report on the New York City court system, also argued that probation 
understaffing and underfunding made transfer of the PSR function to 
the courts a sensible suggestion.^
The Correctional Association
The most recent call for the removal of probation departments 
from the sentencing process comes from a 1982 report of the 
Correctional Association of New York, the major focus of which was the 
"crisis in our jails and prisons."
In a case of the blind leading the blind, the Correctional 
Association cites the Morgenthau Committee citing the Economic 
Development Council citing some disgruntled probation supervisors as 
"evidence" that PSR's "concentrate on superficial backround 
information and criminal histories and generally do not attempt to 
formulate a specific post-conviction p r o g r a m . In a charge lifted
1New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services,
"State Standards and Goals for Criminal Justice Corrections," Albany, 
N.Y., 1977.
2"For the Record," The Chief (New York City civil service 
newsweekly), 31 July 1981, p. 4.
•^Correctional Association of New York, The Prison Population 
Explosion in New York State : A Study of the Causes and Consequences 
with Recommendations for Change (New York, 1982), p. 71.
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whole cloth from the Morgenthau Report, the Association complains that 
PSRs do not inform judges of suitable non prison programs for 
offenders, but praises the purported success of "client specific 
planning models" which are prepared by the Legal Aid Society in New 
York City in order to "set out a program for [the offender] designed . 
to ensure the future lawful conduct of the defendant and to serve the 
interests of others...such as the defendant's family and the victims 
of the crime.1 The Association thus urges transfer of the 
investigative function to court administrators or a public benefit 
corporation, since it feels "a prerequisite for an effective 
presentence and pre-plea investigation system is the removal of this 
function from already overburdened departments.
The PSR in New York: A Summary
It appears that recent overviews of the PSR in New York have 
confounded and misused prior studies of the subject for polemical 
reasons in an effort to: 1) accommodate the judiciary by urging that 
the PSI function be subsumed under the court administration; and 2) 
seize greater control of a device which could be used to better 
regulate jail and state prison intake. These issues will be explored 
at greater length in Chapter VI in connection with the 1981 jail 
overcrowding crisis in New York City.
Finally, it will be useful to point out in tabular form the 
basic dichotomy which exists in the recent literature on this topic, 
noting that a focus on sentencing disparty and P.O. decision-making
llbid., p. 72. 2Ibid., p. 74.
usually employs federal courts as the paradigm, while an emphasis on 
the futility of PSRs because of sentence bargained dispositions is 
always associated with research on the state court level. Oir review 
clearly illustrates that these two paradigms are mutually exclusive, 
although many writers continue to inappropriately combine the two 
because of an unfamiliarity with the day to day work flow of the 
different courts. This ignorance of the many informal rules which 
hold sway in the sentencing process accounts for some of the erroneous 
findings in this field to date.
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TABLE 2
SUKMARY OF PSR LITERATURE
Federal Courts: State Courts:
Disparity/Discretion PSR's
STUDY 8 P.O. Decision-Making Futility Data Base
San Francisco 
Project
Yes 300 PSR's 8 
Decision Games
John Coffee Yes Review of Lit.
Willard Gaylin Yes No* Interviews 
with Judges
Abraham Blumberg Yes Observation
Witztum Report* Yes 300 PSR's
Kingsnorth/Rizzo* " Yes 300 PSR's
Board of Correction* Yes Review of Lit.
Correct'l Ass'n." Yes Review of Lit.




Yes0 Yes Interviews 
w/Judges, ADA's
Hughes Committee* Yes° Yes Interviews 
w/ Inmates
Wilkins $ Carter Yes Decision Games
Wood § Sparks Yes Review of Lit.
Hogarth/Hagan Yes (Canadian) PSR's
* Both state and federal judges interviewed.
* Urges increased use of PPI's (pre-pleading investigations).
■ Urges probation be divested of investigative function in order to 
concentrate on supervision.
o Based on study of state courts.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Hypotheses and Definitions
Blumberg, Kingsnorth and Rizzo, Witztum and others argue that 
presentence reports have little impact on the sentencing judge-- not 
because of the reports' assertedly "mechanical, inaccurate and 
unfocused" nature* and "deficient techniques of fact-gathering"^
--but because once the plea and the accompanying sentence have been 
bargained, the parties involved (judge, defense attorney and assistant 
district attorney), intent on "moving things along," are loathe to 
amend the sentence promise lest they jeopardize the plea. Secondly, 
amending the sentence promise would also run counter to the United 
States Supreme Court's dicta in the McMann, Alford, and Santobello 
decisions that a plea bargain not kept is a conviction which can be 
reversed. Thirdly, it is argued from a purely bureaucratic 
perspective that the courtroom participants in the plea bargaining 
process are reluctant to amend the sentence promise based solely on a 
report delivered by a "non-lawyer professional"--the probation officer.
Based on my daily experience as a probation officer for more
*Morgenthau Committee, Report , p. 37.
^Frankel, Criminal Sentences, p. 33.
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than ten years, there is certainly much to support such arguments. 
However, I am also aware of many cases where the plea bargain has 
broken down or the sentence promise has been amended, based 
principally on the efforts of an "in-depth" presentence investigation 
by the probation officer. I suggest two hypotheses to test the 
arguments pertaining to the PSR's futility:
H* = The court is more likely to agree with a presentence
rep>ort which recommends a sentence to probation than it is 
to agree with a presentence report which recommends 
prison, because a judge is more likely to amend a promised 
sentence to a less severe outcome than a more severe 
outcome due to the primacy of legal constraints.
H^= A high quality presentence report has a significant impact
upon the actual sentence imposed for convictions wherein a 
specific sentence is promised by the court at the time of 
plea.
On the other hand, Coffee, Cohen, Hagan and others have argued 
that the PSR contributes to sentencing disparity because of unchecked 
P.O. discretion in framing the PSR. In addition to the PSR, however, 
critics have identified legal, extra-legal, organizational and 
extraneous variables as sources of sentencing disparity, such as sex, 
race, financial/employment status, custodial status, type of legal 
representation, judicial temperment, publicity, and defendant 
recalcitrance.
In order to test whether the impact of the PSR is overshadowed 
by demographic/legal variables contained within it, I have framed the 
following hypotheses:
H-*= The PSR's recommendation and the court's sentence are 
strongly correlated with the severity of the offense, 
criminal history, and custodial/employment status of the 
defendant.
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The PSR's recommendation and the court's sentence are not 
correlated with sex, age, race, legal representation, or 
financial status of the defendant.
H^* Sentences which are not correlated with sentence promise, 
or PSR recommendation or ADA recommendation are explained 
by extraneous variables.
Lastly, our statistical analysis will be supplemented by case 
studies of those dispositions in which promise, recommendation and 
sentence appear to be anomalous. Whenever possible, plea minutes were 
obtained and the probation officer and assistant district attorney 
assigned to each case were interviewed to supplement the written 
record in an effort to identify extraneous variables not controlled 
for in this study.
Methodology
There were 3,177 PSIs assigned to probation officers by 
Brooklyn Supreme Court judges during calendar year 1979. (About 150 
modified PSIs were also completed for other jurisdictions, primarily 
involving defendants residing in Brooklyn but convicted in other 
states; these cases were eliminated from consideration).
Since I decided to study each PSI in depth, extract over 40 
variables for each case, and computerize the data, it would have been 
prohibitively time consuming to select the entire universe of Brooklyn 
Supreme Court PSIs for analysis. Therefore, I used a random sampling 
technique to chose 283 cases for the study group and 57 cases for the 
control group. These 340 cases represent 10.7 percent of the PSIs 
requested by the Court for the year.
The probation branch in question assigns a case nunber to each
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judicial order for investigation as it is received. To choose my 
sample, I obtained a listing in numerical sequence of every PSI 
assigned and arbitrarily selected the eighth PSI assigned during 1979 
as the first candidate for selection. Thereafter, I chose every eighth 
number until I had accumulated 353 numbers. I then obtained the 
corresponding indictment numbers for each of these 353 cases from the 
clerk's log. Armed with this list of indictment numbers, I attempted 
to locate every judge's file for these cases in the record room of 
Brooklyn Supreme Court in order to obtain the plea minutes and note 
the case processing particulars of each case. If the case file did 
not contain a transcript of the plea elocution, I later attempted to 
obtain these details from the corresponding assistant district 
attorney's file. If the court folder or assistant district attorney's 
file indicated that no sentence promise had been made at the time the 
plea was entered -- or that the conviction was the result of a trial, 
the case was selected for inclusion in the control group.
Because of the unavailability of court, ADA or probation case 
folders, 43 cases had to be eliminated, leaving a total of 310 cases. 
Because of the low number of cases accumulated at that point for the 
control group (only 27, of which 15 were trials and 12 were pleas with 
no sentence promise), I randomly selected 20 additional trial 
convictions for inclusion in the control group from a list of trial 
cases noted in the probation log and located each of the folders. I 
then was forced to peruse 280 more randomly selected court files 
before I could locate 10 additional cases wherein a defendant had pled 
guilty but received no sentence promise. The final sample of 340
103
cases was then analyzed to determine whether they were truly 
representative of the universe of PSRs:
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE WITH POPULATION
Sample Population^
N-340 (12'. 11) N=2,803 1100.0%)
Conviction by Plea N-304 (89.3%) N=2,523 ( 90.1%)
Conviction by Trial N« 36 (10.7%) N= 280 ( 9.9%)
Predicate Felony Offender N= 43 (12.6%) N= 287 ( 10.3%)*
Youthful Offender N« 53 (16.1%) N- 317 ( 11.3%)*
Plea Withdrawn N= 15 ( 4.4%) N=Not Recorded**
By Disposition
Discharge/Fine/Other N= 14 ( 4.3%) N* 221 ( 7.9%)
Probation N=149 (45.8%) N« 789 ( 28.1%)
Jail Term*** N= 53 (16.3%) N= 234 ( 8.3%)
State Prison N-104 (32.0%) N-1,559 ( 55.6%)
*Pro-rated for King's County based on reported City-wide share.
**My research of probation records found a total of 75 pleas 
withdrawn during calendar year 1979, or 2.4% of all dispositions.
***Includes those sentenced to a period of probation following a jail 
committment.
The sample is difficult to compare with the total population 
for a number of reasons. First, the statistics compiled by the State 
from Kings County do not include misdemeanor convictions, which
^New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services, New 
York State Criminal Justice Processing, Felony Offenders Disposed~Tn 
1979 (Albany, 1982), pp. 13, 136-3?.
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represent almost eight percent of the sample. Since a prison sentence 
is impossible for a misdemeanor conviction, this would appear to 
account for some of the under-representation of prison sentences in
our sample. For example, Probation records indicate 3,177 convictions 
were recorded for the year. The 1,559 prison sentences recorded by 
the State would thus represent 49.1 percent of this total, in 
contrast to the 55.6 percent share of felony dispositions only. 
However, the difference between our sample and the population, even 
adjusted for the omission of misdemeanor convictions in the prison 
category (32.0% versus 55.6%) is still significant. Moreover, 
probation sentences and youthful offender adjudications appear to be
over-represented in the sample. The reason for this is unclear. A
sampling error might have favored selection of defendants in the study 
group for whom a prison or jail sentence was not mandatory (e.g., 
files for defendants sentenced to probation might have been more 
available for selection than files for imprisoned defendants because 
of appeals or subsequent indictments pending among this latter group 
of presumably more criminally active defendants):
TABLE 4
PROPORTION OF MANDATORY JAIL/PRISON CASES
Incarceration Incarceration
Not Mandatory Mandatory Total
Promise MadeT  „ (Study Group) 248 (88%) 35 (12%) 283 (100%)
N  ~  ”  1
35 (61%) 22 (39%) 57 (100%)
Total 283 (83%) 57 (17%) 340 (100%)
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On the other hand, the distribution in our sample, while 
appearing to be lopsided in favor of non-mandated sentences, might 
relfect reality in one sense. The control group would be expected to 
contain a greater proportion of mandatory prison cases because of the 
trial defendants within that sample (trial convictions usually are 
associated with more serious charges while plea bargains usually 
entail, by definition, some form of charge reduction in return for a 
guilty plea).
Neither the court administration, the State, nor the Probation 
Department maintained statistics in 1979 which would establish the 
absolute number of defendants who were convicted of offenses requiring 
incarceration sentences. However, it is known that in 1980, Kings 
County Supreme Court sentenced 52 percent of probation-eligible 
offenders to probation, compared to a City-wide average of 44 
percent.1 Another finding by the New York State Department of 
Correctional Services--which found that 21 percent of state prison 
inmates in 1979 were convicted of crimes for which probation sentences 
could have been imposed2--suggests that the disparity in our sample 
between mandatory and non-mandatory sentences (83% vs. 17%), if 
caused by sampling error, at least errs on the side of relevance.
A precoded research instrument (see Appendix) was used to
^Unpublished New York State Division of Probation study, 
referenced in agency memorandum of 18 January 1982, "Proposed 3-Tier 
Reimbursement."
^Executive Advisory Commission on the Administration of 
Justice ("The Liman Commission"), "Report on Proposals Under 
Consideration to Address Prison Population Growth and Overcrowding," 
(March 1982), p. 12.
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extract 45 variables from each probation case folder selected. In 
addition to plea bargaining details, probation and prosecutorial 
reconmendations and sentencing data, other identified legal and 
extra-legal variables noted in the literature as possibly influential 
in the sentencing decision were also obtained. These included: the 
defendant's sex, age, race, employment, marital, citizenship and 
social status (demographic, or "extra-legal" variables); and the 
defendant's prior arrest, conviction and community supervision record, 
custodial status, the type of defense counsel assigned, the status of 
any co-defendants, the severity of the offense and other case 
processing data (legal variables).
The recommendation for each PSR is written by the supervising 
probation officer (S.P.O.), with the recommentation of the probation 
officer writing the report treated as an intra-departmental document, 
and not submitted to the court. In examining all 340 files however, 
we could not locate a single P.O. recommendation which did not agree 
with the S.P.O.'s recommendation. This is not surprising. Any 
disagreement between P.O. and S.P.O. is resolved in-house through a 
conference with the Branch Chief. Rather than involve superiors in 
such matters, P.O.'s and S.P.O.'s usually thrash out their differences 
and arrive at a consensus recommendation.
Interviews with P.O.'s, S.P.O.'s, the Branch Chief and my own 
experience indicate there is rarely any disagreement which is not 
resolved below the Branch Chief level. (This practice differs 
substantially in federal court, where the P.O. submits the sentence
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recomnendation to the court after consulting with the supervisor.)
In collecting data on promises, recommendations and sentences, 
13 discrete categories were created with probation broken into four 
separate categories: "straight" probation (i.e., a term of probation
supervision with no incarceration, fine or special condition added), 
"shock" probation (i.e., a jail term followed by probation 
supervision), probation with a fine imposed and probation with a 
special condition imposed (the last category frequently entails a 
restitution order or a condition that the defendant enter a 
drug/alcohol/psychiatric treatment program).
In addition, although the N.Y.C. Department of Probation 
discontinued a practice of recommending specific terms of imprisonment 
in 1975, data on the length of a prison term promised and actually 
imposed was collected, in order to determine whether the PSR had any 
influence on the length of incarcerative sentences.
Finally, youthful offender ("Y.O.") adjudication is a device 
sometimes used by the court to induce guilty pleas by softening the 
blow of conviction for younger defendants. I collected data on 
youthful offender promises, recommendations and adjudications, as an 
additional means of measuring the PSR's inpact more precisely.
Of particular importance, content analysis of each PSR was 
conducted in order to frame an index of thoroughness for each 
investigation. Thus, each report was skimmed in order to determine 
if: 1) the arresting officer or the complainant for the current 
offense had been contacted; 2) dispositions were obtained on prior
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arrests; 3) school records or employment verification had been 
obtained; 4) parents or spouse of the defendant had been interviewed; 
and 5) the report contained a concluding evaluation of the defendant's 
recidivism/rehabilitation potential. A scale of thoroughness was then 
constructed with a value of one (1) assigned for each of five facets 
of an investigation completed, and a value of zero for each component 
not completed. The score for each PSR was then tallied and divided by 
five: a score of 1 on such an index indicates highest quality and a
score of 0 indicates lowest quality. Scores of 1, and .8 were 
collapsed and considered to be of high quality, while scores of .6,
.4, .2 and 0 were also compressed and considered to be of low 
quality. Low quality reports were hypothesized to have little impact 
on the court, even in cases where the judge is unlikely to read more 
than the supervising probation officer's one page recommendation, 
because it was conjectured that the S.P.O.'s recommendation would be 
more persuasive in high quality cases than in perfunctory reports, 
which contained little new information of any interest. For the 
purposes of this study, I will assume the validity of the findings of 
the 1966 Federal study of the Northern District of California and many 
other surveys which report that "some data are dominant as aids to 
decision making, notably the current offense [our thoroughness 
component #1 above], prior record [our #2 above], and 
measures/indicators of stability [our #3 and #4 above]."! These 
findings also conform to common sense.
^Carter and Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy," 
pp. 513-14.
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All of the data was thereafter transferred onto key-punch 
cards, loaded onto tape and processed through a mainframe computer. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences software was then 
utilized to analyze the data. Later this same data was loaded onto a 
microcomputer and analyzed using other statistical software.
A multivariate analysis of the data was performed to test the 
validity of the following path diagrams:
DIAGRAM 1







HYPOTHESIZED PATH MODEL FOR SAMPLE 
(Sentence Bargain)
PROMISE








In Table 5, the demographic characteristics of the study and 
control groups are presented. Sample 1 consists of 283 defendants who 
pled guilty in Brooklyn Supreme Court and were promised sentences of 
either probation, discharge, fine, city jail (or combination thereof) 
or state prison. The control group represents 57 defendants who pled 
guilty but did not receive a sentence promise or who were convicted 
after trial and faced sentences ranging across the same spectrum of 
dispositions.
The defendants are largely young black and Hispanic males, 
unemployed, single American citizens and from the lower class. The 
control group is significantly older than the study group, owing to 
the legal factors associated with trial convictees discussed below. 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of processing agents are male, 
except for the probation officer, who in 70 percent of the cases was 
female (however, the supervising probation officer was a male in fully 
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- Male 252 89.1%
- Female 19 6.7%
























- Male 274 96.8%






- Male 220 77.7%





In Table 6, the legal characteristics of the sample are 
presented. The study group consists largely of first offenders 
convicted of probation eligible property crimes (class "D" and "E" 
felonies), usually within six months of indictment, on bail or 
released in their own recognizance (ROR), with a significant prior 
history of arrests and community supervision, represented by legal aid 
and court appointed ("18b") attorneys, and prosecuted by the Supreme 
Court Bureau of the District Attorney's Office (the "all-purpose" 
bureau which handles those indictments not referred to other 
specialized bureaus within the Office, such as the Economic Crime, 
Narcotics, Major Offender, Sex Crimes and Rackets Bureaus). The 
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- 2 Months 105 37.1%
- 2 to 6 Months 95 33.6%
- 6 to 12 Months 49 17.3%










- None 60 21.1%
- One Below Top Count 171 60.4%












- Class A, B or C Felony 64
- Class D or E Felony 203







- Property Crime 147 51.9% 13 12.7%
- Violent Crime 78 27.6% 36 63.2%
- Weapon/Drug Possession 58 20.5% 8 14.1%
COURT PART (39 Judges)
- Conference 78 27.6% 3 5.3%
- Other 205 72.4% 54 94.7%
TYPE of DEFENSE COUNSEL
- Legal Aid 145 51.2% 20 35.1%
- "18b" 72 25.4% 15 26.3%
- Retained 66 23.3% 22 38.6%
TYPE of ADA
- Supreme Court Bureau 227
- Specialized Bureau 56
TYPE of SUPERVISING P.O.
- SPO #1 63
- SPO #2 67
- SPO #3 83









The Control Group differs from Sample 1 in a number of 
categories which reflect the predominance of trial convictees. Thus, 
the Control Group is more likely to be in detention, charged with 
violent crimes, represented by retained attorneys, and convicted of 
more severe offenses, with a longer case processing time than Sample 1.
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TABLE 6 - Continued
Sample 1 Control Group
Variable Number % Number %
PRIOR EXPERIENCE OF 
DEFENDANT WITH PROBATION/
PAROLE SUPERVISION
- None 183 64.7% 35 61.4%
- Lower Courts 64 22.6% 10 17.5%
- Felony Level 36 12.7% 12 21.1%
UNDER PROBATION/PAROLE 
SUPERVISION AT ARREST
- Yes 52 18.4% 6 10.5%
- No 231 81.6% 51 89.5%
STATUS OF CODEFENDANT 
AT TIME OF SENTENCE
- No Codefendant 201 71.0% 39 68.4%
- Charges Still Pending 57 20.1% 7 12.3%
- Previously Sentenced 25 8.9% 11 30.3%
HOW P.O. OBTAINED DETAILS 
OF PLEA BARGAIN________
- Not applicable
(i.e., trial) - -- 36 63.2%
- Not Indicated 48 17.0% 5 8.8%
- From Court or ADA 103 36.4% 8 14.0%
- From Defendant 132 46.6% 8 14.0%
The details of the plea bargain noted in the PSI case file were 
more likely to be obtained from the defendant than from the court or 
ADA. I found such information to be accurate in 90 percent of the 
cases compared against ADA and court records, with inaccuracies usually 
minor in nature. For instance, the P.O. noted a promise of probation 
reported by the defendant when the actual promise was probation and a 
fine. (In 1980, a new form was developed by the N.Y.C. Probation 
Department for the court's use in ordering PSI's, which includes 
specific details on the nature of any sentence promise.)
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In Table 7, data concerning the quality of the PSR's is 
presented, with the data aggragated to form an index in Table 8.
Fully two-thirds of the reports were found to be of high quality 
(i.e., containing a quality index of .8 or higher), with the P.O. most 
likely to have obtained dispositions of all prior arrests and to have 
interviewed the community member closest to the defendant. The 
reports were least likely to contain statements from the arresting 
officer or complainant.
TABLE 7






































*For those cases involving defendants with no prior arrests (N=56j, 
a substituted criterion--obtaining a copy of the police ballistics/ 
laboratory report for weapon/drug possession cases, or obtaining a 




(An average of 5 components 
listed above for each PSR)
- Poor (0) 3 1.1% 0
- Minimal (.2) 18 6.4% 2 3.5%
- Low Avg. (.4) 30 10.6% 5 8.8%
- High Avg.(.6) 44 15.5% 12 21.1%
- Low Impact 95 33.5% 19 33.4%
- Good (.8) 97 34.3% 21 36.8%
- Excellent (1) 91 32.2% 17 29.8%
- High Impact 188 66.5% 38 66.6%
Tabular Analysis
In Table 9, a cross-tabulation of the sentence promised by the 
court at the time of plea by final disposition, is presented for the 
study group. (We eliminated those 35 cases where an incarceration 
sentence was mandated by law.) The promises and sentences are listed 
in descending order of severity, with the least severe consisting of 
conditional or unconditional discharge, the most severe consisting of 
state prison and a line separating non-incarceration from 
incarceration promises.
There is exact correspondence between promise and sentence in 
193 of the 248 cases, for a 77.8 percent agreement rate between 
promise and sentence. For the 55 remaining cases, 14 (or 5.6%) 
received less severe sentences than originally promised, 28 (or 11.3%) 
received more severe sentences thar. originally promised, and 13 cases
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(or 5.2%) resulted in the withdrawal of guilty pleas, for an aggregate 





Frob+ Prob+ Prob +
PROMISE P/Vi Disch Fine Prob SpCon Fine Jail Jail Prison Tot.
DlscK----------- §--------T l T ------------------------------------&
Fine 5 (1) 6
Prob. 9 [2] [1] 104 (16) (2) (3) (2) (3) 142
P+SpCon 2 2
P+ Fine 4 4
P+ Jail TIT m  17 21
Un.Incar [1] 2 3
Jail 2 [1] [1] 15 19
Prison 2 [1J [1J (2] 39 45
Total IT ~7 ~E---1M ---- 23“ “5“ “22“ “2l“ ~TT
Promise = Sentence *= 193 (77.8%)
Sentence = More Severe = 28 (11.3%) (indicated by ())
Sentence * Less Severe = 14 (5.6%) (indicated by [])
Plea Withdrawn (P/W) = 13 (5.2%).
Collapsing this table into a dichotomous comparison of incar- 
cerative ("in")/non-incarcerative ("out") promises and sentences 
(treating probation with a jail term as an incarcerative sanction, and 
eliminating withdrawn pleas from consideration while including the 35 
mandatory sentence cases) reveals a higher rate of congruence:
TABLE 10
PROMISE BY SENTENCE (FULL DICHOTOMOUS MODEL)
SENTENCE (N-270)
PROMISE In Out Total
In 112(94.1%) 7 (5.9%) 119 (100%)
Out 8( 5.3%) 143 (94.7%) 151 (100%)
Total T2B T30 275"
120
Only 15 cases, or 5.5% of the 270 in the sample, received 
sentences that either eliminated (5.9%) or added (5.3%) incarcerative 
sanctions originally promised. Eliminating further the 35 cases in 
the study group whose incarceration was mandatory, produces the 
following result:
TABLE 11
PROMISE BY SENTENCE (IN/OUT FOR NON-MANDATORY CASES) 
___________  SENTENCE (N-235)________________
PROMISE In Out Total
In 77 (91.7%) 7 (8.3%) 84 (106%)
Out 8 (5.3%) 143 (94.7%) 151 (100%)
total 98 150 235
In this cross-tabulation, the likelihood of judges to amend 
"in" promises with less severe ("out") sentences (8.3%) rather than 
the converse (5.3%) is more evident, since the elimination of 
mandatory incarceration cases reduces the number of "in" promises 
(from 119 to 84) but does not effect the number of "out" sentences 
associated with such promises (7).
In Table 12, a cross-tabulation of the judge's promised 
sentence by the PSR recommendation is presented for the same group, 
adding the 13 plea withdrawn cases and providing the same expanded 
categories detailed in Table 9.
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TABLE 12 
PROMISE BY RECOMMENDATION 
RECOKflENDAT I ON (N-248)
Prob+ Prob+ Prob+ Unsp.
PROMISE Disch. Fine Prob SpCon Fine Jail Incar Jail Pris. Total
Disch. 2 (3) (1) 6
Fine [2] 4 6
Probat. 14] [3] 92 (14) (1) (1) (17) (10) 142
P+SpCon 2 2P* Fine [1] 11] 2 4
P+ Jail 13 J I 2 J 5 (9) ( 2) 21
Un.Incar 3 3
Jail [3] [1] 9 3 ( 3) 19
Prison [5] 9 31 45
Total 8 8 107 20 3 6 47 3 46 248
Promise = Recommendation ■ 162 (65.3%)
Recommendation ■ More Severe = 61 (24.61) (indicated by ( )) 
Reconmendation = Less Severe = 25 (10.1%) (indicated by [ ])
Of the 248 cases where a recommendation was made, 162 (or 
65.3%), agreed with the promise made; 61 recommendations (or 14.6%), 
were more severe; and 25 (or 10.1%), were less severe than the promise.
Collapsing this data into an "in/out" dichotomy reveals the 
following (again eliminating the 35 mandatory prison/jail cases):
TABLE 13
PROMISE BY RECOMMENDATION (IN/OUT FOR NON-MANDATORY CASES)
PSR RECOMMENDATION (N«248)
PROMISE In Out Total
In 77 (87.5%) 11 (12.5%) 88 (100%)
Out 28 (17.5%) 111 (82.5%) 166 (100%)
Total m  H 3  7M
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Here a much greater congruence of promise with recommendation 
is found than in Table 12 (209, or 84.2%, of the 248 cases in Table 
13, versus 162, or 65.3% in Table 12). However, the 39 cases (15.7%) 
in Table 13 for which recommendation disagrees with promise is more 
than twice the number of cases (15, or 6.4%) for which sentence 
disagrees with promise (Table 11). Moreover, PSR's are more apt to 
disagree with promises on the side of more punitive sanctions: 17.5%
(or 28) of the 160 cases promised "out" sentences in Table 13 resulted 
in incarceration recommendations, but P.O.'s recommended the converse 
("out" when "in" was promised) in only 12.5 percent (or 11) of the 88 
cases: P.O.'s recommendations were thus much more likely to conflict 
with "out" sentence bargains than judges were likely to amend such 
bargains:
TABLE 14
VARIANCE OF PROMISE/SENTENCE VS. PROMISE/RECOKWENDATION
"In" Promise with "Out" Sentence 
7 (8.3%) of 84 Promises
"In" Promise with "Out" Recommendation 
11 (12.5%) of 88 Promises
"Out" Promise with "In" Sentence 
8 (5.3%) of 151 Promises
"Out" Promise with "In" Recommendation 
28 (17.5%) of 160 Promises
Total Variance
15 (6.4%) of 235 Promises
Total Variance
39 (15.Ik) of 248 Promises
Comparing the reconmendation with the eventual sentence 
produced the cross-tabulation presented in Table 15.
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TABLE 15 
RECOMMENDATION BY SENTENCE 
SENTENCE (N * 248)
Prob+ Prob+ Prob +
RECMDTN. P/W Disch Fine Prob SpCon Fine Jail Jail Prison Tot,
Disch. "4" (1) (3) 8
Fine 5 (1) (2) 8
Probat. 6 [2] 86 (4) (1) (2) (5) (1) 107
P+SpCon [1] t2] 15 (1) (1) 20
P+ Fine HJ 2 3
P+ Jail 6 6
Unsp.In. 3 [9J [3] [11] 11 11 48
Jail [1] 2 3
Prison 4 [6] [1] [1] [3] 30 45
Total 13 7 6 108 23 6 22 21 42 248
Recommendation = Sentence = 172 (70.11)
Recommendation = More severe sentence * 22 (8.9%)(indicated by ()) 
Recommendation « Less severe sentence = 41 (16.5%)( " " " [])
Plea Withdrawn (P/W)= 13 (5.2%)
In fully 70 percent of the cases, recommendation agreed with 
sentence, occupying a median position between the congruence of 
promise with sentence (78%), and the agreement of promise and 
recommendation (65%).
Adding the 35 mandatory incarceration cases to Table 9 (and 
eliminating one case which contained no recommendation) changes the 
variance very little: the study group reflects complete agreement
between PSR and eventual sentence in 72.0 percent of the cases (203 
out of 282), with the PSR more likely to have recommended less severe 
sanctions (41, or 14.5%) than more severe dispositions (22, or 7.8%) 
in cases where disagreement is found.
Collapsing Table 15 into a dichotomous cross-tabulation 
(eliminating withdrawn pleas and mandatory sentence cases) reveals an
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overall agreement rate of 881 (207 out of 235 cases), with the court 
more likely to follow non-incarcerative (94%) than incarcerative (80%) 
recoranendat i ons:
TABLE 16
RECOWENDATION BY SENTENCE (IN/OUT FOR NON-MANDATORY CASES)
SENTENCE (N-235)
RECOMMENDATION In Out Total
"In " TFCS'OVT 19'('2D.1T%) 93 (100%)
Out 9(6.4%) 131 (93.6%) 146 (100%)
Total 85 150 235
To summarize, our study group of cases wherein the court 
possessed sentencing discretion, when examined for variation across 
the complete spectrum of possible dispositions, shows significantly 
more deviation between promise and sentence (22%), promise and 
recoranendation (35%) and recommendation and sentence (31%) than when 
examined in simple dichotomous terms (6%, 16% and 12%, respectively):
TABLE 17
NUMBER 8 PERCENTAGE OF DISAGREEMENT 
FOR PROMISE/RECOMMENDATION/SENTENCE
Dichotomous Full
Analysis (N=235)* Analysis (N=248) **
PROMISE BY
SENTENCE 15 (6%) 55 (22%)
PROMISE BY
RECO&MENDATION 39 (16%) 86 (35%)
RECOKWENDATION BY 
SENTENCE 28 (12%) 76 (31%)
*The 13 cases involving withdrawn pleas are excluded (since the plea 
bargain was dissolved), except for promise by recommendation (n=248).
**"nie 13 cases where pleas were withdrawn are included in these 
calculations as part of the variance.
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It is the contention of this dissertation that the full impact 
of the PSR on sentencing is more properly assessed by considering all 
possible sanctions. Although it may be argued that there is little 
substantive difference between a promise of probation and a sentence 
of probation with a special condition added, such an outlook dismisses 
the importance of restitution and drug treatment programs that can 
frequently impart real meaning to a probation sentence, satisfy 
complainants and protect the community. Moreover, as mandatory 
sentencing laws have come to account for a greater proportion of the 
court's calendar over the past decade, some judges--to escape a 
perceived harshness in dealing with defendants whose crimes might be 
mitigated by special circumstances detailed in the PSR--have adopted 
jail terms of up to six months, followed by probation supervision, as 
a means of satisfying the incarceration requirement. Finally, there 
are a broad range of felony offenses for which either a jail or prison 
term is possible. In such cases, substituting a jail term for a 
promised prison sentence when the PSR indicates the less severe 
sanction might be more appropriate, would serve to divert deserving 
offenders from overly harsh sentences.
In order to determine whether the PSR's sentence 
recommendation could account for the 55 amended sentence promises in 




SUMMARY OF AMENDED SENTENCE PROMISES
1) Promise ^Sentence ■ PSR Recommendation = 24
2) Promise ̂  Sentence ̂ PSR RECOMBTOATION = 18
K>R Influence - 42
3) Promise ̂  Sentence PSR Recommendation = 12
4) Promise = Recommendation =£-Sentence = 1
Anomalous Cases = 13
Total - 55
For category #2 in Table 18 above, we included cases wherein 
the PSR recommended either a less severe or more severe sanction than 
promised and the judge amended the sentence promise in the same 
direction, although not in an exact one to one correlation (e.g., 
promise «= state prison; recommendation = probation; sentence = jail 
term 5 probation). Thus, the PSR would appear to have had some 
influence on 42 of the 55 amended promises. But what of the third 
category, where there was no correlation between any three variables? 
Interestingly enough we found 7 of these 12 cases involved cases where 
pleas were withdrawn, despite agreement between promise and PSR 
recommendation. TVo judges were involved in six of these cases.
Three were pleas before Judge "X," who attributed two of the withdrawn 
pleas to the PSR during an interview I conducted two months later.
In the first instance, a 37 year old male, employed part-time 
with a history of four prior arrests, two of which resulted in 
misdemeanor convictions, released on his own recognizance since his 
arraignment for criminal sale of marijuana, pled guilty following the
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ADA's agreement to reduce the final charge from a class D to a class E 
felony and concur with the court's promise of five years probation. 
However, the PSR, although recommending probation, quoted the 
defendant's assertion to the P.O. that he had earned $100 a week for 
the past year--including the two months since his arrest--by selling 
marijuana. The Judge then told the defendant at sentencing that he 
believed six months in jail, followed by 4-1/2 years probation, was a 
more appropriate sentence in order to effect the defendant's "forced 
resignation" from his drug dealing. The defendant did not agree and 
accordingly was permitted to withdraw his plea. (The case was later 
assigned to a trial part where the defendant was sentenced to 
probation; the judge who imposed the sentence stated that he was 
satisfied that "if the probation department recommended probation 
despite this fellow's drug involvement, I felt that the sentence 
should stand--but I told this man at sentencing that if he ever sold 
marijuana while on probation, I'd send him to state prison for the 
'max"').
In the second instance, Judge "X" promised a detained 18 year 
old, with a history of 10 prior arrests but no felony convictions, a 
sentence of one year in jail, consecutive to the one year jail term he 
was presently serving, in return for his plea to third degree 
burglary, a class D felony (the ADA having agreed to reduce the 
original charge, second degree burglary, if the defendant agreed to 
the sentence promise). The PSR recommended "a sentence to custody,"
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which was not in conflict with the promise, but unaccountably to Judge 
"X," in light of the defendant's lengthy criminal record, the PSR also 
recommended a youthful offender adjudication, which had not been part 
of the sentence promise. The defendant's attorney, upon learning of 
the Y.O. recommendation, urged its adoption. When the Judge refused, 
the defendant demanded to withdraw his plea. He was permitted to do 
so, despite Judge "X'"s right to maintain the original agreed-to 
promise, because he wanted to discuss the Y.O. recommendation with the
Probation Department. (Later, the defendant was sentenced to a one 
year concurrent jail term by Judge "X," with Y.O. 
adjudication denied.)
In the third case involving Judge "X," a bailed 19 year old 
defendant with 4 prior arrests and no convictions, was permitted to 
plead guilty by the ADA to attempted second degree robbery, a class D 
felony, and two counts below the top count of the indictment,, which 
rendered him eligible for a promised probation sentence. The PSR, 
which found the defendant possessed of "much potential," recommended 
probation as well. Yet, the ADA, at the sentence hearing, recommended 
a state prison term of 1 to 3 years. Judge "X" asked the ADA to read
the PSR. After doing so, the ADA was asked whether he still
recommended a prison term be imposed. The ADA repeated his original 
recommendation. Whereupon, Judge "X" asked what additional material 
had come into the ADA's possession since his "magnanimous" consent to 
the much reduced final charge, a reduction which required approval by 
the ADA's supervisor, under procedural guidelines then in effect in
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the Brooklyn DA's Office. The ADA responded that the nature of the 
offense and the defendant's prior arrest history were the basis for 
the recommendation. The Judge, incensed by the ADA's "ex parte" 
recommendation, then dissolved the bargin. (Later, the defendant was 
sentenced to probation, as promised, by Judge "X" despite the ADA's 
continuing recommendation for state prison.)
The three cases which involved Judge "Y” are more difficult to
assess in terms other than judicial temperment. We interviewed ADA 
"P," who prosecuted all three cases, which were remarkably alike: 
each defendant pled guilty to a charge one class below the top count 
of the indictment in return for a promise of probation, promises with
which the PSR concurred. Yet the pleas were all withdrawn, only to be
re-instated on future dates before the same Judge, who sentenced all 
three to probation. ADA "P" identified Judge "Y"'s pique at the 
defense attorneys, all of whom were retained, as the reason for the 
withdrawn pleas. In two cases, the bailed defendants and their 
counsel arrived late for sentencing and in the third instance, the 
retained attorney insisted on adjournment of the sentencing hearing to 
allow his appearance in another court on the same day. In all three 
instances, Judge "Y," ironically an ex-defense attorney with a 
reputation as a "defense oriented" jurist, according to ADA "P," 
dissolved the plea bargain as a "lesson" to the attorneys. (The 
possibility that these plea withdrawals were actually staged by Judge 
"Y" at the request of counsel to obtain their legal fees from 
defendants before final disposition was imposed was discounted by ADA
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"P," who suggested that "Judge "Y" would have been more likely to 
adjourn sentencing in such a case. "I think he just didn't like these 
attomeys--one in particular was very abrasive.")
As for the remaining plea withdrawn case in this category, 
Judge "Z" dissolved a plea bargain, at the request of the ADA, which 
would have resulted in a "zip to seven" state prison term when the 
defendant, subsequent to plea, agreed to cooperate with "an on-going 
investigation conducted by the Office of the District Attorney." (The 
defendant was later sentenced by the same Judge to probation, against 
the recommendation of the PSR, which continued to recommend state 
prison.)
Of the five remaining cases wherein the eventual sentence 
differed from both the original promise and the PSR recommendation, 
the PSR itself contained information which had an impact in two cases, 
the ADA's recommendation had an impact in two cases and an intervening 
variable--the arrest of the defendant subsequent to plea for another 
offense--was influential. In one case, involving a sentence promise 
and PSR recommendation of probation, the PSR contained documentation 
that the defendant's burglary had caused $51 damage to the 
complainant's property, whereupon a special condition of probation 
that the defendant pay $51 restitution was added.
In another case, involving a promise and PSR recommendation of 
state prison for rape (although the defendant was eligible for a Y.O. 
adjudication which would have permitted a probation sentence), the PSR 
reported that the complainant was glad that the defendant had pled
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guilty, because she "would never have been able to testify in an open 
court room." According to the ADA prosecuting this case, the defense 
attorney--after reading the PSR--related this disclosure to the 
defendant, "a 'skel' who really knew how to manipulate the system," 
who promptly demanded to go to trial. To save the conviction, the 
Judge then called upon the ADA to make a mitigation statement which 
would have allowed the defendant to escape a mandatory state prison 
sentence, in return for the defendant's consent to an amended sentence 
of one year in jail.
Of the two cases involving influential ADA recommendations, 
one involved a defendant who was cooperating with the prosecution, 
whereupon the promised sentence of one year jail was amended to two 
months jail and 58 months probation, despite the PSR recommendation of 
jail; the other involved a defendant promised a jail term of "no more 
than 9 months" and recommended by the PSR for "committment to the New 
York City Department of Correctional Services." The Judge, however, a 
former bureau chief in the Brooklyn DA's Office, agreed with the ADA's 
recommendation of two months jail and 58 months probation.
Finally, there was one case (category #4 above) in which the 
Judge promised "a term of incarceration," the PSR recommended the 
same, but the final disposition was 2 months jail, followed by 58 
months probation. Since neither the plea minutes nor the PSR 
mentioned probation as part of an intended/recommended sentence, we 
interviewed the P.O. and S.P.O. who wrote the report and 
recommendation respectively to determine if they could shed some light
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on the disposition. We learned that the defendant, a 46 year old male 
on bail with a history of five prior arrests (including one prior 
felony conviction which occurred more than 10 years before the present 
offense, thus making him eligible for a non-incarcerative sentence), 
with a full-time job, had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated. He had been arrested twice before for the same 
offense. However, when the PSR verified that his employment supported 
two children, the Judge, reluctant to sentence him to a year in jail, 
contacted the supervising probation officer to ask if he would 
recommend a less severe sentence. The S.P.O. defended his recommenda­
tion in light of the defendant's recidivistic drunk driving, ii.e 
Judge's reluctance to amend the sentence without consulting the S.P.O. 
was attributed by the S.P.O. to press coverage at the time in the 
press regarding perceived unwarranted leniency for drunk drivers by 
the courts, and this Judge's desire (considered to be 
prosecution-oriented by the S.P.O.) to "protect his reputation" should 
the defendant be re-arrested on probation for vehicular manslaughter. 
Thus, this disposition would appear to be attributable to the 
influence of the PSR, despite its contrary recommendation.
To recapitulate, our analysis of the 55 cases where promised 
sentences were amended reveals the following:
TABLE 19
CAUSES FOR AMENDED SENTENCE PROMISES
Attributable
Attributable Attributable To Extraneous
To PSR To ADA Variables Total
47 (85.4%) 4 (7.3%) 4 (7.3%) 55 (lOOt)
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Thus, in 55, or 22 percent of the 248 cases in our sample
wherein the court possessed sufficient discretion to amend the 
sentence promise,the bargain was either amended or dissolved; and the 
PSR appears to have played a significant role in amending 47, or 19 
percent of the 248 sentence bargains studied.
Conclusion of Tabular Analysis 
A dichotomous analysis of the judge's promise (P), recommenda­
tion (R) and the eventual sentence (S) for the 235 cases in Sample 1 
where the judge possessed "in/out" discretion and actually imposed a 
sentence, revealed the following:
TABLE 20
PROMISE AND RECOfrMENDATION BY SBTTENCE
S=IK S-OUT TOTAL
P = IN
R - IN 70 1 71
P = OUT
R * OUT 2 125 127
Subtotal 126 198 (84.31)
P - IN
R - OUT 7 6 13
P - OUT
R = IN 6 18 24
Subtotal 13 -' ' 24 ' 37 (15.7%)
Total 85 ISO 235 (100%)
In 198 out of the 235 cases (84.31), the promise and
recommendation agreed on either an ''in" or "out" disposition. And in
195 out of those 198 cases (98.51), the promise, recommendation and
sentence were equivalent. The three anomalous cases where the court 
substantially changed its promise, despite a concurring
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recoranendation, were attributable to: 1) an intervening variable (the 
defendant was returned on a bench warrant for failure to appear for 
sentencing, having been re-arrested subsequent to the promise, which 
was probation, and the recommendation, which was also probation, with 
the result that he was sentenced to a one year jail term concurrent 
with the similar sentence imposed for the conviction on the 
re-arrest); 2) the influence of the PSR (promise = probation; 
recommendation » probation with the special condition that the 
defendant, who was discovered by the P.O. to be injecting 
"speedballs," i.e., a mixture of cocaine and heroin, enter drug 
treatment; sentence = a jail term of 60 days, followed by 58 months 
probation, a sentence which the defendant preferred to either 
outpatient drug treatment or dissolution of the plea bargain); and 3) 
the combination of another intervening variable and information in the 
PSR (the defendant was promised probation and jail, recommended for 
state prison and sentenced to probation--after agreeing to cooperate 
with the D.A.'s Office--with a special condition that he cooperate 
with counseling for his alcohol abuse noted in the PSR).
Of the remaining 37 cases, the court amended its "in" promise 
to grant an "out" sentence recommended by the PSR on six occasions and 
amended an "out" promise to impose a recommended "in" sentence on six 
occasions, for a total 12 cases in the dichotomous analysis for which 
the PSR is presumed to have had an impact on an amended sentence 
promise. It is noteworthy that six defendants agreed to "in" 
sentences when "out" dispositions had been promised. Combined with
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the two anomalous cases already noted above, there were eight 
defendants out of 151, or 5.3 percent, who were sentenced to some form 
of incarceration despite non-incarcerative promises. Conversely, 
there were seven defendants out of 84, or 8.3 percent, who were 
sentenced to non-incarceration sanctions despite incarceration 
promises. This suggests that judges are more likely to amend 
incarceration promises, given the reluctance of defendants to accede 
to jail/prison terms which did not form part of the sentence bargain 
agreement. Moreover, defendants would appear to be amenable to 
avoiding promised incarceration sentences. Our research indicates 
however, that there are some defendants who preferred to serve short 
jail terms that were not promised rather than withdraw their pleas, 
and a handful who preferred to serve their bargained for jail/prison 
terms rather than accept substituted sentences involving five years of 
probation supervision.
To summarize, there was an overall agreement between 
recommendation and sentence in 207 out of 235 cases, or 88.1 percent. 
In 12 of the 207 cases, or 5.8 percent, the sentence represented a 
significant amendment of the plea bargain. Of the 28 cases where the 
sentence did not follow the recommendation, 25 represented adherence 
by the court to the plea bargain, with judges (and defendants) much 
more likely to resist jail/prison recommendations that were contrary 
to probation/fine/discharge promises (rejecting such recommendations 
in 18 out of 24 cases) than judges were to agree with more lenient 
recommendations and to obtain acceptance by defendants to recommended
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"out" sentences when jail/prison terms had been promised (accepting 
such recommendations in 6 out of 13 cases).
Thus, a dichotomous analysis of the sentencing process 
presented in Table 21 reveals that 17 percent of the time (40 out of 
235 cases), there is disagreement between the promise, recommendation 
and sentence and in those 40 instances examined, the court is twice as 
likely to follow through on its original promise (25) than to amend 
the sentence bargain as per the recomnendation (12), with the 
remainding anomalous cases (3) attributable to an intervening variable 
(re-arrest), data in the PSR (defendant preference for short-term jail 
than long-term drug program) or a combination thereof (prosecutorial 
intervention and acceptance of counseling recommended by the PSR).
TABLE 21
SUKWARY OF DICHOTOMOUS ANALYSIS 
SENTENCE ("In'VOut")
Same As Promised Different Total
P - R 195 (S-P-k) 3 ( S ^ P 5 S ^ R J 198 (84.3%)
k 25 (S-k) 12 (S-k) 31 (15.21)
Total 220 (93.6t) lS (6.4%) 235 (1001)
In conclusion, there is a considerable difference in estimating 
the influence of the PSR on sentencing, depending on whether the full 
spectrum of sanctions or the basic "in/"out" dichotomy is analyzed.
In the former analysis, 19 percent of all sentence bargains appear to 
have been affected by the PSR, but in the latter, more limited 
comparison, only 6 percent--at best--of the sentence bargains appear 
to have been amended as a result of the PSR. Although it is my 
contention that all gradations of sentences imposed should form the
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basis for study, dichotomous analysis does validate our first 
hypothesis, that judges are more likely to amend "in" promises in 
favor of "out" recommendations, than the converse.
A cross-tabulation of the quality of PSR by sentence for those 
cases in which the PSR recommendation differs from the sentence 
promise was performed in order to determine if the PSR quality was 
significantly better for amended promises attributable to the PSR, 
than for those cases wherein the court declined to amend the promised 
sentence.
For the 47 cases previously identified as influencing amended 
sentence bargains (see page 129), the PSR quality index was found to 
have an average value of .81, while the 33 cases in which the court 
maintained the plea bargain despite contrary recommendations were 
computed to have a significantly lower average index value of .73. 
Moreover, for those 12 cases in which the dichotomous "in"/"out" 
sentence bargain was presumed to have been influenced by the PSR, the 
average index value was found to be an impressive .83.
Thus, there would appear to be some evidence that higher 
quality PSRs have more of an impact on sentencing. It is also 
possible that well researched reports are more likely to result in an 
independent assessment of the proper sanction for the subject under 
investigation--an assessment which would be more forcefully argued in 
the S.P.O.'s recommendation--than would be the case for perfunctory 
reports in which the P.O. and S.P.O. would be more likely to endorse 
the sentence bargain in the absence of any significant information to
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contribute to the court.
Comparison With Prior Studies 
Witztum claimed that PSRs were primarily used in Kings County 
Supreme Court--and by extension, throughout New York City--as rubber 
stamps for usually inviolate sentence bargains. Although her findings 
resemble mine in terms of the percentage of agreement between promise, 
recommendation and sentence, she concludes that an amended plea 
bargain rate of approximately 21 percent--which she concedes is 
attributable to the PSR--is not significant enough, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively, to justify the expenditure of 
resources and case processing delays involved in producing PSR's. 
Kingsnorth and Rizzo reported significantly less variance between 
promise, recommendation and sentence in their "Western City" study but 
argued in a similar vein that PSRs merely ratify the sentence 
bargain.
I have pointed out in earlier chapters some of the 
methodological errors in these studies, most of which were essentially 
cross-tabulations of two independent variables with the dependent 
variable (sentence). In order to conduct a more sophisticated 
analysis involving multiple regression, which attempts to sort out and 
control for the effect of interrelated independent variables upon a 
dependent variable, it is necessary to identify those factors which 
are most influential in the sentencing decision.
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TABLE 22 
COMPARISON OF TABULAR FINDINGS 
Percentage of Agreement 
STUDY Promise 5 Recmndtn. Promise Sentence Recmndtn. 5 Sentence
California* -- -- 96%
(probation)
811 (prison)
San Francisco* -- -- 96%
(probation)
81% (prison)
Canada (Hagan) -- -- 80%
"Western City"* 98% 99% 98%
Brooklyn (1972) 69% 73% 79%
Brooklyn (1979) 65% 78% 69%
(Dichotomous) (84%) (94%) (88%)
*Dichotomous study.
Hagan and the San Francisco Project both identified variables 
contained within the PSR which exerted significant influence on the 
judge and P.O. and helped to explain the perceived high degree of 
agreement in sentencing outcomes. In Table 23, I have isolated those 
variables common to both this study and the San Francisco Project to 
determine both within and between group rankings and correlations.
(All variables are interval type, except for race, sex and codefendant, 
which were recoded as dummy variables.)
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TABLE 23
SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATION OF VARIABLES 
MOST IMPORTANT FOR JUDGES AND PROBATION OFFICERS
Sample 1 (N»235) vs. San Francisco Project (N»300)
SAMPLE 1 SAN FRANCISCO**
Variable* Promise Rec. Sentence Rec. Sent
1. Custodial Status 1 1 1 2 2
2. Offense 2 2 2 3 1
3. Arrests 3 4 3 1 3
4. Employment 4 3 4 5 4
5. Financial Status 5 5 5 4 5
6. Type of Counsel 8 6 6 7 7
7. Sex 6 11 9 8 8
8. Marital Status 11 9 10 6 6
9. Race 10 8 8 10 11
10. Age 9 7 7 11 10
11. Codefendant 7 10 11 9 9
*Only variables common to both studies were utilized in computing 
rank order correlation. Those included are consistently identified 
in the literature as the most important.
**As noted in Chapters II and III above, there is no sentence bargain­
ing in federal courts. Thus, there is no rank for promise here.
Utilizing the Spearman formula for the rank orders presented 
above, I constructed the matrix presented in Table 24.
These results reveal striking correlations within each group of 
recommendation with sentence: .96 for Brooklyn and .95 for San 
Francisco. Although comparison across studies would appear to 
indicate less correlation, with the Brooklyn promise to San Francisco 
sentence correlating the highest (.83) and the Brooklyn recommendation 
to San Francisco recomnendation correlating the lowest (.75), the 
Kendall test for measuring the association of ranks indicates a very 
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*Significant at the .01 level. (All values significant at the .05 
level.)
Table 15. In fact, the correlation of concordance for the set of five
ranks was computed to be .87, which is significant at the .01
level.1 These findings suggest that judges and probation officers 
in both localities agree on the significance of certain variables in 
arriving at sentencing decisions. The very close rank order 
correlation coefficients for promise and recommendation with sentence 
(.99 and .98) in the sample group also suggests that there is little
"shaping" of the PSR to conform to the promise.
Path Analysis
Based on my review of the literature, my experience as a 
probation officer and analysis of the correlations of variables to the 
sentencing outcome, I conducted a path analysis of the sample data in
^Michael Kendall, Rank Correlation Methods (London: Griffin, 
1948), chap. 6 passim.
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an attempt to validate the second, third and fourth hypotheses 
enumerated in Chapter IV. In addition to the eleven independent 
variables listed in Table 23, I utilized twenty other variables in 
constructing and testing hundreds of multiple regression equations 
(never using more than 23 variables in any given equation).
Although it is accepted practice in conducting path analysis 
research to dichotomize interval variables, I selected a strategy of 
dichotomizing only those independent variables which had skewed 
distributions. For example, although "D.A. Bureau" had seven possible 
values--corresponding to the seven different Bureaus prosecuting cases 
in the Brooklyn District Attmey's Office--fully 80 percent of the 
cases (Table 6) fell in one category, "Supreme Court Bureau" (wherein 
most street crimes are prosecuted), while none of the remaining six 
values had an aggregate proportion larger than four percent. Thus, I 
recoded "D.A. Bureau" as a dummy variable, assigning a value of "1" to 
the "Supreme Court Bureau" and a value of "0" to the other 
specialized bureaus (wherein homicides, sexual, economic, organized 
and narcotic crimes receive more vigorous prosecution). Moreover, 
Cohen (1983) has convincingly demonstrated that graduated variables, 
once dichotomized, result in "a loss of one-fifth to two-thirds of the 
variance that may be accounted for on the original variables, and a 
concommitant loss of power equivalent to that of discarding one-third 
to two-thirds of the sample."1
1Jacob Cohen, "The Cost of Dichotomization," Applied 
Psychological Measurement 7 (Summer 1983): 253.
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In this study, the most important variables--promise, 
recommendation, sentence, number of arrests/felonies, charge severity, 
custodial status, penal law classification, etc.--are all graduated, 
with a value of "1" signifying least severe and subsequent values ("2" 
through "9" for dispositional variables) signifying increasingly less 
favorable characteristics/outcomes.
The assistant district attorney's sentence recommendation was 
also added to the multiple regression equations I formulated.
Although no sentence recommendation was made by the ADA in more than 
half of the cases, this was not suprising, since it was common 
practice in 1979 for ADAs in the Supreme Court Bureau to voice their 
views on sentencing at the time of the plea, rather than at 
disposition. In fact, it is possible to argue that the ADA's 
recommendation is in fact a disguised sentence promise, in as much as 
the ADA is instrumental in stucturing the promise by either consenting 
to the concommitant charge reduction and/or setting the sentencing 
parameters within which the court operates. Under the New York State 
Criminal Procedure Law, no plea of guilty to less than the entire 
indictment can be entered without the District Attorney's consent. In 
any event, the ADA's viewpoint on sentence is usually communicated to 
the court during the (bench) conference which normally precedes the 
entering of the guilty plea. Therefore, it is difficult to 
conceptualize the ADA's sentence recommendation, if formally announced 
or submitted to the judge at sentencing (which frequently is the case 
for indictments prosecuted by specialized bureaus within the office),
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as an event subsequent to the plea which influences the sentence.
Multiple regression equations, testing the path model 
presented on page 106, and using forward selection to allow for 
inclusion of the most significant predictive independent variables (at 
the .05 level, with significance at the .001 level indicated by an
asterisk) produced the models which follow.
2In the Tables presented below, "R " is the regression 
coefficient, also referred to as the coefficient of determination, 
which reflects the linear fit of the model--i. e., the square of the 
simple correlation coefficient between the observed value of the 
dependent variable and the predicted value of the dependent variable 
from the regression line. "Beta" is the standardized partial 
regression coefficient or weight, which expresses the change in the 
dependent variable due to the change in the independent variable, with 
other variables held constant.*
TABLE 25
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING CUSTODIAL STATUS
Independent Variables R^ Beta
1. No. of Prior Arrests .28 .53*
2. Severity of Charge .40 .35*
3. Type of Counsel .44 .22*
4. Sex of Defendant .46 -.15
5. Type of Judge (Trial or Conf.) .47 -.10
*Significant at the .001 level.
*Maria J. Norusis, Advanced Statistics Guide (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1984), pp. 17-771
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The number of prior arrests has a large effect on custodial 
status: defendants with the fewest arrests in our sample were likely 
to be on bail or ROR'd, with recidivists jailed. In fact, 28 percent 
of all the variance in custodial status is predicted, or explained, by 
arrest history alone. Charge severity is another important factor, 
with an effect of .35 accounting for 12 percent of custodial 
variance. The type of legal representation is also a significant 
indicator of pre-dispositional status, with an effect of .22, 
explaining four percent of the variance. The sex of the defendant is 
the only demographic variable related to custodial status--the 
negative correlation (-.10) indicates that female defendants are more 
likely to be at liberty than their male counterparts. Finally, 
defendants pleading guilty in conference parts are more apt to be 
incarcerated than defendants later convicted before trial judges 
(prior to the start of trial, of course, since all dispositions in our
TABLE 26
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING PROMISE
Independent Variables R2 Beta
1. Custodial Status .19 .43*
2. D.A. Bureau .25 .25*
3. Type of Offense .30 .23*
4. Prior Supervision History .33 .18
5. Y.O. Adjudication Promised .34 .12
6. Timespan (t months to plea) .36 .14
7. Type of Judge .37 .14
8. Penal Law Class, of Offense .39 .13
9. No. of Prior Felonies/Y.O.'s .40 .12
^Significant at the .001 level.
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study group were plea bargained). These findings are somewhat similar 
to previous studies, particularly the criminal court study conducted 
by Davis (see Chapter II, p. 57).*
Table 26 indicates that custodial status is the most powerful 
predictor of the sentence bargain, explaining 19 percent of the 
variance, with a moderately high effect of .43. There is much 
evidence in the literature that aside from the correlation of severity 
of the offense with dispositional outcomes, defendants who are "out" 
at the point of conviction tend to stay "out," while those in 
detention are more likely to stay there. Indeed a common scenario I 
encountered in the course of interviewing hundreds of detained 
defendants involved tacit recognition of this unwritten law of case 
processing: having served some three or four months in detention in 
the expectation of a better deal, unavailability of complainants or 
possible acquital, certain defendants weigh the potential risk of 
continuing toward trial against a proferred jail sentence and finally 
plead to a one year jail term (if the deal still holds)--a "bullet" in 
the parlance of "court speak" in New York City--since good time and 
time served combine to reduce the penalty to less than a half of what 
it might have been had the same bargain been struck at the outset of 
prosecution.
*James Davis, "Sentencing Dispositions," pp. 99-101.
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The significance of prosecutorial policy is suggested by the second 
variable selected in the equation, "D.A. Bureau," which also reflects 
the relative gravity of the offense, since garden variety strong arm 
robberies do not ordinarily qualify for "Major Offender" treatment. 
The type of crime (recoded as violent, property, or gun/drug 
possession) also has an impact on the promise, as would be expected 
intuitively. The other variables, which acting together with the 
afore-mentioned factors explain 40 percent of the sentence bargain, 
are all legal in nature: prior community supervision and felony or 
Y.O. adjudication histories; the timespan from indictment to 
conviction; the type of judge; the promise of youthful offender 
adjudication; and the penal law classification of the conviction 
(ranging from Class "A" to "E" felonies, in descending order of 
gravity, and "A" misdemeanors).
TABLE 27
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING RECOMENDATI ON
Independent Variables R2 Beta
4. Prior Supervision
5. Sex of Defendant
6. Y.O. Recommended
7. Violation of Probation Filed
1. Custodial Status
2. Promise















Custodial status also explains a greater proportion of the 
P.O.'s recommendation (29 percent) than the promise (12 percent), and 
is a stronger predictor of probation's recommendation than the court's
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promise, which is not surprising, given the practical constraints on 
prosecutors and judges in structuring plea bargains. In other words, 
P.O.'s can afford to be more swayed by legal variables which speak 
more to the underlying offense or prior community supervision 
adjustment than to the bargained adjudication. Thus, while both the 
promise and recommendation are affected by the lack of a prior 
probation/parole supervision record, the recommendation is also 
influenced by the lack of a violation of such supervision, i.e.,
P.O.'s are more apt to recommend less severe sentences for defendants 
who have no history--or a successful history--of prior supervision.
The penal law classification of the offense for which the 
defendant has been convicted is a more significant predictor of a 
P.O.'s decision-making than a judge's for the opposite reason: there 
are a number of cases for which an "out" sentence was not permissable 
under the criminal procedure or penal law unless ther were a youthful 
offender adjudication or a finding by the court that an incarceration 
sentence would not be "in the best interests of justice." In such 
cases, "out" promises are given with a caveat that the PSI does not 
uncover countervailing negative material or that the PSR's 
recommendation concurs with the lenient promise. In such instances, a 
negative PSR would merely conclude that the the sentence to jail was 
mandated by law. But the court might nonetheless follow through on 
the "out" promise because the negative material uncovered might be 
interpreted as not being of sufficient gravity to jeopardize the 
bargain. However, in framing the recommendation, P.O.'s are more
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influenced by their own assessment of whether ameliorating youthful 
offender treatment is warranted, as opposed to the court's promise of 
same, and might recomnend "out" sentences for youthful defendants they 
consider salvagable, or who have previously succeeded on probation 
supervision. Such arguments are sometimes convincing enough to result 
in amendments of an "in" promise by the court.
Finally, tlie sex of the defendant is the only extra-legal 
variable influencing the P.O.'s decision-making in our study group, 
with female defendants more likely to be recommended for less severe 
sentences than males. There is considerable evidence in the 
literature that favorable outcomes for female convictees is related to 
the fact that females are more apt to be convicted of non-violent 
crimes which carry less of a penalty exposure. Indeed, of the 17 
female defendants in our sample, only one was convicted of a violent 
offense (arson), who was nonetheless recommended for probation and 
received it.
TABLE 28
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING SENTENCE
Independent Variables R2 Beta
1. Recommendation .57 .75*
2. Sentence Bargain .71 .45*
3. Custodial Status .73 .17
4. D.A. Bureau .74 -.10
5. Penal Law Class, of Offense .75 .10
6. Timespan .75 .08
7. Y.O. Promised .76 .08
The model presented in Table 28 explains 76 percent of all the
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variance in sentencing, with the PSR recommendation accounting for 57 
percent of the variance alone. The beat weight of .75 is 
significantly large and almost twice the value of the independent 
variable with the next strongest effect, the sentence bargain, which 
explains an additional 14 percent of the variance in sentencing 
outcomes. The other five variables, taken together, account for an 
additional five percent of the variance in sentence, and, 
significantly, they were all found to be predictors of the promise as 
well. Penal law classification and custodial status were the only 
variables which were found to be significantly related to the promise, 
recommendation and sentence.
The models presented above would appear to support the tabular 
analysis which found that promise, recommendation and sentence were in 
agreement in the majority of cases, but that incongruities were 
largely attributable to the presentence investigation. The models are 
also in agreement with most prior studies which have analyzed 
sentencing (absent the promise as an independent variable, however) 
and found the nature of the offense, prior record and custodial status 
to be the most crucial determinants of felony dispositions.1
*See Leslie T. Wilkins et al., "Sentencing Guidelines: 
Structuring Judicial Discretion" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1978); Susan Welch and Cassia Spohn, "Evaluating the Impact 
of Prior Record on Judges' Sentencing Decisions: A Seven-City 
Comparison," Justice Quarterly 3 (December 1986): 389-90; and Brian 
Frost and William M. Rhodes, "Structuring the Exercise of Sentencing 
Discretion in the Federal Courts," Federal Probation 37 (September 
1973): 9-13. Carl F. Wiedemann and Karl-Heinz Lilienwald ("A Study of 
Severity of Sentence at the Bronx County
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Utilizing the path coefficients derived from the equations
above, a full path model for the sample of 235 cases is presented in
Diagram 3. Custodial status, through its direct and indirect effects 
transmitted to sentence, has an aggregate path coefficient that is 
slightly higher (.77) than the direct effect of the reconmendation on 
sentence (.75), while the aggregate path coefficient value of promise 
to sentence is slightly lower (.73).
The Quality of the PSI as a Factor in Sentencing
In the path models developed, the quality of the presentence 
investigation was found to have no significant effect on the 
recommendation or sentence. (The quality of the PSI itself was found 
to be effected most by the sex of the P.O., with females more likely 
to submit high quality reports than males; more thorough PSI's were 
also found to be associated with incarcerated, younger defendants.) 
However, the quality of the PSI was found to be influential in 
sentencing outcomes when the sample was analyzed utilizing bifurcated 
and dichotomous strategies.
First, retaining the full range of interval values for the
dispositional variables, the sample was split into two discrete
categories for the dependent variables of recommendation and sentence.
Supreme Court Using Multivariate Methodology,” paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Criminal Justice Statistical Association, Winter 
Park, Florida, February 1980) found custodial status to be the most 
influential factor in regressing a number of legal and extra-legal 
variables found in presentence reports against the sentencing decision 
in Bronx Supreme Court in 1975.
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DIAGRAM 3







Diagram 4 indicates the path model found when the dependent variable, 
sentence, is analyzed for cases where defendants were recommended for 
probation, discharge or fine (A) and for defendants who were 
recommended for some form of incarceration (B).
In this analysis, "out" recommendations are almost twice as 
significant in predicting sentence, while "in" recommendations have no 
predictive power at all, indicating further support for the hypothesis 
that judges are more likely to amend "in" promises in favor of "out" 
recommendations than the converse.
This finding is further underscored by a bifurcated analysis 
of the sample by disposition itself. In Diagram 5, the recommendation 
is clearly seen as interacting with promise to reduce the severity of 
non-incarcerative sentences, since the recommendation is positively 
correlated and the promise is negatively correlated with sentence, the 
dependent variable. Moreover, as the quality of the PSI decreases, the
DIAGRAM 4
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"out" sentence is more likely to be less severe (i.e., there is less 
likelihood of sentences being amended by adding restitution or special 
conditions to the bargained disposition, absent a thorough 
investigation). Incarcerative dispositions, however, are controlled 
by the promise and custodial status (i.e., promises of jail were 
related to sentences of jail; promises of prison were related to 
sentences of prison; etc.).
These findings led to the second strategy: dichotomizing 
promise, recommendation and sentence as dummy variables (recoding all 
incarcerative values as "0" and all non-incarcerative values as "1"); 
and bifurcating the sample by the PSI Quality Index (see Table 8, page 
118). By segregating those cases with an index value greater than .6 
from those cases with an index value less than .6, two equal groups 
were formed, and promise and recommendation were regressed against 
sentence (and each other) for each group, as shown in Diagram 6.
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DIAGRAM 6
PATH MODEL FOR BIFURCATED DICHOTOMOUS SAMPLE: 
PSI QUALITY BY SENTENCE




These results reveal recommendation as the most significant 
predictor of sentence when the PSI lias been thoroughly conducted, 
while the promise controls both recommendation and sentence in cases 
where the PSI has been minimally or poorly conducted. This finding 
seems to confirm the hypothesis that presentence investigations of 
high quality have an important impact on sentencing, while perfunctory 
investigations result in recommendations that merely "go along" with 
the promise. (As noted above, such dichotomization sacrifices 
considerable power; a larger sample would be needed to confirm this 
finding.)
Analysis of the 57 cases in which no sentence bargain was 
stipulated at the time of the plea was conducted to determine any 
significant differences from the sample group. Table 29 presents a 
cross-tabulation of the PSR recommendation by the actual disposition 
imposed by the court.
Control Group Tabular Analysis
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TABLE 29
REOOKMENDATION BY SENTENCE (CONTROL GROUP)
SENTENCE (N * 57)
REC. P/W Disch. Fine Prbtn. P+SpCon P+Fine P+Jai1 Jail Prison T/S Tot.
Disch. 1 2
Fine 1 (1) 2
Prbtn. 1 11 (1) (2) 15
P+SpCon 2 2
Incar. 1 llj U] T  1 1 6
Jail [1] 2 3
Prison 27 27
loT. 2 I I U 2 1 2 4 30 I 57
Plea Withdrawn = 2 (For percentages below, N ■ 55) 
Recommendation « Sentence ■ 48 (87.2%)
Recommendation * More severe than sentence = 3 (5.5%) (See [ J) 
Recommendation ■ Less severe than sentence - 4 (7.2%) (See ( ))
There is considerably more congruence between the 
recommendation and sentence in the control group: 87 percent versus 73 
percent for the sample (see Table 15; withdrawn pleas were not counted 
for either group in calculating percentages). This high agreement is 
obviously a reflection of the large share of mandatory imprisonment 
cases in the control group--almost 40 percent--which frustrates any 
in-depth analysis.
Path Analysis for the Control Group 
Table 29 summarizes the findings when custodial status, 
recommendation and sentence are each regressed against the same set of 
independent variables utilized for the study group (never utilizing 
more than six independent variables in the same equation because of
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the small sample size--also, promise and certain other variables 
related thereto are not applicable to this group by definition).
TABLE 30
PREDICTIVE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (NO PROMISE)
A. Predictors of Custod. Status R^ Beta
1. Arrests .70 .44*
2. Severity of Charge .28 .29
B. Predictors of Recommendation
1. Arrests .23 .43*
2. Penal Law Class, of Offense .42 .44*
C. Predictors of Sentence
1. Recommendation .58 .76*
2. Penal Law Class, of Offense .63 .26
As we found with the sentence bargain sample, the custodial 
status is correlated with the number of prior arrests and the severity 
of the charge. These two factors explain 28 percent of the variance in 
the control group's custodial status, versus 40 percent in the study 
group. The determinants of the PSR recommendation in the control group 
are the the number of prior arrests and penal law classification of the 
conviction. The latter independent variable was also found to be one of 
the predictors of the study group's recommendation, where it explained 
six percent of the variance, as opposed to 19 percent of 
recommendation's variance here; the number of prior arrests, however, 
was not found to be significantly associated with the recommendation of 
the study group, unlike the finding presented in Table 29.
Finally, the variation in sentence explained by the PSR 
recommendation for those defendants convicted after trial or who pled
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guilty in the absence of a sentence bargain, was found to be almost
equivalent to that found for the study group: 57 percent for the
former and 58 for the latter. (The beta weight values were also
equivalent: .76 for the control group, compared to .75 for the study
group.) Significantly, if the recommendation is removed from the
equation, the penal law classification of conviction controls the
sentence (R =.31; Beta*.56*). The only other independent variable
selected as explaining a significant proportion of the sentencing
variance in the absence of the recommendation is the quality of the
2
presentence recoranendation (R =.06; Beta®.23).
Thus, path analysis of the control group sentencing outcome 
appears to confirm the significance of the presentence recommendation 
for judicial decision-making. Diagram 7 presents the full path model 
for the control group.
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Summary of Findings 
Tabular and content analysis of 248 cases wherein the 
sentencing decision was subject to the widest range of judicial 
discretion confirms the hypothesis (H*) that "out" recommendations 
have more influence than "in" reconmendations which are contrary to 
the sentence promise. In nearly one out of every five cases, the 
presentence report appears to have played an important role in 
amending the sentence promised by the court during the plea 
negotiation, and judges were found more likely to impose amended 
non-incarcerative sanctions than the converse because such a favorable 
change for a defendant will usually not jeopardize the plea.
There is less evidence that suggests high quality reports have 
more overall influence in amending sentence promises than low quality 
reports (H ). However, better quality investigations appear to have 
a significant impact in predicting "out" dispositions, regardless of 
the sentence promised, and dichotomous analysis of sentencing suggests 
that poor quality investigations predict the plea bargain will control 
disposition, while high quality investigations predict the PSR 
recommendation as the controlling variable for the sentencing decision.
Analysis of a control group--wherein no sentence promise was 
made--appears to confirm the primacy of the PSR recommendation as a 
crucial determinant of sentencing outcomes.
There is strong evidence to accept the hypothesis that 
recommendation and sentence are largely determined by legal variables
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(H^), and that sex, alone among the demographic variables, has any 
discernible relationship to the sentencing outcome (H^), which is 
likely an artifact of female defendants' correlation with less serious 
crimes, compared to males.
Finally, this study found some evidence that suggests 
extraneous variables can sometimes be crucial to a sentencing 
decision--but the number of such cases appears to be few (H^). The 
actual sentence imposed is overwhelmingly predicted by the presentence 
report's recommendation, followed by the sentence bargain. Custodial 
status, prosecutorial specialization, penal law classification of the 
conviction, timespan from indictment to conviction, and a promise of 
youthful offender adjudication are also related to the dispositions of 
Brooklyn felony court judges.
CHAPTER VI
IN CONCLUSION: THE 1981 PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
CRISIS AND WHAT IT REVEALED.
Introduction
The findings presented in Chapter V suggest that in a 
significant number of cases, judges rely on presentence reports to 
fine-tune sentence promises and to dissolve plea bargains which appear 
to be inappropriate when measured against information and/or 
recommendations within the PSR. Most judges polled for their opinion 
on the value of PSRs have also consistently rated them as essential 
to their sentencing decisions.1
In 1981, a series of events affecting New York City's criminal 
justice system offered more evidence of the importance of PSRs to the 
judiciary and corrections. As we shall see, the City's Criminal 
Justice Coordinator, and to a lesser extent the Probation Department's 
own management, in attempting to deal with a jail overcrowding crisis, 
operationalized the long-standing argument that the PSR was rendered 
inconsequential by: sentence bargaining; reduced judicial discretion; 
and other sources of information available to correctional 
decision-makers (see Chapter III). However, the City's effort
ISee the Harris Survey presented in the Morgenthau 
Committee, Report, pp. 230-31
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was rebuffed within six months and a status quo ante bellum restored 
as the result of the unforeseen disruption of post-conviction 
operations which the evisceration of the PSR engendered.
Origins of the Crisis 
In the aftermath of state legislation which mandated 
incarceration sentences for violent, armed, juvenile and repeat 
offenders (and prevented post-indictment charge reduction to 
non-violent offense categories for violent offenders), local and state 
correctional facilities reached capacity in 1980. Also contributing 
to the lack of space was an increase in crimes reported to the police, 
arrests and indictments. In fact, indictments filed in New York City 
rose 15 percent during 1980 and then increased again the following 
year, which represented the high-water mark for the reported 
occurrence of index crimes in New York City--more than 725,000, up 17 
percent from 1979.1 The Supreme Courts in the City were thus 
confronted with a backlog of 10,000 indictments as 1981 began, amidst 
a 20 percent increase in new indictments during the first quarter, 
prompting an emergency transfer of civil court judges to the criminal 
term by New York State's Chief Judge.2
In early 1981, the New York State Correction Commission found
l"City Felonies Last Year Rose Much Slower Than in 1980,"
New York Times 27 February 1982, p. 28; "Serious Crimes Nearing Record 
in New York," New York Times 18 November 1980, p. 1; and "Crime Index 
for NYC 60% Over Nation's for Six Months," New York Times 7 December 
1980, p. 1.
2"37 Civil Judges Will Assist City in Felony Trials," New 
York Times 19 March 1981, p. 1.
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that all state and local facilities for sentenced and detained adults 
were either at or above capacity. It ordered the three counties 
closest to New York City (Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk) to reduce 
their jail populations or face civil suits and, in March, it gave the 
City 10 days to develop a plan to relieve the jail overcrowding which 
had led to 9,200 inmates being held in a system geared to house a 
maximum of 8,300.1 The Commission did not have to threaten the City 
with court action, however--a suit had already been brought in federal 
district court by the Legal Aid Society's Prisoner's Rights Project, 
which contended that the overcrowded conditions constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Judge Morris Lasker (U.S. Southern District of New York), in 
response to the original litigation brought in 1973 during a period of 
similiar congestion, had ordered the closing of the deteriorating 
Manhattan House of Detention for Men ("the Tombs") in 1974 and its 
inmates transferred to other facilities. When the Adolescent 
Detention and Reception Center population on Riker's Island doubled in 
1980, with the overflow assigned to the House of Detention for Men, 
the Prisoner Rights Project brought another suit. The City responded 
with a plan to sell the Riker's Island facility to the State, with the 
State in turn building eight new jails for the City throughout the 
boroughs. Judge Lasker granted the City time to complete the 
negotiations, but when the deal fell through in mid-1980, he 
threatened to take steps to relieve the congestion if the City did not
^''Overcrowded City Jails Present a Tangle of Problems," New 
York Times 12 March 1981, p. B3.
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act.l
In an attempt to ward off judicial intervention, the City: 1) 
obtained agreement from the State to accept the transfer of 90 inmates 
serving weekend sentences; 2) requested the City's Chief 
Administrative Judge to conduct bail reviews of 1,800 inmates whose
bail had been set at $1,000 or less; 3) planned the addition of
prefabricated housing units to its major facility, Riker's Island, 
which would increase its capacity by 600; and 4) ordered probation 
officers to submit PSRs within two weeks of conviction, rather than 
the customary four to six week interval, regardless of the actual 
sentence date set by the court.
Of all the actions planned or actually undertaken by the City 
to deal with the crisis, the fourth measure produced the most positive
results, but not without modification of the initial PSI speed-up
directive and fierce resistance from the judiciary. In the end,
however, none of the City's measures, including its attempt to
eviscerate the PSR, could stem the steadily increasing numbers of 
detainees and Judge Lasker's eventual action in November of 1983 which 
forced the City to release 611 inmates. And despite institutionalized 
productivity gains within the Probation Department during the past 
five years and an excellent track record in submitting PSRs within 
shortened time frames (made possible by the expenditure of millions of 
dollars in staff overtime), as of this writing the City's jails remain 
overcrowded, Judge Lasker continues to loom large in the City's
^'U.S. Judge Who Shut Tombs Seeks Meeting on Deteriorating
Jails," New York Times 23 May 1980, p. Bl.
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consciousness and other remedies that will forestall another 
federal intervention are vigorously pursued. (The City's 1987 
strategy involves siphoning honor inmates onto refurbished ferry boats 
moored at Riker's Island to free up more secure cells.)
The PS1 Speed-Up 
1981 was not the first time that the PSI was identified as a 
major bottleneck in inmate processing during times of jail 
overcrowding. In 1973, at the recommendation of the Board of 
Correction, county courts completely eliminated the practice of of 
adjourning sentencing sine die for detained convictees. This custom 
had formerly given P.O.'s in some courts (particularly Kings County) 
the discretion of calendaring sentencing proceedings upon completion 
of PSRs. (There is evidence that such discretion had led to abuse by 
some habitually tardy P.O.'s, according to veteran probation 
supervisors in Kings County Supreme Court.) Similarly, in the late 
1960s and again in the early 1970's, probation branches serving the 
felony courts in New York City had utilized "pro forma" PSRs (i.e., 
reports which contained condensed legal and social histories) to deal 
with an enormous increase in indictments and subsequent convictions 
during that period. However, such modifications were implemented with 
the cooperation and direction of the county court administrators to 
whom chief probation officers were then answerable. With the 
consolidation of county probation offices into a unified City agency 
in 1974, probation administrators were now controlled by the executive 
branch and thus, 1981 represented a new organizational alignment which
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pitted an antagonistic municipal administration (frequently critical 
of the judiciary) against court administrators resentful of being 
"scapegoated" by other actors in the criminal justice system during a 
period of increasing public alarm over an increase in crime. In the 
middle of these combatants stood the Probation Department.
In February of 1981, in response to the pending federal 
litigation, the Criminal Justice Coordinator's Office began to examine 
ways to reduce jail overcrowding and thereby render the lawsuit moot. 
Research of Correction Department records identified approximately 
1,000 inmates who had been convicted in felony and misdemeanor courts 
and were awaiting sentence. It was felt that the average elapsed time 
of eight weeks separating conviction from sentence date was largely 
attributable to PSR production and that if the reports could be 
produced within two weeks, this population could be effectively halved 
within six months, even allowing for other delays, if the judiciary 
could be persuaded to cooperate.
Accordingly, on 10 March 1981 the Probation Department issued 
a staff directive which instituted the following changes: 1) PSRs for
all jailed defendant's were to be submitted to the court within 10 
working days of conviction, regardless of sentence date set by the 
judge; 2) pro forma reports were to be submitted for all jailed 
defendants convicted of "D" and "E" felonies who were not promised 
state prison or probation sentences; 3) the legal history section, 
wherein prior and subsequent arrests and convictions (and details of 
each) are presented was to be eliminated and in its stead, the
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computerized New York State Identification and Information System 
(NYSIIS or, later, NYSID) printout of the defendant's arrest history 
was to be stapled to the PSR with any open dispositions to be updated 
by hand on the actual computer paper; 4) PSRs for all bailed 
defendants were to be submitted within two weeks to promote 
calendaring efficiency; 5) the Correction Department would 
automatically bus detained inmates to court holding pens within 72 
hours of conviction to allow P.O.'s to conduct multiple interviews of 
PSR subjects in rapid succession, eliminating the need for P.O.'s to 
visit convictees in any other correctional facility; and 6) P.O.'s 
were to be authorized to accumulate a maximum of 20 hours overtime a 
week to complete PSRs.
This directive met with immediate resistance from P.O.'s, with 
the union leader widely quoted in the press that "a two-week 
investigation is no investigation at all," complaining that "(t]he 
Mayor does not know what a presentence report entails."* Later, 
when the United Probation Officers' Association (UPOA) sued the City 
in Manhattan Supreme Court to reinstall the traditional four week time 
frame for PSRs, the Criminal Justice Coordinator maintained that 
P.O.'s could "do a reasonable job within a two week period," while the 
Probation Department's Deputy Commissioner admitted that there were 
"definite problems" with the new schedule but that only "in some
ln2-Wk. Probation Report a Laugh: Union Leader," New York
Daily News 10 March 1981, p. 15.
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cases," would two weeks not be enough time to complete a PSR.*
Tliis same Deputy Commissioner, in reaction to staff 
resistance, convened a task force to review the new PSI proceedures. 
Composed of representatives of all levels of probation staff, the task 
force was scheduled to meet four times during the Summer of 1981, but 
because of a disastrous first meeting which ended in acrimony over 
perceived "after the fact" input from line officers to changes already 
institutionalized, it was decentralized to the county level, as each 
probation branch was encouraged to forge their own proceedures within 
established criteria to fine-tune the speed-up.
As a member of this task force, I was told by the Deputy 
Commissioner that the pro forma PSR should be viewed as not just a 
stop-gap measure but as "the wave of the future," since "probation is
no longer in the business of treatment primarily, but rather serving
2as a secondary social control agent." This viewpoint in essence 
identified the primary use of PSRs as diagnostic devices and, arguing 
that the medical model no longer appertained, concluded that they 
could be modified so as to fulfill the statutory requirement, itself 
viewed as an artifact of the treatment-oriented view of sentencing. 
This rationale advanced by probation administrators represented a 
ratification of the previous decade's denunciation of PSRs as
^''Probation Union May Sue to Nullify Keating Order," The 
Chief, 28 July 1981, p. 3.
2Interview with Kevin Benoit, Deputy Commissioner for 
Planning, N.Y.C. Probation Department, 17 June 1981.
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meaningless in the sentencing decision because of plea bargaining, 
while at the same time endorsing the justice model of corrections 
which holds that interposition of rehabilitation treatment concepts in 
a coercive context lends itself to abuse, the avoidance of which 
outweighs any potential benefits. Such a synthesis however, ignores 
the "social control" contribution PSRs can make to sentencing, as 
demonstrated by our study of their impact in Brooklyn Supreme Court.
It is instructive to note in this context that the principal architect 
of the speed-up, the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinator, like his 
predecessor and successors, was a former assistant district attorney 
(who later was appointed to the bench by the Mayor and ironically now 
is an administrative judge).
Thus, the only ally for line P.O.'s discouraged by 
administrative dismissal of PSRs as moribund survivors in a system 
geared more toward efficient than individualized justice, was the 
judiciary.
Judicial Reaction
From the outset, court administrators and individual judges 
were critical of the revised PSI process. This was partially 
attributable to their perception that the Koch administration had once 
again set up the judiciary as "the fall guy" for systemic conditions 
that reduced the efficiency of the courts in general, and contributed 
to jail overcrowding in particular. In a testy exchange in the Spring 
of 1981, the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge of the city's court
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system--which is funded and managed by the State--refuted the Mayor's 
charge that the courts could reduce overcrowding through bail review, 
claiming that such reviews were already institutionalized and new 
reviews could not produce "dramatic results," since judges would 
continue to use the same bail criteria, regardless of over­
crowding.* Later, when the City was forced to release over 600 
detainees by Judge Lasker, Mayor Koch blamed the lack of court 
cooperation for the politically embarrasing outcome, claiming 
that judicial foot-dragging prevented expeditious case processing.
But the major reason for judicial resistance was the resultant
reduced content and quality of the PSRs--a reduction which a State
2audit in May of 1981 confirmed. In testimony before the New York 
State Assembly Codes Committee, a number of New York City Supreme 
Court judges claimed that the new PSRs were "lacking in proper 
sentencing information," "too skimpy," and led to sentencing delays to 
obtain more information, since judges did not want to risk imposing 
improper sentences on the basis of "wholly inadequate" reports."*
1"Panel In Conflict Over Jail Release," New York Times, 9 
June 1985, pp. 1, 46.
2New York State Legislative Commission on Expenditure 
Review, State Division of Probation Programs Program Audit (Albany, 
June 1982), p. 29.
^Ibid. Also see, "Judge Assails City Agency on Its 
Presentence Reports," New York Times 14 October 1981, p. 29; and 
"Justice Aides in Dispute Over Lag in Sentencing," New York Times 3 
October 1981, p. 29.
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My interviews and contacts with Brooklyn Supreme Court judges 
during this same period indicated that this response reflected not 
merely irritation over the lack of consultation by the City in 
drafting the new format, but also arose out of a genuine concern that 
defendants would be improperly sentenced. Most judges reacted with 
particular vehemence to the substitution of NYSID printouts for the 
formerly detailed legal history section, pointing out that NYSID 
arrest records were already available to the court, the ADA and 
defense counsel at the time of plea. What they needed most was a 
"fleshing out" of these arrests, verification of prior felony 
convictions and dispositions of the arrests listed, the last component 
being frequently absent from the computerized listings. The Probation 
Department had thus institutionalized a dubious reform suggested four 
years earlier by the Economic Development Council, later highlighted 
by the Morgenthau Committee, without ever researching its validity.
A Probation Department memorandum (dated 24 July 1981) relates 
the judicial reaction to the "revisions in PSI protocol:"
 the feedback we have received from the judiciary clearly
indicates that a revision of the original guidelines is in order 
at this time. Judges have complained that the NYSID reports they 
received were often illegible and even when legible they were too 
often sketchy and uninformative. The Judges have therefore 
insisted that we no longer attach the NYSID sheets to our PSI 
reports. They want us to resume our former practice of including 
all the NYSID sheet information within the body of the PSI report.
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This will, of course, include the dispositional data on all 
arrests. Additionally, the Judges have complained that they have 
found the disposition data alone is inadequate and they have 
therefore requested that we [return to providing] them with brief 
thumbnail sketches of significant prior arrests.*
Although the legal history section was restored to the PSR, 
criticism continued to pour in from other actors in the system who 
were beginning to feel the effects of the March reforms. Thus, in a 
letter dated 7 August 1981, the State Director of the Division of 
Probation (the agency which provides half of the funding for the 
City's probation system and monitors local compliance with State rules 
and regulations) appealed to the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinator 
to revise the City's PSR policy in light of the many complaints he had 
received from other agencies in the justice system:
We must all understand that the PSR is not only used by the 
courts for sentencing, but by the New York State Department of 
Correctional Services in classifying inmates and by the New York 
State Division of Parole in parole decision-making. I am 
enclosing copies of letters received from both of these agencies 
during the past week complaining about PSI's from New York City.
It appears that with the arrival of the new inmates, a large 
number of them are being classified to maximum security by the
^Memorandum from A1 Garfinkel, Deputy Commissioner,
Management Services, Department of Probation, to Kevin Benoit, 
"Revisions in PSI Protocol," 24 July 1981.
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classification committee due to the lack of necessary information 
which would ordinarily be contained in the presentence 
investigation. This creates problems in attempting to secure the 
necessary bedspace....we must now develop a format for PSI's that 
will meet the needs of both the courts and the other agencies that 
rely heavily on PSI's for decision-making.*
Thus, on 20 August 1981, as the result of continuing
complaints, the City acceded to the demands of court, correctional,
parole and probation administrators and scrapped the short-lived
2"Condensed Generic PSI Report."
In the end, despite a further lengthening of the PSR 
turn-around time for jailed defendants from two to three weeks, the 
Probation Department and the judiciary both responded with alacrity to 
the jail overcrowding crisis. Of 1,130 jailed defendants awaiting 
sentencing in March, 1981, only 30 remained unsentenced six months 
later.3 Despite the speedy processing of these defendants, most of 
whom received prison terms (the State Department of Correction, beset 
by similar overcrowding, was joined to the federal suit as a 
co-defendant for failure to take speedy delivery of such inmates from
^Letter from Thomas J. Callanan, Director of N.Y. State 
Division of Probation, to Robert Keating, N.Y.C. Criminal Justice 
Coordinator, 7 August 1981.
^Memorandum from Townsend Barnett, Deputy Commissioner,
Adult Court Services, to Kevin Benoit, A1 Garfinkel, Assistant 
Commissioners, Branch Chiefs, et al.
^N.Y.S. Legistative Commission, State Division of Probation 
Audit, p. S-3.
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the City), overcrowded jails remained the norm throughout the city, 
state and federal correctional systems for the next two years. 
(Ironically, the state's request to lease federal prison space in July 
of 1981 was rejected by the Bureau of Prisons because its own 
population was nearing capacity).
Finally, in the Fall of 1983, with the City's inmate 
population nearing 11,000 in a system with a capacity of 10,300 and no 
remedy in sight, Judge Lasker capped the population, forcing the City 
to release 611 pre-trial inmates. The Department of Correction 
screened its population and released the "least dangerous" detainees, 
which, according to its criteria, consisted of those with the lowest 
bail and/or charged with non-violent crimes. A number of these 
releasees were subsequently re-arrested (one on the subway ride home 
from Riker's Island) and almost one in five subsequently failed to 
appear in court. Publicity surrounding these events caused a public 
uproar (despite assurances that the percentage of releasee absconders 
was almost equivalent to the general pre-trial failure to appear rate) 
and prompted a 16 month inquiry by the State Investigation Commission.
The Commission's six members issued three separate reports in 
June of 1985, which sharply disagreed in apportioning blame for the 
episode. Three conn issioners blamed a lack of coordination among the 
component agencies of the criminal justice system and recomnended the 
creation of "a true interagency criminal-justice system on a statewide 
level" modeled after the U.S. Department of Justice which emphasized 
planning, "coordination, conmunication and cooperation." This report,
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authored by Charles Hynes, a former prosecutor, envisioned the pooling 
of state and local correctional resources to better manage 
overcrowding and, while acknowledging the need for the judiciary to 
remain independent of political control, criticized the lack of 
judicial cooperation with the City as "an extreme example of judicial 
noninvolvement.
Two other commissioners, in a report authored by Bernard
Smith, former Suffolk County District Attorney, rejected the Hynes
call for a statewide unified justice system because it threatened the
autonomy of local district attorneys and blamed the defense of the
federal suit presented by the City Law Department for failing to
emphasize the proactive measures which New York undertook to deal with
the overcrowding. The Smith report also reconmended: short and long
range planning by correction agencies; State cooperation in accepting
"state ready" prisoners; and "expedited production of probation
reports" to "speed up the sentencing process and...allow for an
2earlier delivery of prisoners to the state." This report also 
recommended exploring "the current trend towards privatization of 
correction facilities, on both a state and local l e v e l . T h e  third 
report, by Commissioner Thomas Culhane, a former police officer, 
blamed the City for not building more jail cells: "For four years
^Temporary State Commission of Investigation, Report on 
Release of New York City Inmates (New York: June, 1985), p. 15.
2Ibid., p. 5. 3Ibid., p. 8.
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they did nothing until the patience of Judge Lasker was
exhausted."* Of all the reports, Culhane's was the most sympathetic
to the judiciary, praising its resistance to bail reduction as a
solution to the problem and declaring that "judges...must never
consider an overcrowding problem when imposing sentence. The length
of incarceration should be based on the severity of the crime and not
influenced by a governmental failure to provide the necessary jail 
2space."
Both the Smith and Culhane reports were adamant in their
opposition to the Hynes proposal for unification of the justice
system. Culhane argued that the system, despite the competition of
its constituent agencies with their "countervailing interests,"
nonetheless "achieved honest results because of its built in checks
and balances."^ Smith encapsulated in one question the larger
problem which the crisis posed--and which any consideration of endemic
correctional underfunding must address--"How do you coordinate a
system that was never meant to be coordinated and, indeed, should
4remain constitutionally divorced?"
The Changing Function of 
The Presentence Investigation
Despite a continuing trend across the United States during the
ilbid., p. 9. 2Ibid., p. 11. 3Ibid., p. 19. 
4"Panel in Conflict," p. 46.
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past decade toward adoption of the justice model of corrections, which 
favors uniformity and fairness in the processing of offenders, and 
attendant limitation of sentencing and parole-granting discretion, the 
presentence report has survived, even in those jurisdictions where 
parole and the indeterminate sentence have been abolished. Although 
its prevalence has traditionally varied widely from state to state, 
half of the 50 states require a PSR before imposition of a felony or 
probation-eligible sentence.* Thus, while the PSR's utility for 
correctional institutions, parole boards and parole officers 
diminishes (although 36 states still retain an indeterminate 
sentencing structure, according to the most comprehensive recent 
survey conducted in 1985), it still provides significant assistance 
to its primary user, the sentencing judge, since some jurisdictions 
which have adopted sentencing guidelines and fixed penalties are now 
using the PSR as the instrument for determining aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances that allow deviation from legislatively 
prescribed sanctions.
In 1984 the Congress enacted sweeping reforms of Title 18 of 
the U.S. Code affecting criminal procedure ("The Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984"). In effect, the new legislation, which will
1American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Sentencing 
Alternatives and Procedures (New York: Institution of Judicial 
Administration, 1968), pp. 202-3.
^Shane-DuBrow, et al., Sentencing Reform in the United 
States, pp. 282-83.
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begin to take effect in late 1987, phases out parole over a five year
period and severely limits the indeterminate sentencing scheme that
has predominated in federal jurisprudence for half a century. In
fact, presently (and until the newly created Federal Sentencing
Coranission's guidelines are approved by Congress), only a handful of
offenses are considered probation ineligible in federal court,
principally those "punishable by death or by life imprisonment."*
And unlike most states, there is no "predicate felony" statute on the
federal level, with the result that second and third felony offenders
still are eligible for non-incarceration penalties.
At recent hearings of the Sentencing Commission in U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Commission
discussed the revised role of the P.O. in the sentencing process as a
"fact finder" concentrating on gathering information related to the
2offender's legal history and the details of the crime. Under a 
point system which assigns fixed weights to certain variables, the 
predominant emphasis will be on the present offense and prior criminal 
record, with social history and rehabilitative potential relegated to 
very minor importance in the scoring system that will determine 
sanctions and their severity.
*Rule 32(e), Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18, United 
States Code.
^Hearing, 21 October 1986, U.S. Courthouse, Foley Square,
New York.
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In this justice model of sentencing, the P.O.'s major role 
during the PSI might very well consist of mediating an agreement 
between the Assistant U.S. Attorney and defense counsel to resolve 
conflicting arrest, court and correctional data present in the 
record. In fact, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
envisages the P.O.'s major function under the new system, as indeed it 
has always been, will be to advise the court on the appropriate 
sentence. In so doing, the P.O.'s discretion will be limited by the 
guidelines and the PSR will undoubtedly be subjected to much more 
rigorous analysis by defense attorneys. While a social work trained 
P.O.'s analysis of an offender's social history is more susceptible to 
challenge--given the inexact nature of the social sciences--it seems 
likely that the P.O.'s expertise in ferreting out court and 
correctional data will continue to give the PSR an important role to 
play, even in a justice model-oriented sentencing process.
Victim Impact Statements: Another
Important Component of the PSR
There has also been a growing trend since the 1970's to make 
the criminal justice system more responsive to victims. This has 
evidenced itself in the assignment of more female police officers and 
prosecutors to sex abuse
cases, and in the establishment of victim service agencies as adjuncts 
of prosecutorial agencies, to cite two popular examples. In addition, 
administrative changes in court and prosecutorial case processing,
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with many jurisdictions assigning the same judge and/or prosecutor 
from arrest (or indictment) to disposition, has produced an ancillary 
benefit of allowing complainants to track progress of the case more 
readily (and avoid multiple interviews with newly assigned 
prosecutors), in addition to speeding adjudication of the case.
As part of this trend, many states as well as the Congress, 
have enacted legislation requiring that "victim impact statements" be 
made available to the sentencing judge. In most instances, the PSR 
has been mandated as the vehicle through which this statement is to be 
delivered. Thus, in 1982, New York State amended its Criminal 
Procedure Law to require inclusion in the PSR of "the consequences of 
the (felony) offense for the victim, including the extent of the 
physical injury or economic loss and the amount of restitution sought 
by the victim."* Despite the fact that PSR's in New York City have 
traditionally contained a "complainant's statement" section (since at 
least the 1920's), the new law was widely reported as an 
innovation. Indeed, Elizabeth Holtzman's successful 1981 campaign for 
the post of Kings County District Attorney highlighted the need for 
the judiciary to be more responsive to victims in their sentencing 
decisions. And publicity attending the signing of the new law by the 
Governor emphasized that the PSI had previously dealt "with the
^Chapter 612 of the New Laws of 1982, amending New York 
State Penal Law Section 1.05 and Criminal Procedure Law Section 390.30.
^New York City Department of Probation, Manual for 
Presentence Investigations, 1975 edition, p. 15.
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convicted felon, not the victim."*
This episode, and many others previously discussed, illustrate 
the viewpoint, predominant among criminal justice managers and the 
political community, of the PSR and probation itself as a "treatment" 
oriented vestige of the medical model of corrections. On the other 
hand, the legal community often assails the PSR and probation for a 
lack of client-oriented rehabilitation plans and being too closely 
allied with the prosecutorial viewpoint.
Such contradictory criticisms can be seen as by-product of
popular displeasure with a judiciary perceived as too dispassionate
and too independent in an era of rising crime, while at the same time
reflecting increasing judicial discomfort over the introduction of
justice model concepts into a probation conmunity engulfed by record
numbers of supervisees and the lack of individualization such case
loads dictate. In response, "privately commissioned" PSR's have
become more commonly used by the defense bar, but have
failed to usurp probation in this sphere because of the private PSR's
2inherent advocacy function.
Yet, the PSR remains resillient, as a fine-tuning mechanism 
for sentence bargains, as an arbiter of sentencing guideline formulas, 
as a case management tool for correctional agencies, and as a vehicle
l"New Law to Aid Victims," New York Daily News 10 August 
1982, p. 5.
^Thomas Rodgers and Thomas Gitchoff, "The Privately 
Commissioned Pre-Sentence Report: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach," 2 
Criminal Justice Journal (Spring 1979): 271-79.
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for providing some measure of victim and offender catharsis in an 
often times impersonal bureaucratic setting.
Conclusion
This dissertation, in attempting to determine the impact of 
PSR's on sentencing decisions, has found confirmation for its salutory 
effect on plea bargains. Since sentence bargains are frequently 
engineered without due consideration to the plethora of options 
available to the court beyond the basic dichotomous decision of 
whether to incarcerate or release an offender, the PSR is frequently 
used to adjust such bargains, most often within the limits of change 
which can be accomodated without jeopardizing the plea, but also, in a 
suprising number of cases the PSR leads to substantial modification 
of, or dissolution, of the sentence bargain. It has found that in New 
York, probation is often bloodied by the countervailing pull and push 
of executive and judicial branch tensions. And our study suggests 
that despite dramatic changes in the sentencing process since the 
presentence investigation was bom, including the ascendency of 
prosecutorial influence in determining the final parameters of most 
convictions, itself an outgrowth of public support for a more 
incapacitation oriented justice system, the presentence report will 
remain a necessary ancillary tool of any sentencing or correctional 
scheme that does not regard its deviant population as "entirely 
fungible."
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Indeed, as David Rothman predicted in a 1983 essay which 
traced the history of sentencing reform in the United States, the 
momentum for determinate sentencing appears to have slowed 
considerably within the past year, and it is not altogether clear as 
of this writing whether the U.S. Sentencing Commission's proposed 
reforms will survive congressional review.
But whether discretionary power is shifted to other actors in 
the system or remains in its more visible judicial guise, we can only 
hope, with Professor Rothman, that the ascendancy of the quantitative 
analyst and "the search for mathematical precision in sentencing"* 
will yield to a realization within the criminal justice community that 
rigid formulas, much like the "treatment modalities" of previous 
generations, promise much more than they can ever hope to deliver.
*David J. Rothman, "Sentencing Reform in Historical 
Perspective," Crime and Delinquency 29 (No. 4, 1983): 646.
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